How Agents Make Money Out Of Rookie Contracts

September 26th, 2014

(originally posted elsewhere)

The general rule for agents is that their earnings off of negotiated player contracts are capped at 4% of the player’s salary. Indeed, 4% is an assumed amount unless otherwise agreed upon, as outlined in section 3(B) of the Standard Player Agent Contract:

If the Player receives compensation in excess of the minimum compensation applicable under the CBA for one or more playing seasons, the Agent shall receive a fee of four percent (4%) of the compensation received by the Player for each such playing season, unless a lesser percent (%) or amount has been agreed to by the parties […]

In practice, this 4% is rarely deviated from. 4% is the norm, and rarely is it any different, especially in contracts involving the more powerful agents. There was an intriguing case involving Antoine Walker and agent Mark Bartelstein some years ago, in which Bartelstein had agreed the fairly unusual concession upon Antoine’s signing of a contract with Atlanta of lowering his standard fee from 4% at the time of signing to 3%, at the player’s discretion, if it was felt that Bartelstein ‘wasn’t doing a good job’. (The case went to arbitration over a disagreement over quite what that phrasing meant, and of how much Walker had to pay him. It was not in dispute that Walker owed Bartelstein, but merely how much, based on the arbiter’s findings of whether Walker was entitled to pay only 3% or not. Bartelstein won the case and was awarded a judgement of $671,373.) But this case stands out for its novelty, and is certainly not par for the course.

However, the same handbook adds a few other criteria. In section 3(A) immediately preceding the previous paragraph, it states this:

If the Player receives only the minimum compensation under the NBA-NBPA collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) applicable for the playing season or seasons covered by the individual contract, the Agent shall receive a fee of two percent (2%) of the compensation received by the player for each such season, unless a lesser percent (%) or amount has been agreed to by the parties […]

Section 3(A) is itself an odd one. It protects the player somewhat, in that their smallest possible payday is not made too much smaller by an agent’s cut, yet it penalises the agent. Minimum salaries are arguably the hardest contracts to get, because so many people are worthy of them, and yet because so many are worthy of them, it is even harder to get any significant amount of guaranteed compensation on them. For more work, then, comes less reward.

However, there exists a protocol these days for players drafted early in the second round – or, as is increasingly prevalent, anywhere in the second round – to sign contracts for longer than the two year maximum allowed by the minimum salary exception. Teams are using their mid-level exceptions or cap space, both of which provide for a maximum of four years in this scenario, to sign their players to a three year contract, and sometimes even a four year one. And because using the mid-level exception or cap space does not tie the player nor the team to the minimum salary, these players almost always get more than the minimum in the first season of the contract, before normally earning the minimum for the two years thereafter.

This season, the minimum salary for rookies is $507,336. A player signing a two year minimum salary contract this season – for the sake of argument, let us pretend all salaries included in this hypothetical are fully guaranteed – would thus earn $507,336 this season and $845,059 the next – 2% of that total for the agent would be $27,048. However, if the contract negotiated was actually a three year deal, paying $650,000 in the first year and the minimum in the following two, that would be a total contract of $2,475,490, on which an agent will earn $62,510 (getting 4% of the $650,000 in year one and 2% of the $1,825,490 for the combined two years of minimum salary). The player gets more money too (although the Omer Asik and Jeremy Lin affairs are testament as to whether three year contracts are really beneficial to the player and his representatives, while the Chandler Parsons saga really rather disproves the value of a fourth year), yet the agents get a significant pay increase for what are ostensibly negligible tweaks to the contract. The difference between a $507,336 standard minimum and an $800,000 feel-good contract is for the player about 150%, yet for the agent about 300%.

So, that’s why that happens. And yes, it does mean that it is possible for a player to sign for so little above the minimum that it in fact costs them money.

There exists another criterion, too. Immediately after both of the above, Section 3(C) of the Standard Player Agent Contract states:

If the Player is a rookie drafted in the first round of the NBA Draft who receives compensation in accordance with the “Rookie Scale” set forth in Article VIII of the CBA, the Agent shall receive a fee that is the higher of: (i) 4% of the compensation in excess of the 80% amount that is guaranteed under the Rookie Scale; or (ii) the amount payable under subparagraph (A) above by a rookie who receives only the minimum compensation under Article II, Section 6(b) of the CBA, unless a lesser percent (%) or amount has been agreed to by the parties […]

It has long since been established that first rounders, who are eligible for anywhere between 80% and 120% of their pre-determined salary amounts, almost always get the full 120% of it. Indeed, since 2002 and as best as can be ascertained, the only players to take anything less than that full amount have been as follows:

– Raul Lopez (2001, #24; signed in 2002): 80% in year one, 120% thereafter.
– Beno Udoh (2004, #28): 80% in year one, 120% thereafter.
– Yaroslav Korolev (2005, #12): 100% in year one, 97% in year two, 120% in years three and four.
– Sergei Monia (2005, #23): 100% in year one with incentives to reach 120% [see below], 120% thereafter.
– Sergio Rodriguez (2006, #30): 100% all four years.
– Ian Mahinmi (2007, #28): 80% in year one, 80% in year two with incentives to reach 100%, 90% in years three and four with incentives to reach 110% in both [see below].
– George Hill (2008, #26): 120% in years one and two, 80% in years three and four [see below].
– Donte Greene (2008, #28): 100% in all four years with incentives to reach 120%[see below].
– James Anderson (2010, #20): 105% in year one with incentives to reach 120%, 105% in year two with incentives to reach 115%, 107% in year three and four with incentives to reach 117% in both [see below].
– MarShon Brooks (2011, #25): 115% in year one, 120% thereafter.
– Marquis Teague (2012, #29): 100% in year one, 120% thereafter.
– Dennis Schroeder (2013, #17): 100% in year one, 120% thereafter.
– Andre Roberson (2013, #26): 80% in year one, 120% thereafter.

[NB: It is very common for rookie scale contracts to have incentives to reach the full 120%. Very common, in fact – it applies to more than half of all first-round draftees contracts every year. However, these incentives are normally for things such as participating in summer leagues and summer development programs. It is very rare indeed for rookie scale incentives to not be met. Monia and Greene are listed here because they were deemed to be unlikely to be met as opposed to the usual likely, and because they were in fact not met, not in any of the four applicable years for Greene and nor in the one year Monia managed. John Salmons also had incentives that were unusually considered initially to be unlikely in his rookie scale deal, in the same way as those two, but he met them, received the full 120%, and thus is not listed. In Mahinmi’s case, his incentives for years two and three were initially considered likely, and subsequently met, but he never got to his fourth season as his option was declined. Furthermore, as a side note, the 80% amount in George Hill’s third season was so small that it was actually less than the minimum salary, and had to be adjusted upwards to be that instead.]

In the 386 first-round draft picks covered in that time period, those are strongly believed to be the only thirteen players to have not signed for the full 120% of the rookie scale contract. It self-evidently is therefore a rare situation to encounter, especially when it is considered which teams are the ones that do this – of the above, one was done by the as-then New Jersey Nets, one by the Chicago Bulls, one by the Oklahoma City Thunder, one by the Atlanta Hawks, one by the Utah Jazz, one by the Houston Rockets, one by the L.A. Clippers, two by the Portland Trail Blazers and four by the San Antonio Spurs, so it is often times a select practice by a certain team. Other circumstances often play a part – for example, Lopez was only offered 80% on account of missing the previous season due to severe knee injury, and luxury tax concerns played a part in both the Teague and Roberson decisions. Teams will also occasionally leverage the “no one else was going to pick you that high” card in negotiations, as seen with Hill, and as was recently seen with 2014 draft pick Josh Huestis. Even with all these exceptions to the rule, however, the norm is the norm is the norm, and that norm is 120% throughout the life of the contract.

Remember that agents do not get 4% of rookie scale contracts. Instead, they can get only 4% of the amount above the 80%. Therefore, if a payer gets 120%, the agent gets 4% of that 40%, and if the player gets 80%, the agent gets zero. To put that into some actual numbers, the #15 pick in this past draft had a scale amount of $1,546,100 for the 2014/15 season. 80% of that amount is $1,236,880, and 120% of it is $1,855,320. The difference between the two is $618,440, 4% of which is $24,738. This is a decent one year pay day for negotiating a contract normally so automatic that 95% of eligible players get it.

You can see, then, why it is a very big thing for an agent to get his played signed for the full 120%. And so you can see why an agent might do everything in his player to get that full 120%. You can see why they would not wish to work for free. And you can see why they might advise a client taking the 80% tender offer. After all, if the player does that, the agent gets nothing. And that’s not how agents work. So if the only offer on the table is an 80% one, you can see perhaps why an agent might advise against it.

[Edited to note that a decent percentage of agents actually take 0% on rookie contracts, instead making their money off of endorsements. But not all.]

San Antonio Spurs Sign Josh Davis

August 26th, 2014

The San Antonio Spurs have signed Josh Davis, last of San Diego State, to a multi-year contract. The amount of guaranteed money is not yet known.

Davis graduated from San Diego State last season after transferring in from Tulane, where he had spent the previous two seasons after spending his freshman campaign at North Carolina State. The 6’8 athletic forward saw his offensive game regress significantly last season, down to 7.7 points per game from 17.6, shooting only 45.5% from the field down from 49.2%, and struggling badly at the free throw line, hitting only 47.2% from where he had previously shot 71.6%. Nevertheless, he brings to the table athleticism, prolific rebounding and versatile defence, and recently played well for the Charlotte Hornets summer league team, averaging 8.6 points and 10.1 rebounds per game. Should he not make the Spurs’ roster, is a logical and perhaps likely candidate for allocation to the team’s D-League affiliate, the Austin Toros.

With Davis’s signing, the Spurs’ roster now stands at 17. Davis will likely battle fellow camp signees JaMychal Green and Bryce Cotton for what might at best be one roster spot.

Boston Celtics Sign Rodney McGruder And Christian Watford

August 20th, 2014

The Boston Celtics today signed Rodney McGruder and Christian Watford to one year contracts. The levels of guarantee are not yet known, but are expected to be either nominal or nil.

Watford, a jump shooting combo forward, attended summer league this year with both the Detroit Pistons and Golden State Warriors, averaging 8.5 points in two games for Detroit. He has spent the one year of his professional career thus far in Israel. McGruder meanwhile did not appear in summer league for anybody, yet last year spent some time with the Oklahoma City Thunder. The 6’4 off-guard is also only one year into a professional career, spending the bulk of his first campaign in Hungary with Atomeromu, averaging 14.4 points and 5.3 rebounds in 27 minutes a contest.

After signing Tim Frazier earlier in the day, the Celtics roster now stands at 20, the maximum permissible amount in the offseason. Evan Turner, reported to have agreed a deal with the team some weeks ago, has yet to sign it.

Sorry guys, Carmelo Anthony did not get $62 million in advance

August 16th, 2014

(originally posted elsewhere)

For the most part, NBA players are paid on the first and fifteenth of every month, with a standard of 24 paydays per calendar year. Players earning more than the minimum can agree to 12 payments over six months or 36 payments over eighteen months, yet the norm is the norm.

There is room for some further deviation from these standards. Players can receive both advances on their salary, and receive loans from their teams.

There is not, however, room for the amount of deviation that is currently being reported in the case of Carmelo Anthony.

It is being reported in several places around the web, most notably (and I believe initially) the Wall Street Journal, that Melo received 50% of his new $124,064,681 contract in one up front payment. Admittedly, it is not so much expressly stated as it is implied that this is the case, but whichever it is, the idea it spawned that he will or might have already gotten $62 million is wrong. The confusion comes from a misunderstanding about how, when and to what degree NBA contracts can be advanced, a confusion I hope to clarify here.

The first and most important point to make is that salary for a future season can never ever be advanced. NBA seasons begin on July 1st and end on June 30th, so if it is October 6th 2014 and you want an advance on your 2015/16 salary, you are begrudgingly going to have to wait until July 1st 2015 to get so much as a piece of it. This rule alone is enough to show that the idea that Melo received a full 50% of the full life of the contract up front is false.

There is, however, a reason the story exists, for the 50% threshold comes from somewhere. What players earning more than the minimum can do is receive an amount for up to 50% of their annual base salary prior to the November 15th of that season. In practical terms, what that means is if you have a $12 million salary in one season, you can receive up to $6 million of it before November 15th, only 25% of which can be before October 1st. [For minimum salary players, change the 50% limit to a mere 7.5%.] When considering the the previous provision that no salary in future seasons can be advanced, we are now looking at a situation whereby the most a player can receive immediately upon signing a deal is 25% of the first year base salary. And that is considerably less than 50% of the whole shaboodle.

This, then, is what Carmelo did, and therein lies the confusion as to what that 50% designation means. He did not get 50% of his contract up front. He merely will receive some of it earlier than it could have been, in a series of advances stretching throughout the life of the contract.

This is not all that common, but is not unprecedent or rare. Many players – especially rookies on rookie scale contracts who almost always get at least something – have some money advanced to them, and some even have the full 50% designated in this way. As has been cited alongside the Melo story, his team mate J.R. Smith also has this full 50% advance stipulated in his contract, but so do others, including Pau Gasol’s new deal with Chicago, while Cleveland gave 50% advances to all three of LeBron James, Kyrie Irving and Mike Miller this summer. Chris Bosh’s new contract with Miami calls for a highly comparable 40% advance, should we wish to keep naming names. Of all the new contracts handed out this offseason, approximately 50 call for some sort of advance, and while some of those advances are a mere $50,000 or so, some are as big as it gets.

[It is possible that Melo did indeed get his $62 million in advance from a bank or private lender, I suppose. But that is not what was being discussed here, and certainly not what was reported. If this is true, this is coincidental.]

So no, Carmelo did not receive $62,032,340 of his contract up front. At most, he received $5,614,600. We generally do not talk about NBA player payment schedules because, unless you directly pay or receive the checks yourself, they do not matter significantly from the point of view of roster management. However, if we are to do it, we must do so properly.

Jusuf Nurkic revisited

August 7th, 2014

This post from yesterday talks about how Nuggets draftee Jusuf Nurkic was set to receive less than 120% of the rookie scale, the customary amount. And in doing so, it was mentioned that he would be the highest first-round pick to ever do so.

Not quite. It turns out this is a misreporting on my part. Nurkic will receive less than the salary of the 120% rookie scale amount, but he will count on the cap for the 120% amount. Nurkic’s buyout with Cedevita was for larger than the amount NBA teams can pay cap-exempt ($600,000 this season), and while teams are eligible to pay more than that amount in an international player’s buyout, they must do so by putting any amount greater than that paid into the cap hit in the form of a signing bonus. This is not especially to do in a rookie scale contract, with its fixed parameters, but it is doable if sufficiently small. The figures listed for Nurkic were an even $350,000 smaller than what the full rookie scale would have been, and that is the extra amount of buyout Denver paid, charged as a signing bonus.

These rules were known to me, of course, and the practice is not uncommon. Bismack Biyombo, Andrea Bargnani and several others have been in this same situation, getting less than the full 120% in actual salary yet counting against the cap as the full 120% (and to anyone other than the people signing and receiving the cheques, i.e. us team building fans, only the cap number matters). Nevertheless, it was understood in the instance that the figures given were the actual cap hits and thus included the buyout signing bonus. It was counter checked and passed both tests. And yet now the opposite is said to be true, that Nurkic is signed for the full 120%, and that the whole issue is irrelevant.

There is a process we (I) go through in order to get salary information. It does not always work.

Without looking, guess which first-round draft pick didn’t get the full 120% of the rookie scale this year

August 4th, 2014

Answer after the jump.

(this is the jump)

The answer is Jusuf Nurkic of the Denver Nuggets. His contract calls for 108% of the scale in year one ($1,562,680), 107% in year two ($1,642,000), and then 120% in years three and four ($1,921,320 and $2,947,300 respecitvely). That adds him to an exclusive and small club of non-120%ers, including Raul Lopez, George Hill, Ian Mahinmi, James Anderson, Sergio Rodriguez, MarShon Brooks, and probably some others. It is believed that Nurkic, a #16 pick, is the highest drafted player to ever not receive the full amount.

30 Offseason Reviews In 30ish Days: Atlanta Hawks

August 4th, 2014

Completed transactions:

Draft night: Drafted Adreian Payne (15th, signed) and Walter Tavares (43rd, unsigned). Acquired the rights to Lamar Patterson (48th, unsigned) for a future second round pick.
30th June: Traded Lou Williams and the rights to Lucas Nogueira to Toronto in exchange for John Salmons.
10th July: Waived John Salmons.
15th July: Acquired Thabo Sefolosha via sign and trade (three years, $12 million) along with cash and the draft rights to Giorgis Printezis in exchange for the draft rights to Sofoklis Schortsanitis.

 

Agreed upon but not yet completed transactions:

Re-signing Shevlin Mack.
Re-signing Mike Scott
Signing Kent Bazemore.

 

In:

Adreian Payne, Thabo Sefolosha, Kent Bazemore

Out:

Lou Williams, Gustayo Ayon, Elton Brand, Cartier Martin

Words:

On the face of it, Atlanta improved their team. Those incoming players are, or will be, slightly better than those outgoing. Brand is a shell of what he was, Ayon needed upgrading, Williams was not the right fit, and Martin is highly replacable. On the simplest of evaluations, then, things are OK.

The bulk of the Hawks’s offseason business was conducted in one fell swoop with the trade dated 30th June. Williams, a once prolific scorer who has never developed as a point guard and who rather compounded a size problem found throughout Atlanta’s roster, still had his moments as a high-usage volume scorer, but he was eminently replacable on a team prioritising efficient players. Using the rights to Nogueira (a sprightly big with potential but also concerns about his knees) as a crux for dumping Williams’s $5.45 million salary for only the $1 million cap hit of a waived Salmons was deemed an acceptable cost for the cap space gamble.

In return, they receive Sefolosha, a sizeable wing who can guard all comers at two positions, but not without his faults Sefolosha’s very limited offensive game was even more limited last season with the disappearance of his jumpshot, a tool once thought to have become reliable but which regressed back to where it used to be, thus leaving the previous 18 months as a clear outlier. He is, of course, a very limited player and one becoming even more so, not just stopping any attempts to handle the ball in traffic or create his own shot (which is probably best) but regrettably also going away from his ability to rebound in traffic, something he once shone at as a wing player. However, if the jumpshot comes back – or, if the amount of liquid in your glass is trending upwards, when it comes back – Atlanta has added for themselves a proven three and D role player at the wing positions, who can handle the matchups that DeMarre Carroll cannot. Between those two, Al Horford and Mack, Atlanta can guard anyone.

Sefolosha compliments a core of incumbent quality role players. Mike Scott, soon to be re-signed, emerged last year as a very effective bench scorer from both inside and out, with a quality jumpshot slowly being extended to three point range and a . He rebounds poorly is stuck between positions and struggles in all kinds of defensive matchups, but those things merely make him limited and not ineffective – be it via the jump shots, or by timely finishing at the rim (where he is remarkably efficient for a player who needs a running start to be able to dunk), Scott gets points. DeMarre Carroll gets some points now, too, having added a three point jumpshot to his grounded but nuanced defensive game and informed offensive movement. And Kyle Korver, of course, is completely ridiculous, one of the greatest role players that ever took to the game. The Hawks lack star talent, but they do not lack talent. There is young talent, too – Payne is a projectable defender, Mack and Scott are only 50 between them, Jenkins and Mike Muscala the good side of 24, and while Dennis Schroeder has a long way to go, he has shown the reasons why it is OK to believe he will get there.

Atlanta have a good team. The injury to Horford last season should not obscure how wonderfully solid the team was beforehand and will be again. The team moves the ball, shoots and defends, and even if they lack rim protection and any one single elite playmaker, they are a well coached unit with a team full of two-way quality role players (or at least role players very good on one end). If things stay as they are, they will be one of the better teams in the East given a clean bill of health, not on the level of those at the top but a solid playoff seed you would not wish to play against. There is the shooting from Korver, Jenkins and Scott, the defense of Antic, Carroll and Sefolosha, the everything of Horford, the relentless decency of Millsap and Teague. They move the ball, they play as a team, they pay pretty, they play hard, and they play smart. They are good.

However, that is not what this offseason was about. They came into the offseason with a good team already, so it is no victory to leave with one. In a summer in which they had plenty of cap flexibility, some decent picks, and some expendable spare parts who nevertheless had some value, they needed to come out of it with a tangibly better one. And they have not thus far done so. Aside from swapping out Lou Will for Thabo – which may be an improvement in their balance, but certainly not their talent level – the Hawks will likely return the same rotation as last season, which does not really suffice when you have eight figures of cap room and two mid-first round picks (one to use, one unsigned from the previous year) at your disposal.

In trading Williams and Nogueira, all Atlanta returned was cap space they have not subsequently used, and that they did not need to complete the other moves (Scott and Mack could have been re-signed with the Early Bird rights they had anyway, while they already had enough cap room for Thabo and Bazemore). The trade put them in a position to sign a max or near-max free agent, or some combination of other players that added up to that much, but that max free agent is not here and was never especially close to coming here. Atlanta did not blow what they had, but they did nothing to add to it, and they needlessly cost themselves in the process assets that could have made it happen down the road. They went all in on nothing, and came up with nothing.

They probably could have seen it coming. The Hawks made the trade to open up cap room before they had anyone to open up cap room for. They could have done trades to open up this extra cap room – it might not have specifically been for Salmons, but it never needed to specifically be for Salmons. It only specifically needed to be for Salmons if it was to be done before the moratorium. And it did not need to be done before the moratorium. Indeed, it did not need to be done at all. Atlanta lost two decent assets and two decent players and have not a single one of either to show back for it.

What they can do to salvage it is throw a boatload of this surplus money at Greg Monroe. Monroe is the second best player still available, and while he is neither as good as the best available player Eric Bledsoe, nor as good of a fit, he has the distinct advantage of being gettable. [An offer to Bledsoe would just be matched, and all parties know it.] Monroe is still not exactly the true centre the Hawks lack, and his acquisition creates a rotational problem for Mike Budenholzer (one of he, Horford and Millsap is going to have to come off of the bench, because Millsap as a mismatch three is not the percentage play here). Nevertheless, Monroe is at least a truer post player than their current centre crop, an upgrade on Antic and Scott, an infusion of talent, the close-enough filling of a need. He is a very talented player on a team short of very talented players.

There are some whispers that this may happen. It really ought. But until such time, we can only work with what we see. And what we see is a good team with a great hand to play, who misplayed it. No one wanted to sign with Atlanta, again, for whatever reason, yet it was not merely luck or perception that got them in this situation. Losing Lucas Nogueira’s future, whatever it may be, is not the end of the world or a franchise crippler. But it was highly unnecessary.

Sum it up in a quote: “Did not think that one through.”

Josh Huestis’s D-League adventure, a misplaced exercise in loyalty

July 23rd, 2014

(originally published elsewhere)

A few days ago, Darnell Mayberry broke the story that Oklahoma City Thunder draft pick Josh Huestis might spend next year in the D-League, collecting a mere $25,000 or so salary, rather than sign in the NBA. This would be groundbreaking, not as the first first rounder to not sign immediately in the NBA (this happens quite often), but as the first to do so who instead signs in the D-League.

It also makes absolutely no sense on the face of it. As useful as the D-League can be, its salaries are extremely uncompetitive. Players are paid by the league in one of three salary brackets, determined by their ability, and even though Huestis would no doubt be worthy of the highest D-League salary possible, that figure is still paltry. It will be comparable before tax with what an NBA 10 day contract pays, and when I say ‘comparable with’, I mean ‘slightly lower than’.

Huestis would be doing so because the Thunder asked him to, in a pre-arranged deal running unnervingly close to the line. Tom Ziller speculated it, and Zach Lowe confirmed it. The projected second round or undrafted player going in the first round was indeed a eye opener, and it follows that, given that they may have been alone in wanting to take him that high, the Thunder felt they had the leverage to lean on him in this way. Apparently, to agent Mitchell Butler, the fact that it is the Thunder makes it all worthwhile.

An analogous situation here is that of George Hill with the San Antonio Spurs in 2008. The Spurs took the IUPUI guard in the first round when no one expected them to, and used this as a means of leveraging him into accepting less than the customary 120% on his rookie scale contract (one of only a handful of players ever to do so). Hill ended up with a contract paying 120% in the first two years but then only 80% in the final two – indeed, his 80% in the third year was such a low amount that it was actually lower than the minimum salary, and so the NBA had to modify his salary upwards to the league minimum.

Huestis, however, is all in for more than that. Rather than just taking less in his rookie deal, he is forgoing a year of salary altogether, save for some D-League dregs. And why? Because….well, because he’s nice. Or loyal. Or gullible. Or some combination thereof.

The NBA draft is a bizarre vehicle at the best of times. Bartered between the league, its teams and its current players – and not, it must be remembered, those it will actually effect – the draft is a means of controlling any young player worth a damn. Young players are told where they are going to play, and pretty much told how much they are going to play for. Now, apparently, they are also to have even less control as to when they can do it.

Only one party benefits here, and that is the Thunder. Huestis gains little apart from the thanks of the Thunder, and all that will get him is a 120% rookie scale deal next summer, one he ought be entitled to receive this summer anyway.

Players drafted in the first round are bound by the rookie salary scale for their first three years after being selected, a predetermined amount of money they must sign for in which they have very little say. They can sign for as much as 80% of the amount or as much as 120%, and any amount in between, but nothing more or less than that. To keep a first-round pick’s draft rights, the team must offer a ‘required tender’ on or before the July 15th immediately after the draft (or, if applicable if the player does not sign in that first season, any relevant subsequent seasons). That required tender must be a contract that satisfies the requirements of the Rookie Salary Exception, which means it must be a rookie scale contract of a permissible amount.

Offering 80% of the rookie scale would suffice to meet this criteria. Just to have Huestis’s draft rights, then, the Thunder are required to offer him a guaranteed two year contract worth $1,579,459 – 80% of the rookie scale $918,000 for the 29th pick in the first year ($734,400), and then $845,059 in year two (the sophomore minimum, for it is larger than the $767,520 that 80% of the second year rookie scale salary of $958,400 would offer). That is the bare minimum amount of money available to Huestis today – in all likelihood, he would also be a strong candidate to have his third year option of $980,431 (again a modified minimum amount) and his fourth year option of $1,769,678 both exercised, for a total minimum tender offer of $4,329,568. That is on the table right now, at the bare minimum, and $1,579,459 of it is his regardless.

And of course, all this assumes the Thunder do not move beyond the 80% at any point. Were Huestis to take the full 120%, he would earn $5,621,236 over those same four years, with $2,252,880 guaranteed in the first two. That is what he is turning down for less than $30,000 in the D-League. And all because they asked. Even if we assume it really is a case of 80% if he does not play ball and 120% if he does, that is still (assuming a $25,000 D-League salary, which is a slightly lower amount than what his D-League salary will actually be) a $1,579,459 guaranteed salary over two years or a $2,287,880 salary over three.

Therefore, even if the Thunder really do only offer more than the 80% if Huestis goes to the D-League first (which we cannot decisively say is true), and take this stance even more strongly by declining his third year option, Huesties will still earn more by taking the tender and a subsequent $980,431 minimum salary. He would do without the shackles of his drafting team being the only one he can negotiate with, and he would also do it without the burden of restricted free agency, for players who had rookie scale options declined cannot be made into restricted free agents. Huestis therefore sacrifices money and freedom in order to gain……errr, support? Thanks? A salary increase that does not offset the salary towelling he takes in the interim?

(If the Thunder rescinded the tender, which they are allowed to do, they would not be allowed to sign him as a free agent until Huestis had signed with another NBA team first, and either completed that contract or was waived.)

Moreover, all this ignores one thing. If Huestis really is not going to sign in the NBA next year, fine, but this does not mean it has to be the D-League. He and his representatives agreed to go to the D-League, sure, but there is nothing binding them to it save for a promise. There are plenty of good leagues with plenty of good money that Huestis, a player who just gave his marketable skill away for free for four years, ought consider.

Maybe he really means it when he says he doesn’t want to go to Europe. But Emmanuel Mudiay probably didn’t think going overseas was the best idea, either, until someone offered him a million dollars to reconsider. Brandon Jennings likely had not considered it at one point, either, until the sheer size of the paycheck changed a few minds. Huestis stands to gain very little from this agreement, least of all money. The playing time and development excuses will probably be bandied about as a reason for Huestis’s decision, but if he thinks he cannot get playing time and development opportunities in Europe, with the right gig, then he has not been looking.

Accept the tender, Josh. They are contractually compelled to give it to you and you are surely morally bound to take it. If you only get the 80%, then, well, you were otherwise only going in the second round anyway, where two guaranteed years is no automatic thing. Take it and play no games. Get yours. The Thunder can make you promises that I have absolutely no doubt they intend to keep. But promises get broken. Read Keith Glass’s book, for example. It happens.

It may well work out exactly the way you forecast it will. Indeed, I have no doubts that it will. No one is entering this agreement with the intent to break it. But that does not make it worth it. A million dollars is yours right now with one phone call, and you’re walking away from it, under the guise of some greater good. It might not be there next time, fella, because as much as everyone is on board now, things change. Take it. Risk nothing. In risking it, you gain nothing. Accept the tender they are obliged to give you. Force their hand. Win that spot off Hasheem Thabeet. Start your NBA career. Live your dream. Get paid a million to do it.

And if they rescind it? Congratulations. Enjoy the free market. It’ll pay you more than this conscription ever would.

The Following Players Are Untradeable

July 21st, 2014

What Is A Cap Hold And Why Does It Matter?

July 20th, 2014

The calculation of a team’s cap space would, you would hope, be as easy as looking at their owed contracts to both current and waive players, and subtracting it from the salary cap amount for that year.

Nope, not close.

There are a few extra things that go into the determination of a team’s “team salary” amount, and by association that team salary amount’s proximity to the salary cap thresholds. And of these extra things, the most important, obvious and prevalent are things we know as “cap holds”. There are two types of cap hold – a free agent’s cap hold, and a draft pick’s cap hold.

The first one, the free agent cap hold, is the most common. A free agent’s cap hold is an amount of money that is charged to your team’s salary cap number, even though the player is not under contract. This is a deliberate ploy that exists to close a loophole; if free agent cap holds did not exist, it is theoretically possible for a team to have its entire roster become free agents at the same time, have their entire cap to spend on other team’s free agents, and then use Bird rights to re-sign their own ones afterwards. That would be disingenuous and would create a rather ludicrous situation whereby there would be no incentive to ever sign a long term deal. In having cap holds, your free agents eat into your cap room, forcing you to prioritise a bit better. The juggling of these priorities is a key component in team building and roster management.

There are multiple ways to get rid of a cap hold. Firstly, if you waive a player, they are automatically removed, and so will not have a cap hold. Secondly, if a player signs with another NBA team, they also no longer have a cap hold to their former team. Thirdly, if a player retires (by which it is meant that he properly retires, sending official retirement paperwork to the league, and not just informally saying that they have retired), then their free agent cap hold (or ‘free agent amount’) is removed too. And fourthly, teams can just ask for them to be removed, which is called ‘renouncing’ the cap holds.

Players often do not formally retire until they are eligible for their NBA pension, as there is no incentive to do so prior to that. This all can lead to a situation whereby players from years past can have cap holds outstanding to teams they have not played for for years – unless the team has had cap space which has meant renouncing these redundant cap holds for space, there is no reason to renounce them. There is also no reason not to renounce them, yet they gather up over time as archaic relics more than through any conscious effort to keep them around.

There used to be a reason to keep them around. Once upon a time, having a free agent’s cap hold, no matter when they were last with the team, meant that the team could still incorporate that player (if they were willing) into sign and trades as salary filler for trades. It would have been an extremely unlikely thing to imagine happening had it not happened twice at the 2007 trade deadline, when both the long-departed Aaron McKie and Keith Van Horn were both signed and traded to complete deals while being unofficially retired. And all they had to do to be eligible was never file the retirement paperwork.

This, however, is no longer permissible under the 2011 CBA. Now, only players who finished the season immediately prior can now be signed and traded, and the ancient the cap holds remain only as archaic relics. They are not automatically renounced unless the retirement paperwork is filed, which, as seen above, it rarely is. Similarly, if a player’s contract with an NBA team expires without him going through waivers, and he then signs with a non-NBA team, he will continue to have a cap hold until he is renounced. (Only if he signs with another NBA team, as mentioned in point two above, does it disappear.) As such, these things pile up and affect a team’s salary cap picture.

When teams have set themselves up for cap room, they renounce these basically useless free agent amounts to maximize how much room they have. For example, in the summer of 2007, Milwaukee, Orlando and Memphis all figured to have cap room, and so they renounced all their free agents who were not under contract. These included players from previous years; Orlando renounced Darko Milicic, Grant Hill, Andrew DeClercq, Stacey Augmon, Jaren Jackson, Mark Jones, Shawn Kemp, Sean Rooks, Bo Outlaw and Olumide Oyedeji; Milwaukee renounced Reece Gaines, Jermaine Jackson, Ervin Johnson, Toni Kukoc, Jiri Welsch, Ruben Patterson, Brian Skinner, Jared Reiner and Earl Boykins; and Memphis renounced Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf, Junior Harrington, Lawrence Roberts, Mike Batiste, Antoine Carr, Kevin Edwards, Antonis Fotsis, Dahntay Jones, Will Solomon and Doug West. This year, in their first pursuit of cap room for some years, the L.A. Lakers renounced a whole load of free agent cap holds, ranging from Pau Gasol and Kent Bazemore of last season all the back to Brian Shaw and John Salley from their three-peat days. As seen above, Shaw and Salley never played for another NBA team after the Lakers, never filed their retirement paperwork, were not waived in their last contract, and had never previously been renounced for cap space because the Lakers had not had any in the years since they left. And as such, their cap holds were still kicking around, despite how meaningless they become.

The cap hold that each free agent has varies, and is dependent on how much the salary in the final year of their last NBA contract was. The cap hold is a percentage of that salary, and is also dependent on what kind of free agent rights the team has on that player. The exact parameters can be found in question 38 of Larry Coon’s eternally beautiful CBA FAQ.

When a free agent is renounced, the team can still re-sign that player. However, they do lose the ability to re-sign them with Bird rights. This means that to re-sign them, they need to use cap space or a cap exception. And this, of course, makes it difficult to re-sign them. Normally, then, if a player is renounced, they are not coming back. What you do sometimes however see is a player with a big cap hold be renounced so as to accommodate other players into the cap room, then re-sign for a smaller amount of it later, or via the new Room Exception (an exception that teams get as well as cap space, as opposed to all other exceptions, which are instead of cap space). An example of that this year would be Kirk Hinrich, whose $5.7 million cap hold was an obstacle to Chicago’s cap space plans, but who agreed to re-sign for the amount of the room exception, and who they thus renounced even though they intend to keep him.

The other type of cap hold is the draft pick cap hold. Specifically, it is the first round draft pick cap hold, as second round draft picks do not have them.

Back in the day, first round picks were allowed to sign for whatever they could get. This, however, started to get ridiculous as negotiations (aided by the very real threat of holdouts) started to reach 10 years and tens of millions of dollars. So starting with the 1995 CBA, the league and players union collectively bargained the rookie salary scale. Depending on where they are drafted, first round picks now have a set contract amount that they can sign for, the actual amount changing slightly year by year. The only allowed variance is that players can sign for between 80% and 120% of the amount. In practice, almost everyone takes the full 120%, and on only a handful of occasions has that not been true.

Almost every first round pick signs in the year they were drafted. There are currently only four first round picks from drafts prior to 2014 that have never signed their rookie deals, one of whom (Lucas Nogueira) is about to. The other three are Fran Vasquez (Orlando, 2005), Petteri Koponen (Dallas, 2007) and Livio Jean-Charles (San Antonio, 2013). When a first round pick does not sign their rookie scale deal, however, their team nevertheless still have a cap hold charged to their cap number. And that amount is equal to 100% of that season’s rookie scale salary amount.

This means, then, that Koponen are Vasquez were eating into their team’s cap space. This is why you sometimes see numbers for these players you were not expected to see numbers for, players you had long forgotten about. They are still there and present in the maths, if not the hearts and minds.

Note also the difference between the cap hold and the usually-signed-for amount. Cap holds are always 100% while signed contracts are almost always 120%, and while this difference is negligible in the lower amounts, it can mean much more at the top. The #1 pick this year, for example, has a cap hold of $4,592,200, while 120% of that figure would be $5,510,640. That difference of $918,440 is a pretty significant amount of cap room, and is why Andrew Wiggins has still yet to sign with the Cavaliers. It is custom for teams with cap room and aspirations to use a lot of it to not sign their draftees until after they have completed their cap space wrangling. And such, if a team with cap room signs their draftees early, it is often a sign they do not intend to use the cap space fully.

What teams can do under the 2011 CBA is sign a written agreement between themselves and the unsigned drafted player that they will not sign in the NBA in the upcoming season. If they sign this agreement and submit it to the league, that player’s cap hold is expunged from the team’s salary cap number, and this is what Dallas (who valued every dollar of space they could get) did with Koponen. Phoenix have also done that this season with Bogdan Bogdanovic. And while Orlando have not done so with Vasquez, maybe they will do once they get nearer the limit.

So if you see a calculation of a team’s salary figure that includes this seemingly inexplicable numbers to otherwise irrelevant players, now you know why they are there, and what can be done about it.

And if you see a calculation of a team’s salary figure that does not include these things, you now know to add them.

The amount of cap room teams have remaining

July 17th, 2014

The bulk of free agency is behind us, maybe, but we’re far from done. There follows a look at how much cap space NBA teams still have outstanding, which, with the exception of the occasions I blatantly do the opposite, will be presented without analysis as to how the situation came about.

All the teams that have cap space, or have had cap space this offseason, are included in the list. That is a total of fifteen teams and half the league. The other fifteen – Boston, Brooklyn, Denver, Golden State, Indiana, L.A. Clippers, Memphis, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma City, Portland, Sacramento, San Antonio, Toronto and Washington – are not mentioned at all.

All salary information is taken from this website’s own salary pages. All figures taken from the day of publication – if subsequent trades/signings are made, then adjust accordingly.

It is vital – VITAL – that you understand what a “cap hold” is before you read this. An explanation can be found here.

Players with asterisks by their names are not under contract with the team, and cap holds are separated from active contracts by the use of a simple link break.

    Atlanta Hawks

Committed salary for 2014/15: $48,416,058 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: $10,839,436

Atlanta has made only one signing in free agency, facilitated by one trade, and the money jointly spent on Thabo Sefolosha and John Salmons is actually less than the money they were due to spend on Louis Williams. They started with cap space, added more possibly unnecessarily, and still haven’t used up the extra bit, let alone dip into the reserves. I say “possibly unnecessarily” because it does not appear as though they have looked to do much with it, got shot down when they did, and the list of candidates is really running out. Here is their current position:

Al Horford – $12,000,000
Paul Millsap – $9,500,000
Jeff Teague – $8,000,000
Kyle Korver – $6,253,521
Thabo Sefolosha – $4,150,000
DeMarre Carroll – $2,442,455
Dennis Schroder – $1,690,680
John Jenkins – $1,312,920
Pero Antic – $1,250,000
John Salmons* – $1,000,000
Mike Muscala – $816,482

Elton Brand* – $4,800,000
Gustavo Ayon* – $2,850,000
Adreian Payne* – $1,546,100
Shelvin Mack* – $1,148,163
Mike Scott* – $1,115,243
Cartier Martin* – $915,243

Renouce Ayon, Brand and Martin, and that’s $10,839,436 to spend in cap space. But what on?

They need an extra big and an extra scoring guard. Which they could have had in Lou Williams and Lucas Nogueira. Which they traded for a chance at star power. Which they got absolutely no bites on. The decent but low ceilinged Hawks need a great infusion of talent, something they don’t have and stand no obvious chance of getting, despite the spending power. They could at least give it a go with Eric Bledsoe, however inevitable a matched offer sheet is. As it is, the Hawks gave up two of their very few assets for what has amounted to no returning assets. Kent Bazemore and Thabo Sefolosha don’t count. Could a deal to create space not have been worked out after they had found someone to use it on? It’s what Cleveland did.

    Charlotte Hornets

Committed salary for 2014/15: $39,858,252 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: None, or maybe only a bit

As can be seen, the Hornets at the moment have plenty of cap space remaining:

Al Jefferson – $13,500,000
Gerald Henderson – $6,000,000
Michael Kidd-Gilchrist – $5,016,960
Cody Zeller – $4,030,560
Bismack Biyombo – $3,873,398
Kemba Walker – $3,272,091
Gary Neal – $3,250,000
Jeffrey Taylor – $915,243

Noah Vonleh* – $2,103,500
P.J. Hairston* – $958,100
Roster charge – $507,336
Roster charge – $507,336

Total – $43,934,524 = $19,130,476 in cap space.

It won’t last, though. Agreements with Lance Stephenson (three years and $27.5 million), Marvin Williams (two years and $14 million) and Brian Roberts (two years and $5.5 million) will gobble up the remainder. This might be revisited once figures for Williams and Stephenson are in – if Roberts subsequently takes the room exception, Charlotte might have room for one more.

    Chicago Bulls

Committed salary for 2014/15: $46,703,593 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: $11,358,463

The Bulls have amnestied Carlos Boozer, traded Greg Smith and Anthony Randolph, and waived the trio of Mike James, Ronnie Brewer and Lou Amundson. That has cleared up the cap a ton:

Derrick Rose – $18,862,876
Joakim Noah – $12,700,000
Taj Gibson – $8,000,000
Mike Dunleavy – $3,326,235
Jimmy Butler – $2,008,748
Tony Snell – $1,472,400
Richard Hamilton* – $333,334

Kirk Hinrich* – $5,276,700
Doug McDermott* – $1,898,300
Nikola Mirotic* – $1,075,300
Daequan Cook* – $915,243
Jimmer Fredette* – $915,243
Nazr Mohammmed* – $915,243
Vladimir Radmanovic* – $915,243
Brian Scalabrine* – $915,243

There are still many free agent cap holds there, but they can all be renounced quite readily. (Hinrich, the only one who might command more than the minimum, is said to have already agreed to take the room exception.) Renounce them all, tack on four roster charges, and the Bulls have $11,358,463 in cap space. And in some form, it’s going to Mirotic and Pau Gasol.

    Cleveland Cavaliers

Committed salary for 2014/15: $56,030,677 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: Dregs

LeBron James – $20,644,400
Anderson Varejao – $9,704,545
Kyrie Irving – $7,070,730
Anthony Bennett – $5,563,920
Tristan Thompson – $5,138,430
Dion Waiters – $4,062,000
Brendan Haywood – $2,213,688
Carrick Felix – $816,482
Matthew Dellavedova – $816,482

Andrew Wiggins* – $4,592,200
Roster charge – $507,336
Roster charge – $507,336

Adding up all of that totals $61,637,549, offering up $1,427,451 in cap space. That number can be increased by waiving the unguaranteed contract of Dellavedova, although he has done nothing to deserve it. Mike Miller has agreed to sign, albeit for more than that amount, and thus likely for the room exception. Ray Allen is the other target, but that amount is less than his minimum. It seems more likely that this amount is used on second-round picks Joe Harris and Dwight Powell, getting them three year contracts.

    Dallas Mavericks

Committed salary for 2014/15: $58,171,433 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: Effectively none

Tyson Chandler – $14,846,888
Chandler Parsons – $14,700,000
Monta Ellis – $8,360,000
Dirk Nowitzki – $7,974,482
Brandan Wright – $5,000,000
Raymond Felton – $3,793,693
Greg Smith – $948,163
Jae Crowder – $915,243
Ricky Ledo – $816,482
Gal Mekel – $816,482

DeJuan Blair* – $915,243
Devin Harris* – $915,243
Bernard James* – $915,243
Petteri Koponen* – $911,400

Total – $61,828,562 – $1,236,438 in cap space

Koponen and James mean nothing, but Blair is to be signed and traded to the Wizards (presumably for Melvin Ely and some obligatory other minor consideration), a transaction which requires a small amount of cap space to complete. And even though a decent amount of space will be opened up after than and the renouncements/expunging of the other two, it’s all going to Harris.

    Detroit Pistons

Committed salary for 2014/15: $51,413,230 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: $1,935,635

The Pistons have signed three players – Jodie Meeks, D.J. Augustin and Caron Butler – which has been pretty much the end of their cap space. They still have agreements to fulfil with Aaron Gray and Cartier Martin, but the minimum salary and room exception ought cover it. Greg Monroe’s cap hold is the culprit here, and that’s not going to change.

At least, not for now. Someone on this list may come in for Monroe – Atlanta seems like they ought – which could offer a testing contract for a player whom they ideally need value from but who just isn’t fitting. And various connotations of the Josh Smith to Sacramento trade, should it go down, might open up some space. As of right now, the cap space has pretty much been used up, with the dregs potentially earmarked for Gray (either that or the room exception). But never say never.

Josh Smith – $13,500,000
Brandon Jennings – $8,000,000
Jodie Meeks – $6,000,000
Caron Butler – $4,500,000
Jonas Jerebko – $4,500,000
D.J. Augustin – $3,000,000
Will Bynum – $2,915,908
Kentavious Caldwell-Pope – $2,772,480
Andre Drummond – $2,568,360
Luigi Datome – $1,750,000
Kyle Singler – $1,090,000
Tony Mitchell – $816,482

Greg Monroe* – $10,216,135

    Houston Rockets

Committed salary for 2014/15: $56,156,175 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: $11,147,981

After whatever, this is the current situation:

Dwight Howard – $21,436,271
James Harden – $14,728,844
Trevor Ariza – $8,579,089
Alonzo Gee – $3,000,000
Terrence Jones – $1,618,680
Donatas Motiejunas – $1,483,920
Scotty Hopson – $1,450,878
Josh Powell – $1,310,286
Patrick Beverley – $915,243
Isaiah Canaan – $816,482
Robert Covington – $816,482
Troy Daniels – $816,482

Jordan Hamilton* – $2,109,294
Clint Capela* – $991,000
Francisco Garcia* – $915,243

The figure above assumes the waivings of Gee, Hopson and Powell, all unguaranteed and used only as contractual pieces. Covington is only $150,000 and could be waived, although this would mean only a $150,000 saving once a roster charge is accounted for and thus likely not worth it, and while Beverley’s deal is fully unguaranteed, he is not being waived. The above figure also assumes the renouncements of Hamilton and Garcia (who can always get minimum contracts post-cap space if needs be), and the removal of Capela’s cap hold. Houston have supposedly agreed to sign Kostas Papanikolaou, Joey Dorsey and Nick Johnson, which will cut into that figure. But if they and Ariza are the haul….

    L.A. Lakers

Committed salary for 2014/15: $46,403,492 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: A dollop, maybe (see below)

After striking out on the big names, the Lakers acquired Jeremy Lin and signed their draft pick, Julius Randle. That will frankly be the bulk of their business. The situation they have is thus:

Kobe Bryant – $23,500,000
Steve Nash – $9,701,000
Jeremy Lin – $8,374,646
Julius Randle – $2.997,360
Kendall Marshall – $915,243
Robert Sacre – $915,243

Jordan Hill* – $6,770,840
MarShon Brooks* – $2,179,354
Ryan Kelly* – $1,016,482
Kent Bazemore* – $915,243
Andrew Goudelock* – $915,243
Xavier Henry* – $915,243
Wesley Johnson* – $915,243
Nick Young* – $915,243

Those contracts and cap holds total $60,946,383. Hill and Young are going to re-sign with the team, but the Lakers have only non-Bird rights on Young, which would limit them to a contract starting at only 120% of the minimum were they to use them, which is not nearly enough for this purpose. So they will have to re-sign Young using the cap space they have remaining, and any more they open up.

They will open up a shred more through renouncements alone, albeit not huge amounts, since only Hill has a big hold. They can re-sign Hill with Bird rights, but only if they don’t renounce him, thus his cap hold must sustain. In practice, Bazemore’s cap hold will be removed when he joins Atlanta, Brooks and Goudelock will be renounced, and then Young will be re-signed. That leaves this:

Kobe Bryant – $23,500,000
Steve Nash – $9,701,000
Jeremy Lin – $8,374,646
Julius Randle – $2,997,360
Kendall Marshall – $915,243
Robert Sacre – $915,243

Jordan Hill* – $6,770,840
Ryan Kelly* – $1,016,482
Xavier Henry* – $915,243
Wesley Johnson* – $915,243
Roster charge – $507,336
Roster charge – $507,336

Total = $57,035,972 = $6,029,028

Let’s say Young’s four year $21 million reported agreed contract starts at $4.9 million with maximum 4.5% raises totalling $20,923,000. Take the $4.9 million out of that $6,029,028, then add back the amount of one less roster charge. That leaves $1,636,364 in cap room. You could add $200,000 to that amount by rescinding Kelly’s QO, $509,146 by rescinding Kelly’s QO and also renouncing him, and $407,907 for renouncements of each of Henry and Johnson. If all free agents other than Hill are renounced, then, the Lakers could re-sign Young for $4.9 million, have $2,961,324 more in cap space for someone else, and then still have the cap room mid-level exception to offer someone else. And they could do all this before re-signing Hill and adding Ed Davis at the minimum salary.

At least one more small move left in the gun, then. Potentially one big move in the gun if the stretch provision is used on Nash, but that’s not conducive to a 2015 plan and ought not be expected.

    Miami Heat

Committed salary for 2014/15: $39,458,485 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: None

The Heat have not signed all their agreed-upon deals, but they’ve done six of them, and it’s left them here:

Dwyane Wade – $15,000,000
Luol Deng – $9,714,461
Josh McRoberts – $5,305,000
Mario Chalmers – $4,000,000
Danny Granger – $2,077,000
Norris Cole – $2,038,206
Justin Hamilton $816,482
James Ennis – $507,336

Chris Bosh* – $20,644,400
Shabazz Napier* – $1,032,200
Chris Andersen* – $915,243
Roster charge – $507,336

All that totals an amount that is not coincidentally exactly $507,336 below the salary cap, so now we know why Deng signed for that bizarrely specific amount. Bosh, Napier and Andersen will sign soon in moves that will put the Heat over the cap, and thereafter they are limited to the room exception and the minimum salary. Waiving the unguaranteed Hamilton would add very little, given that he would have to be replaced with a roster charge.

    Milwaukee Bucks

Committed salary for 2014/15: $51,841,965 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: $11,223,035

The only roster move Milwaukee have made so far was signing Jabari Parker. That has left them this:

Larry Sanders – $11,000,000
O.J. Mayo – $8,000,000
Ersan Ilyasova – $7,900,000
Zaza Pachulia – $5,200,000
Jabari Parker – $4,930,560
Brandon Knight – $3,553,917
Carlos Delfino – $3,250,000
John Henson – $1,987,320
Giannis Antetokounmpo – $1,873,200
Miroslav Raduljica – $1,500,000
Khris Middleton – $915,243
Chris Wright – $915,243
Nate Wolters – $816,482

Ekpe Udoh* – $11,173,870
Ramon Sessions* – $6,500,000
Jeff Adrien* – $915,243
Marquis Daniels* – $915,243

Middleton and Wright are both fully unguaranteed, but Middleton definitely won’t be waived. The figure above was determined by assuming that neither will, while all four free agents (who are actually keeping them over the cap at the moment) are renounced. Udoh is a mere minimum salary player, albeit a potentially useful one, and the Bucks have made no noise about re-signing Sessions. Indeed, they are said to be signing Jerryd Bayless to a two year, $6 million contract, which would both replace Sessions and push Wolters down the depth chart. You weren’t expecting an offer sheet for Eric Bledsoe, surely.

    New Orleans Pelicans

Committed salary for 2014/15: $65,831,445 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: None

The Pelicans had cap space, but it’s gone now. They used their last vestiges of it on Russ Smith, thereby creating this situation:

Eric Gordon – $14,898,938
Tyreke Evans – $11,265,416
Jrue Holiday – $10,404,495
Ryan Anderson – $8,491,500
Omer Asik – $8,374,646
Anthony Davis – $5,607,240
Austin Rivers – $2,439,840
Omri Casspi – $1,063,384
Alexis Ajinca – $981,084
Luke Babbitt – $981,084
Jeff Withey – $816,482
Russ Smith – $507,336

Darius Miller* – $915,243

Some bonus minutiae coming up.

Unable to clear the cap space for Asik – it seems they were unable to meet whatever demands other cap space teams had for taking on Rivers’s contract – the Pelicans had to trade for him without using cap space. And as explained here, that means matching salaries, which wasn’t easy without using Rivers, in whom fellow cap space pursuers Houston had no interest. But they managed it. They used their own unguaranteed contract of Melvin Ely ($1,316,809), then acquired the ones of Alonzo Gee ($3,000,000) and Scotty Hopson ($1,450,878) in two separate trades with Cleveland, the first costing only a top 55 protected second rounder, the latter only cash. They were then able to aggregate those three salaries to send to Houston, their $5,767,687 aggregated salary is within the 150% + $100,000 range of Asik’s, and thus were able to send them, albeit in different directions, to accommodate him. It mattered not how recently Hopson and Gee had been received in trades, because the two months prohibition on a player’s retradeability after being acquired by trade applies only if the retrading team had been over the cap when they first acquired them, which the Pelicans were not. Smith was signed before the Asik trade – he, Gee and Hopson just about fit within the Pelicans’s cap space pre-Asik trade, even with Miller’s cap hold, thus they were able to give Smith the third year on his minimum salary contract that they could not have done had they been armed with only the cap room mid-level exception and the minimum salary exceptions, both of which have a maximum of two seasons on them. (Additionally, Casspi, who was also received in the Asik trade, was on the second year of a two year minimum salary contract and thus absorbable via the MSE, and needed not be included in the trade aggregation.)

It cost them much less than clearing out Rivers would have done, so, well done there. They also got the decent enough Casspi for their troubles. Here’s hoping they don’t waive him, even though they will.

    Orlando Magic

Committed salary for 2014/15: $50,081,737 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: $11,157,904

As was said in the opening, we’ll bear no judgement on the messed up methods by which Orlando got to this point. Instead, we will look only at what “this point” consists of. The results:

Channing Frye – $8,579,088
Glen Davis* – $6,600,000
Victor Oladipo – $4,978,200
Ben Gordon – $4,500,000
Aaron Gordon – $3,992,040
Al Harrington* – $3,804,900
Nikola Vucevic – $2,751,260
Elfrid Payton – $2,397,840
Tobias Harris – $2,380,594
Jameer Nelson* – $2,000,000
Maurice Harkless – $1,887,840
Anthony Randolph* – $1,825,359
Andrew Nicholson – $1,545,840
Evan Fournier – $1,483,920
Willie Green – $1,448,490
Kyle O’Quinn – $915,243
Dewayne Dedmon – $816,482

Fran Vazquez* – $1,898,300
E’Twaun Moore* – $915,243
Jeremy Richardson* – $915,243

(NB – Davis’s amount is not certain but is certainly no higher than this.)

Orlando could renounce the long redundant cap hold on Richardson quite easily, and would do if they had any incentive, and the once promising E’Twaun Moore has no place on the roster any more in light of the rest of the guard reshuffle. Vasquez’s cap hold is easily gotten rid of if needs be, be it by agreeing to expunge it for a year or just getting rid of it for good. Dedmon is unguaranteed, although there seems no reason to waive him. And Al Harrington’s contract has the right of set-off outstanding, which will further reduce it should he sign somewhere else soon. The above figure was arrived at assuming the removal of the three cap holds only, but it’s enough for a decent chunk of change.

As for what they could do with this extra space? Well, there’s surely some mediocre veteran out there who needs overpaying. Seems to have been the MO so far. Luke Ridnour is about to join, getting two years and $5.5 million to be only slightly better than Ronnie Price, so presumably there is one more deal of such type left in the gun. Probably for a centre.

Actually, Vasquez is a centre, and is long since passed being required to sign for the rookie scale. He’s a veteran now, and plays a position with a hole on the depth chart. Give it all to him. For a laugh.

    Philadelphia 76ers

Committed salary for 2014/15: $31,341,130 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: $28,034,170

Philly’s entire offseason thus far has been the draft, where they acquired five new players, none of whom they have yet signed, and none of whom might contribute to the team next year. This of course was the plan, but signing absolutely no one at all thus far, not even a draftee, has given them a ton of space that’s pretty much going to waste. The current situation reads thusly:

Thaddeus Young – $9,410,869
Jason Richardson – $6,601,125
Nerlens Noel – $3,315,120
Michael Carter-Williams – $2,300,040
Eric Maynor* – $2,106,720
Tony Wroten – $1,210,080
Arnett Moultrie – $1,136,160
Elliot Williams – $981,084
Henry Sims – $915,243
Jarvis Varnado – $915,243
Brandon Davies – $816,482
Hollis Thompson – $816,482
Casper Ware – $816,482

Joel Embiid* – $3,689,700
Dario Saric* – $1,803,400
Charles Jenkins* – $915,243 $947,276 Two year veteran’s minimum
Byron Mullens* – $915,243 $947,276 Two year veteran’s minimum
Adonis Thomas* – $816,482

The Sixers could make even more room for themselves than this. The renouncements of Jenkins, Mullens and Thomas are meaninglessly routine, and Saric could sign the paperwork agreeing not to join the NBA next season (since he won’t), thereby expunging his cap hold. All of Ware, Thompson, Davies, Varnardo, Sims and Williams are on unguaranteed contracts and could be waived to open up more space (albeit remembering to add a roster charge of $507,633 for each empty roster spot up to and including 12 places), and you could even take it even further and utilise the stretch provision on Jason Richardson, thereby thirding his cap number. The figure arrived at above assumes no such stretching and no waivings, but does include the renouncements of the three FAs and the expunging of Saric’s cap hold, and yet they could go so much bigger.

However, much of that is not likely to happen. The Sixers it seems have no desire to use this cap space. This accords with their MO of last year, when they sat on an oodle of it for many months and eventually used it all to acquire six second-round picks on one day. The strategy, it seems, is to do much the same again. But it is a strategy with a problem – there are a lot more teams who can take on salary other teams want to shed than there is salary needing to be shed. The Sixers couldn’t turn their tons of cap space into a single first-round pick last deadline, when there were fewer competitors on the market, so their chances of doing it again are automatically limited. And when there was one available just now with Jeremy Lin, they seemingly didn’t want it.

There must be a plan somewhere, but none of it has come to fruition yet, and it is starting to get bizarre. It is not due to an obligation to meet the salary floor that I say this – there is no obligation – but because the cap space is not yielding anything of value at all right now, at a time when others (Lin trade to Lakers, Anthony Randolph to Orlando) are managing to make theirs work for them. Hinkie it seems is all in on something, but God knows what it is this time. I hereby predict a trade of for Gerald Wallace at the deadline, and submit as my corroborating evidence absolutely nothing whatsoever.

    Phoenix Suns

Committed salary for 2014/15: $34,878,911 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: $18,647,161

Even after acquiring Isaiah, the Suns still have plenty to spend. Eric Bledsoe will get a big contract, but his cap hold is sufficiently small that the Suns can boast big time free agency space before signing him to it. The same is true on a smaller scale of P.J. Tucker, whose meeting of the starter criteria boosted the value of his qualifying offer higher but still not to the same level as the contract he is going to re-sign for. That leaves the pleasingly cheap Suns as follows:

Goran Dragic – $7,500,000
Isaiah Thomas – $7,238,606
Alex Len – $3,649,920
Gerald Green – $3,500,000
Markieff Morris – $2,989,239
Marcus Morris – $2,943,221
T.J. Warren – $1,953,520
Shavlik Randolph – $1,227,985
Miles Plumlee – $1,169,880
Archie Goodwin – $1,112,280
Dionte Christmas – $816,482
Michael Beasley* – $777,778

Eric Bledsoe* – $6,566,183
P.J. Tucker* – $2,875,130
Tyler Ennis* – $1,325,600
Leandro Barbosa* – $915,243

The remaining space figure listed above is arrived at by assuming the waiving of Randolph, the renouncement of Barbosa, and the continued wait on signing all three of Ennis, Bledsoe and Tucker. There may not be that many candidates worthy of this much money any more, but by virtue of their tons of space and their young, exciting and quality team, Phoenix may have the pick of the litter. (Well, until they run out of roster spots.) Anthony Tolliver will soon be signing, it is said, for a total of two years and $6 million, which means you can knock about $3 million off of that figure. But that’s still basically maximum contract space. Any takers?

    Utah Jazz

Committed salary for 2014/15: $54,428,296 (view full forecast)

Remaining cap space: $8,636,704

After matching Hayward’s offer sheet, the Jazz are actually technically over the cap at the moment, having been beneath it earlier in order to complete the Steve Novak trade. However, when Marvin Williams (see above) signs with Charlotte, his $11,250,000 cap hold will disappear, creating the following situation:

Gordon Hayward – $14,746,000
Derrick Favors – $12,950,000
Enes Kanter – $5,694,674
Dante Exum – $3,615,000
Steve Novak – $3,445,947
Alec Burks – $3,034,356
Trey Burke – $2,548,560
Jeremy Evans – $1,794,872
John Lucas III – $1,600,000
Rodney Hood – $1,290,360
Rudy Gobert – $1,127,400
Malcolm Thomas – $948,163
Ian Clark – $816,482
Erik Murphy – $816,482

Lucas, Murphy, Thomas and Clark are all fully unguaranteed and could be waived to open up further cap space. However, in light of having already signed Exum and Hood to their rookie deals, and having made no attempt at big time free agents since about 2003, there is no strong likelihood of big cap space usage any time soon. Much of what is left will be used on Trevor Booker, who has agreed to but not yet signed a two year, $10 million deal. Thereafter, unless there is another Novak-like trade to come, they are probably just turning over the non-rotation players.

“Consideration In Trades And Trade Structure” – a league instruction manual

July 11th, 2014

At the end of the July Moratorium each year, the league sends out a memo containing all of the findings from the audit it conducted during it. That audit is what the moratorium period is for – the moratorium is one long end-of-season book-keep in which it crunches all the numbers related to revenue, BRI, escrow, tax and the like, and makes determinations on both the past and the future. That memo generally filters through to the mainstream media – it has to, because it contains all the things that will make the league work next year, such as the salary cap numbers and exact size of the luxury tax threshold. It also contains things such as the latest projection of the season after next ($66.3 million salary cap, $80.7 million luxury tax threshold) and the sizes of next year’s exceptions.

This year, however, the league sent out a second memo. Entitled “Consideration in Trades and Trade Structure”, it is a reminder and/or clarifier to teams about some of the specifics of what they can and cannot do in trades. Seemingly, they felt this was necessary

Considering the presence of this memo suggests that some teams do not entirely understand the rules (or, perhaps, have been intent on pushing them back a bit), it is self-evidently the case that those of us outside of the league will not fully know them either. So, here goes.

The memo is divided into two parts. The first part of the memo deals with what constitutes ‘consideration’ in trades, and is itself split into two parts.

Part two of this first section concerns consideration in trades for non-playing personnel. Seemingly, in light of recent de facto coaching trades (whereby a team receives compensation for letting a non-playing member of staff out of their contract to sign with the other team), those rules needed some clarification. And the clarified rules are stated in the memo as follows:

a) As long as they accord with all other trade rules (e.g. Stepien rule, cash limits), draft picks and cash are allowed to be traded in this way.
b) Players and draft rights to players are not.
c) The two teams involved in such a trade cannot make another trade between themselves for the earlier of (i) one calendar year of the day the non-playing member of personnel was released from the original contract, or (ii) if the release took place in between two regular seasons, after the final game (including playoffs) of the upcoming seaaon for both teams. This includes, and indeed is primarily about, trades of players.

Fair enough. This is not a well documented area, so it is good to see some clarity.

Part one of this consideration section, however, is where the real eyebrow raisers are found.

First of all, the memo establishes what the league considers now to be ‘minimum consideration’, parameters it says that have been established over time and through precedent. Section (a) states that the minimum consideration to be given in all trades regardless of the number of teams involved is thereafter to be one of the following, with teams required to give and receive at least one of them:

i) a player under contract,
ii) a future draft pick, the maximum protection of which is 55 spots,
iii) a player’s draft rights, but specifically those of a player with a ‘reasonable’ chance of signing in the NBA one day (something judged at the discretion of the NBA), or
iv) $75,000.

Further to this, in multi-team trades (i.e. three or more), the parameters are different. Section (b) states that the minimum consideration in trades involving more than two teams is thereafter to be one of these following, with teams required to give and/or receive at least two of them:

a) a player under contract,
b) a future draft pick that, whilst it may have protection, must be unprotected in at least one season and thus must be conveyed at some point,
c) a player’s draft rights (the same definition is not given, but the same wording is, thus the same definition can be assumed), or
d) $750,000.

In all multi-team trades, all parties to the trade must meet the parameters of both sections. In practical terms, this means they must both give and receive something, with ‘something’ defined as being one of the four pieces listed in section A. In addition to this, they must at least send or receive something to at least two parties in the deal, sending or receiving at least two of the four pieces listed in section B.

This does not mean teams have to send and receive something to all parties in the deal. It is still OK for a team C to receive a player from team A and cash from team B, sending only a draft pick to team A. However, the higher minimum thresholds of consideration given in section B necessitate more impactful assets being dealt in these trades in the future. And in particular, the much larger amount of cash makes it more difficult for multi-player trades to merely use nominal amounts of cash in the future. You can still trade only $75,000 to a team in a multi-player trade if you want, but the other two things they are giving and/or receiving are going to have to be more toothy to make up for it.

The memo states this because the NBA has become all too aware of the usage of multi-team trades involving third teams receiving mixed bags of assets and liabilities whilst sending out remarkably little in return. See for example Milwaukee’s role in the three team trade that sent Kevin Martin to Oklahoma City – for taking on the unwanted salary of Luke Ridnour, the Bucks received a second-round pick and cash for their troubles and only had to send out the draft rights to Szymon Szewczyk to the Thunder, a player who meets the NBA’s requirement of ‘starting or rotation player in a reputable league’ but who isn’t going to join the NBA. In letting it be known that the minimum requirements for ‘consideration’ are to be tougher, the NBA seeks to make this more difficult to do, citing as their reasoning the fact that ‘trades involving three or more teams typically provide teams with salary cap or other advantages beyond what could be accomplished via successive two-team trades’, something they do not like seeing outside of what they call ‘bona fide’ trades.

These whatever-the-opposite-of-bona-fide type of deals still will happen, no doubt. But it will cost those involved more to do it now. And in light of the description of the required threshold for a player’s draft rights – which may not be new, but which is new to me – we now get to see which rights to long-since-drafted players are suitable or not. If you are into your esoterica, there are some questions created here that we can look forward to not having answered. Someone try to trade for Venson Hamilton and see what happens.

The second part of the memo, the part concerned with trade structure, is primarily a short and somewhat terse message. It reads thusly:

Please be reminded that anti-circumvention rules apply to all proposed trades. Accordingly, among other things, teams cannot structure a trade to defeat or circumvent provisions of the CBA or other league rules.

The elaboration subsequently given states that a team cannot split one trade into more than one trade ‘to evade a CBA prohibition or to gain a particular Salary Cap advantage’. It elaborates no further than this, however, and no specific example is given. Indeed, the memo goes on to say that transactions that may run foul of this will be addressed on a case-by-case basis, which is unhelpful in establishing the parameters of this reminder, as well as what triggered it.

This is an interesting point, because it suggests the frowning-upon of a practice involving the creation and usage of trade Exceptions via non-simultaneous trades. This practice is a long-standing but ill-covered one which I have attempted to clarify on multiple occasions this season, partly in this piece, but primarily in this one. From that latter link comes this description of the conduct potentially in question:

[E]ach team is able to structure the trade in the way which suits them best, even if said structure is different to how other parties do it. There can be multiple ways to conduct the same trade, and this is evident and important in the creation and usage of TPEs.

This confusing process is best illustrated by way of example. Suppose team A has an $8 million player X, a $5 million TPE and a $3 million TPE, while team B (conveniently!) has a $5 million player Y and a $3 million player Z. Suppose players Y and Z from team B are traded for the $8 million player X from team A alone.

From team B’s perspective, the deal is simply players Y and Z and their $8 million aggregated salary in exchange for player X from team A. However, team A can structure the deal so that player Y is absorbed by the $5 million TPE and player Z by the $3 million TPE, thereby allowing them to send out player X for no incomming salary, thereby creating a fresh $8 million TPE for player X. It is perfectly permissible to structure the trade in this way despite it being different to the structure used by the other party, as long as the structure for each party satifies the CBA. And the rule whereby all parties to a trade must give up something in the deal is satisfied by the fact that player X is traded.

Essentially, the trade is both one big deal and three parallel smaller ones at the same time. The need to trade something for something is satisfied in the overall deal and thus does not need to be satisfied in each parallel smaller one.

The relevant passage in the memo suggests that it is this practice that may be under threat. However, in the trade that the quoted passage above was in reference to (the

Complete History Of NBA Luxury Tax Payments, 2001-2014

July 10th, 2014

This website and its sole proprietor keep a spreadsheet containing to-the-dollar information on all luxury tax paid to date, updated annually. Here is the latest update.

In the 13 seasons since the luxury tax was created, it has been applicable in eleven seasons; in those eleven seasons, 24 NBA franchises have paid over $1 billion in payroll excess. The exact details can be found here.

(Sorted alphabetically – click to enhance.)

(Sorted by expenditure – click to enhance.)

(Orange cells denote the team that won the championship that year.)

Please use the spreadsheet freely for resource purposes, and feel equally free to suggest any improvements. However, please do not just take it, and if you do cite its data somewhere, please acknowledge its source. While the content is not my IP, I did spend a long time sourcing the relevant information, and in return, I seek only credit and a few page hits for that. Thank you.

2014 Summer League rosters – Miami

July 7th, 2014

Ivan Aska – Murray State graduate Aska has played two professional seasons, splitting last one between Greece and Puerto Rico. He averaged 15.2 points, 7.0 rebounds and 3.4 fouls in 29.9 minutes per game for Ikaros, then averaged 6.9 points, 4.5 rebounds and 2.5 fouls in 13.8 minutes per game for Santurce. The 6’7 power forward never really developed at Murray State, saved for an improved free throw stroke he has subsequently lost again, but he brings plenty of athleticism to the table, easily his most alluring quality. There are occasional post ups, straight line dribble drives and mid-range catch-and-shoots in there, but the athleticism doesn’t seem to make him a shot blocker, and there are no NBA calibre skills other than it.

Danilo Barthel – In his first significant season of playing time at the highest level of German basketball, the 6’10 Barthel won the Bundesliga’s Most Improved Player award. A 6’10 face-up power forward who does a bit of everything, Barthel is a very good athlete for his size, and uses it to put the ball on the floor. He shoots jump shots from mid and long range (albeit not especially well yet), plays the pick-and-roll, can get up to throw down, and handles it very well for one so large. He is also a good passer of the ball with good vision, and who knows how to get open for others, a high IQ offensive player and a very real prospect who has started to realise that potential. Barthel has more to do to put it all together – he makes mistakes at times, forces the issue at some, being too passive at others, and needs to toughen up defensively. But he would have been a high to mid second-round pick had he done what he did this year last year.

Jerrelle Benimon – Making no effort to dress it up, let’s be honest and say that Benimon was a disappointment in his two years at Georgetown. He wasn’t given much to do, admittedly, especially on offence. But he didn’t really do anything. Benimon never scored, never looked to score much, mostly took jump shots at which he was never good, rebounded poorly, turned it over remarkably often for someone with so little offensive responsibility, fouled everyone, and only occasionally had a blocked shot to show for his efforts. He did nothing in two years.

Then he transferred to Towson and became someone else. Transferring to Towson involved a much lower standard of play, of course, but it’s not as if anyone else did there what Benimon was doing. He suddenly became Mr Everything, a muscular and reasonably athletic power forward who drove the team on both ends, playing huge minutes of every game, carrying the load. Benimon rebounds well using this strength and motor, and can also get position and finish down low, albeit not with the greatest range of post moves. Instead, he plays a perimeter role based around a jump shot, some ball handling skills, and, bizarrely, a jump shot born out of his ballhandling skills. Benimon runs both halves of the pick-and-roll, but mainly the guard part, and likes to shoot pull-up jumpers, something at which he is frankly not that bad. Benimon runs the break and does everything you would expect a guard to do, and does so without being too ridiculous in the process. The turnover numbers are very high, and Benimon does have a tendency to barrel into people without knowing why he is doing it, but this is partly due to the cirucmstances he was put in. Towson asked him to do everything, and he pretty much did. This from the man who previously was asked to do pretty much nothing.

A complete transformation, then. And now Benimon looks like a player who can play in any league in the world, except possibly this one, given a lack of supreme size or athleticism. Although, if he proves he can consistently stretch the floor without needing the ball too much to do it, you never know.

Nobel Boungou-Colo – This is Nobel’s first NBA foray at the age of 26. Last year, the Congolese forward averaged 15 points in 32 minutes per game, alongside 5.1 rebounds and 2.5 turnovers, on 40% three point shooter. This was his first season of being a good shooter after a career hitherto of being a poor one, which is promising. However, as he transitions from interior to perimeter player, his rebounding has fallen off a cliff and his turnovers have shot way up. Boungou Colo is a very good athlete with a pro body, but he has never quite known what to do with them, and he just doesn’t have the handle of a small forward. He’s a something forward, an athlete, apparently now a shooter, and a productive player warts and all, but also a question mark in many ways.

Andre Dawkins – Dawkins, who will play for the Heat only in Orlando, was covered in the Rockets roster round-up.

Larry Drew II – The Heat continue their interest in Drew, who joined them for both summer league and training camp last season. He spent his first professional season in the D-League, where he was given the keys to the Sioux Falls Skyforce offence (or at least was when DeAndre Liggins let him) and returned averages of 11.0 points and 6.7 assists in 34 minutes a game, alongside only 2.5 turnovers. Drew is certainly willing to pass, and can pass, and wants to pass. But he’s small, no threat in the paint, and his defence is fairly unthreatening. What Drew has does is consolidate the uptick in his three point stroke he demonstrated at UCLA, hitting 38.8% of them on a reasonable number of attempts with the Skyforce. This has to continue to be the case, as he cannot collapse a defence well if he’s obviously not going to score.

James Ennis – Last year’s second-round pick went to Australia and dominated. He averaged 21.2 points, 7.2 rebounds, 2.1 assists, 1.4 steals and 0.8 blocks in 31.7 minutes per game, and the only reason he didn’t win MVP was because Rotnei Clarke’s scoring was considered more valuable for whatever reason. The Australian league is not an athletic one, and Ennis’s leaping ability and transition games were unparalleled and very unstoppable. Ennis also shot the ball fairly well from three (35% on quite high attempts), finished at the rim, and got there in the halfcourt better than usual. With the athleticism and frame to play defence at the NBA level, along with a long wing span and decent passing vision, he seems to be a legitimate roster spot candidate next season. The handle and shot creating in the half court are not there, but as an NBA role player, they wouldn’t need to be.

Frank Gaines – Gaines, who will play with the Heat only in Vegas summer league, was covered in the Pacers roster round-up.

Langston Hall – Hall is a big point guard at 6’4, but not a fast one. He passes for big assist numbers with few turnovers, and is a poised point guard who runs the team well, but this is partly due to a lack of dynamicism. Hall hasn’t the speed to get into the lane or collapse the defence, and thus is not able to take many risks even if he sought do. What he does do is play within him limitations, and cater to his strengths, those strengths being sensible passing and his shooting. Hall is a good shooter with better shot selection who can catch and shoot, or take pull-ups off the bounce, including utilising a step back jump shot. His lack of foot speed and athleticism rather undermines his size, but point guards with height, discipline and jump shots generally do well somewhere.

Justin Hamilton – Hamilton is only one of two Heat players under contract at the moment, along with Norris Cole. The one time Heat draft pick has already been waived by the team once, but is back for now and signed to a unguaranteed contract for next season. In 38 D-League games with Larry Drew’s Skyforce, Hamilton averaged 19.5 points, 9.3 rebounds and 2.0 blocks in 35.4 minutes per game, making his living mostly with a righty hook but also in shooting 39.7% from three on a limited and increasing number of attempts. He has stretch five potential and weak side shot blocker potential, and if he can toughen up on the offensive glass, Hamilton can be a rare type of 7 footer in the NBA.

Eli Holman – Regular summer league attendee Holman is back, having spent last season in Turkey playing for Usaf. There, he did usual Eli Holman-esque things – grabbing 9.4 rebounds in only 28.5 minutes per game, as well as scoring 13.5 points in that time (almost all from inside the foul line), and fouling everyone who gets near him. Physical, tough and aggressive, if unathletic and not much of a rim protector, Holman’s paint finishes and pick-and-roll looks are tailor made for European basketball, where his lack of breakneck speed matters less. He projects less favourably at the NBA level, particularly defensively, but rebounds pretty much always translate, so he could have a role.

Tyler Honeycutt – After a couple of years of moving around and getting little in the way of regular playing time, Honeycutt settled down to a regular gig last year, and it worked out for him. Playing a full campaign with Israeli team Ironi Nes-Ziona, Honeycutt averaged 15.6 points, 9.1 rebounds, 3.8 assists, 2.1 steals and 1.2 blocks per game. The rebounds were second in the nation – this from a wing player – while the steals ranked third, the points eighth, the blocks seventh, and the assists only just outside of the top 10. Honeycutt was Kyle Anderson before Kyle Anderson, and while it’s not a perfect comparison – he isn’t the playmaking option every time down that Anderson is – Honeycutt is more athletic than his currently touted compadre. Honeycutt has NBA talent, and always has done, getting stuck in the wrong place at the wrong time in his NBA opportunity to date. If he sticks around in the D-League and stays healthy, he’ll make it back.

Tyler Johnson – As a senior at Fresno State, the 6’4 Johnson was asked to do a bit of everything. And he did, to the tune of 15.8 points, 7.4 rebounds and 2.9 assists per game, shooting 46.5% from the field and 43.8% from three. Although he led the team in scoring, Johnson didn’t dominate the ball to get those points – the Bulldogs were a fairly high scoring and fast paced team who used multiple ball handlers and player movement to get good looks for multiple perimeter offensive weapons. But Johnson was the best of the bunch, a very discipline high IQ and athletic player who picks spots, makes good passes, sells fakes to open up both the J and the drive, and plays within his limitations. He also crashes the glass hard, and can absolutely sky for his size. Johnson is small for a two guard – even the 6’4 seems a bit generous – and he has no one stand-out facet to his game, but if Chris Babb is projectable as a shooting guard role player, so is Tyler.

Trey McKinney-Jones – In the D-League last season with the Fort Wayne Mad Ants, McKinney-Jones poured in numbers as solid as solid can be. In 32.2 minutes per contest, he averaged 14.8 points, 4.5 rebounds, 2.1 assists and 1.1 steals to only 1.5 turnovers, shooting 46.7% from the floor and 35.3% from three. McKinney-Jones is a good athlete with a strong mid-range game and projectable if not entirely cemented yet three point stroke, who defends well, plays within his limitations, makes few mistakes and loves to run. Role players play roles.

Shabazz Napier – As an underclassman, Napier took many a bad shot. He came in as a scorer and still wanted to be one, but that aggressiveness became damaging as he took too many bad ones and too many early ones. But once he learnt to temper this, Napier became a leader and a go-to offensive option, fearless and unflappable. That is not to say he is not still liable to weak moments – Napier is occasionally still fearless to the point of recklessness and always liable to take a heat check jump shot on his good shooting days but mostly justified now in his decision making. He cannot resist a few bad ones, and often threatens to ruin his hot scoring steaks by playing with tunnel vision. But it is less so now. And a bit of aggression never hurt.

Napier does not really make his team mates better, at least not in a conventional way. Despite decent assist numbers, some pick-and-roll passing and some drive-and-kicks, this is still a score-first player, perhaps even a score-second player. But he does make the team better. Napier is a very talented shot maker, mostly with the jump shot, who regularly hits contested ones and who can shoot off the catch or off the pull-up, needing only a small amount of space to get the shot away. Over time he has put away the excess of long two-pointers and turned them into threes, which has brought up his efficiency, and although he is too small to do much around the basket, he can at least get there, so he cannot be overplayed for the jumper. Napier’s blistering speed and good ball handling skills gets him to the basket with ease even when amongst the trees, and defensively, that same speed combines with good hands, good anticipation, timely passing lane gambles and an improved effort level to be a pest on that end, sufficiently so to often overcome his size disadvantage. He is clutch, a very good foul shooter, and a competitor.

It’s easy to see why LeBron likes him. Given how small Napier is, he will always be slightly hampered at this level. But put talent around him, and he’ll be a fine fourth or fifth offensive option.

Ronald Roberts – Roberts, who will play for the Heat only in Vegas, was covered in the Sixers roster round-up.

Scott Suggs – Suggs, who will play for the Heat only in Vegas, was covered in the Magic roster round-up.

How Chicago Can Get Carmelo

July 7th, 2014

(originally published elsewhere)

Pretend for a minute that Carmelo Anthony chooses the Bulls. It’s possible until it isn’t.

Pretend for a minute that he wants more than they can pay him in free agency. Considering that their best free agency offers would top out at a starting salary of $15 million barring a significant weakening of the roster elsewhere, and that other teams are offering an unconditional max, and this seems a reasonable belief. To join Chicago for an amount of money comparable to what he would get elsewhere, Melo would have to be signed and traded.

Pretend for a minute that the Knicks are willing to do this deal to help out a conference rival. This, too, is realistic. If they want to be proud and/or stubborn and refuse to help a one time rival, instead preferring to let their player walk for free, then….OK. But there’s assets in it for them if they do, so they shouldn’t be stubborn in this way. They need assets to get good again more than they need to worry about who is good whilst they rebuild. It’s not personal, Sonny. It’s strictly business.

With all the previous assumptions in place, Chicago would want badly to acquire Melo via sign and trade while keeping together as good of a team as possible. This means no trading of Taj Gibson, and ideally no trading of Jimmy Butler and Nikola Mirotic. Can Chicago keep all three, acquire Melo, build a brilliant team and do it all within the confines of the Collective Bargaining Agreement?

Just about. Here’s how.

STEP ONE: Amnesty Carlos Boozer.

Thereby expunging his $16.8 million salary from the cap number, if not the payroll. Note that amnestying Boozer does not immediately put the Bulls under the salary cap, due to their assortment of cap holds. This will prove crucial, as will be seen and thoroughly explained below.

STEP TWO: A highly convoluted three team trade.

Bulls trade: Ronnie Brewer ($1,310,286 unguaranteed), Louis Amundson ($1,310,286 unguaranteed), Mike James ($1,448,490, unguaranteed), Greg Smith ($948,163), Tony Snell ($1,472,400), a signed-and-traded Kirk Hinrich (three year deal starting at $4,870,800 with 4.5% decreases totalling $13,954,842), two first-round picks (see below) and $3.2 million in cash to New York. Also trade Mike Dunleavy Jr ($3,326,235) to Boston.

Bulls receive: A signed-and-traded Carmelo Anthony from New York. And something meaningless and arbitrary from Boston.

Knicks trade: A signed-and-traded Carmelo Anthony (four year deal starting at $19,686,660 with 4.5% raises for a total of $84,062,040) to Chicago.

Knicks receive: Hinrich, Snell, Smith, James, Amundson, Brewer, both first-round picks and the cash.

Celtics trade: Something arbitrary like a top 55 protected second-round pick.

Celtics receive: Mike Dunleavy Jr ($3,326,235, absorbed via Paul Pierce trade exception).

_________________

There follows a long explanation of both math and logic.

Teams above the salary cap can complete trades using the Traded Player Exception, the proper name for the cap exception by which teams above the cap are allowed to make trades. It is the exception which brings about the rules of salary matching with which we are all familiar.

Teams below the cap don’t need this – they can trade to their heart’s content without needing to match salary, as long as they don’t finish more than $100,000 over the cap.

But – and this is the important bit – no matter whether you started above or below the cap, you need to use the salary matching rules within the Traded Player Exception if you intend to finish more than $100,000 over the cap.

If Chicago wanted to sign and trade for Melo when below the cap, they could either trade out enough salary so that they don’t go over this $100,000 limit, or use the salary matching rules. Pragmatically, they are not far enough under the estimated $63.2 million salary cap to do the former. They could in theory be $10 million under and trade $11 million to get a $21.1 million player, but the only realistic way to do this is to include Taj Gibson. [Seriously, try it.] So their best bet to complete a trade is to stay over the cap throughout and use the Traded Player Exception.

Note once again what was said below step one – amnestying Boozer doesn’t immediately put Chicago below the cap. The cap holds of Hinrich, Mohammed, Mirotic, McDermott, D.J. Augustin, Jimmer Fredette, Daequan Cook, Brian Scalabrine, Vladimir Radmanovic and all their exceptions keep them above it, and actually quite a long way above it (about $15 million or so). The idea of the Bulls having cap space involves amnestying Boozer and renouncing all of the above save for Mirotic and McDermott, but this is not something that happens automatically. It is something they could opt to do. It is a weapon in the arsenal. It is not a weapon they are using here.

What an amnesty of Boozer does do is give Chicago the room to incorporate players via sign and trade without going over the apron (the line $4 million above the tax threshold, estimated at being $81 million next year, which teams receiving players via sign and traded are not allowed to go over). Amnestying Boozer is not in this instance about cap space, but about cap flexibility. He could be used for cap space in other scenarios, but not here. Here, Chicago are a team over the cap making a trade.

Chicago, then, has to match Melo’s salary. And in this deal, they just about do. Adding up their outgoing salaries totals $14,686,660, and when they are all aggregated together, that allows them to receive back $19,686,660 in trade. (When trading out between $9.8 million and $19.6 million in salary, teams utilising the Traded Player Exception who finish below the tax threshold upon completion of the deal are permitted to take back a maximum amount of the aggregated outgoing salaries plus $5 million.) This is where Anthony’s new salary is arrived at. And this aggregation includes the salary of Mike Dunleavy Jr, even though he goes to a third team.

Dunleavy Jr goes to Boston here, incorporated via part of the Paul Pierce trade exception, but could just as easily go to a team with cap space or anyone with a trade exception and a need for a 40% three point shooter. So could Hinrich, in theory. And indeed any of the outgoing Bulls players. As long as the two are traded to somewhere for no returning salary, or at least for salary which Chicago can incorporate via a different exception without going over the apron line, it doesn’t really matter where they go. But the fewer involved parties, the better.

If Melo refuses to sign for that little, add Nazr Mohammed in another sign-and-trade, and then add however much he gets – which will not be lower than his minimum salary of $1,448,490 – to Melo’s first year salary. Hypothetically, if Mohammed were included and were to receive that exact amount, Melo’s new contract could start at $21,135,150 and total $90,247,091 over the same four years. It’s not quite his four year maximum, but it’s damn close.

Both teams would need to finish below the apron line after this deal, as they both receive players via a sign-and-trade. However, as will be seen below, both will. Even with Nazr.

The amount listed for Hinrich is the most he can receive in a sign-and-trade without being subject to the artist formerly known as Base Year Compensation, which would reduce his outgoing value in trades to half of his actual salary. It would be fully unguaranteed in the two subsequent seasons, a la Keith Bogans, and thus not impinging at all on the 2015 free agency plan. New York receives no contract in this deal that has any guaranteed money beyond next season, and gets two picks for their troubles.

In the offseason, the maximum roster size is 20, so New York has enough space to incorporate all of the incoming. Even if they were to include Nazr, this is the case. They would then be expected to waive the three unguaranteed deals, leaving them with Smith and Snell as two young backups, and Hinrich as the sole returning salary filler. Well, unless you include Nazr.

The cash amount, the maximum amount a team is allowed to trade out in trades in one season, is sent by Chicago to New York to offset the overpayment to Hinrich. And Nazr, too, if you add him in. Then again, given how much Phil Jackson and Derek Fisher may love Hinrich, they might not consider it as such. (It would be, though.) Hinrich will not impinge upon their 2015 free agency plans, only slightly impinges upon the ambitious but apparently alive 2014 free agency plans, and would not hurt the team on the court or in the locker room in the interim. His presence in the deal is as a necessary financial instrument primarily and secondarily, but New York could still get something from him.

As for Smith and Snell – Smith is a solid offensive option at backup centre for the minimum salary when healthy, and Snell could be the next Wesley Person if he learns to shoot as well as he already thinks he does. Both of course are projected as career backups and are not being sold as pieces for the future, but both are worthy of a look.

The two first rounders are the meat of the deal for the Knicks and are in line with what Miami traded to receive Chris Bosh and LeBron James in their respective sign and trade deals in 2010. Chicago could send New York the 2015 first-round pick from Sacramento that they received as a part of the Luol Deng trade, as well as their own 2015 first-round pick, without falling foul of the Ted Stepien rule. The so-called Stepien rule is widely misunderstood, and simply states merely that teams cannot leave themselves without a first-round draft pick in consecutive future drafts, but since Chicago has their own 2016 first-round pick (as well as the right to swap it with Cleveland’s), they are not running foul of this.

Sacramento’s pick is top 10 protected for the next three seasons – if it is not conveyed in that time, it is instead their 2017 second-round pick that is conveyed. In all probability, however, the pick would be conveyed. The Kings are not trying to get worse.  As with pretty much everything else mentioned, the specifics of the picks to be included are very changeable depending on the specifics elsewhere in the deal and the demands of the respective teams – the larger point is that, in my own personal hypothetical, the Knicks would receive two first rounders.

Note also that Anthony Randolph, whose salary cannot be aggregated in this trade, is left out of it altogether given that he is no help to the trade maths. He could be added along with Pablo Prigioni if the Knicks wanted them both to be so.

The Knicks’s total haul would be two cheap if replacable young backups, three veterans they can waive immediately at no cost, a veteran backup point guard used as salary filler, and two first-round picks. If that does not sound enticing, at least read until the end of the post, when hopefully the benefits of this deal to their future will become apparent.

STEP THREE:  Sign Nikola Mirotic for the full non-taxpayer mid-level exception.

It is assumed that this is how much it would take. If the actual amount needed is less, that would be great. The non-taxpayer mid-level exception this season has a maximum starting salary of $5.305 million.

Note that doing so would make the Bulls subject to the apron, the point $4 million above the luxury tax threshold that becomes a hard cap if triggered by certain factors, one of which would be using a proportion of the non-taxpayer MLE to sign a contract or contracts that could not be signed by the taxpayer MLE (which is smaller and a year shorter in its maximum length).

STEP FOUR: Sign Doug McDermott to his rookie scale deal.

This could pretty much be done at any time, since cap space is not in play. Once signed for 120% of his rookie scale deal, as is custom (and woe betide the team that tries to change this custom on a lottery pick, especially one they just traded quite a lot for), McDermott will be due to receive $2,277,960.

STEP FIVE: Beg D.J. Augustin to re-sign for the Bi-Annual Exception

Last used on Marco Belinelli in the summer of 2012, the Bulls have the BAE available to them again, and Augustin earned it. He may feel as though he can get more in a market where Jordan Farmar got this much, and he may be right, but with a player option on the second year, he may be coercible. The Bi-Annual exception is for a maximum of two years and in 2014-15 offers a maximum starting salary of $2.077 million.

STEP SIX: Sign Camerow Bairstow to the standard late second-round pick two year minimum salary contract

Can be done using the inexhaustible minimum salary exception, and is a nice way to stay cheap, as second-round picks cost less than minimums in luxury tax calculations. Bairstow’s cost for 2014/15 would be $507,336.

After all that manoeuvring, the Bulls are left with the following:

Carmelo Anthony – $19,686,660
Derrick Rose – $18,862,876
Joakim Noah – $12,700,000
Taj Gibson – $8,000,000
Nikola Mirotic – $5,305,000
Doug McDermott – $2,277,960
D.J. Augustin – $2,077,000
Jimmy Butler – $2,008,748
Anthony Randolph – $1,825,359
Cameron Bairstow – $507,336
Richard Hamilton (waived) – $333,334

TOTAL – $73,584,274

They would still be three players short of a full roster, lack a true backup centre and have scant little guard depth. But what they would have would be a starting lineup of Rose, Butler, Anthony, Gibson and Noah, with a primary bench three of McDermott, Augustin and Mirotic. They would have $3,415,726 under the assumed $77 million luxury tax threshold to fill out the roster, and (most importantly) be $7,415,726 under the apron. They will have run out of free agency money save for the minimum salary exception, but that might be all they need, and Anthony Randolph is still plenty tradeable. And they could also still use their trade exception of $1,074,720 to acquire one more player via trade. Remember – they never went under the cap, so they never lost this.

As for the Knicks, they would have the following after the trade:

Amar’e Stoudemire – $23,410,988
Andrea Bargnani – $11,500,000
Jose Calderon – $7,097,191
J.R. Smith – $5,982,375
Kirk Hinrich – $4,870,800
Samuel Dalembert – $4,051,527
Wayne Ellington – $2,771,340
Iman Shumpert – $2,616,975
Pablo Prigioni – $1,662,961
Shane Larkin – $1,606,080
Mike James – $1,448,490
Lamar Odom – $1,448,490
Tony Snell – $1,427,400
Lou Amundson – $1,310,286
Ronnie Brewer – $1,310,286
Shannon Brown – $1,310,286
Tim Hardaway Jr – $1,250,640
Greg Smith – $948,163
Jeremy Tyler – $948,163

TOTAL – $76,972,441.

The contracts of Tyler, Brown, Brewer, Amundson, James and Odom are all fully unguaranteed. Dalembert is guaranteed only $1,885,755 of his salary. Waive all them, and the Knicks would have only $65,144,913 in committed salary. They would have Thanasis Antetokounmpo and Cleanthony Early to come, plus exceptions to use – the Raymond Felton TPE of $3,637,073, the non-taxpayer MLE of $5.305 million and the BAE of $2.077 million all still intact.

More importantly, headed into next offseason, their only players under contract after waiving Hinrich would be would be  Calderon ($7,402,812), Larkin ($1,675,320, team option), Snell ($1,535,880, team option), Smith ($6,399,750, player option), Hardaway ($1,304,250, team option), Prigioni ($1,734,572, only $290,000 guaranteed) and whatever they give to Antetokoumpo and Early. This time next summer, they would be looking at the cap space for two maximum salary contracts AND the possibility of two first-round picks that year. In this deal, then, they pick up future assets for a player who would otherwise walk, plus yet more flexibility, both this year and next. The Knicks obviously want Carmelo to stay so very very badly, but if he chooses to go, they can gain from it.

The Bulls said they would have to be creative this summer. Does this count as that?

2014 Summer League rosters – Detroit

July 6th, 2014

Kentavious Caldwell-Pope – It was a bit of a nothing season for KCP, who was given plenty of opportunity to succeed (80 games, 41 starts, 19.8 mpg) and simply didn’t. He averaged only 5.9 points, 2.0 rebounds and 0.7 assists per game, shooting 39.6% from the field and 31.9% from three, looking very awkward on the offensive end of the court. Caldwell-Pope faired better defensively, given plenty of big matchups (especially at the start of the season) and using his athleticism and wingspan to occasionally be a deterrent to any slashing guard, but on offence he mostly looked lost, was unreliable with the handle, and settled for far too many long twos. KCP projects to be a very good three and D role player, which would suffice despite his draft position, but he absolutely needs to spend the summer honing that jump shot. There is something there to work with, yet a long way to go.

Brian Cook – The 33 year old Cook is back for one final go-around, joining the Jazz last year for training camp and now back in summer league for the first time in a decade. Cook however has not been an effective player for seven years, and, having not played in his time since being cut by the Jazz, hasn’t done anything to show this will stop being the case any time soon.

Justin Harper – Seems Stan Van Gundy is bringing in all the stretch fours from his Orlando days. Or at least, that’s what Harper was projected to be. He has not shot the ball well from three point range since leaving Richmond, hitting only 31.9% of his threes last season with Hapoel Tel-Aviv in Israel, on his way to 10.4 point and 5.1 rebound averages. Nevertheless, Harper can stretch the floor a little bit, and put in on the floor as well. SVG apparently went with a stretch four in his Magic days because he had not, not because he wanted to, but now it seems it’s all just his desire.

Jordan Heath – Heath was profiled at length in the 2014 NCAA senior centres round-up, even though he’s basically a power forward. A stretch one, at that. What are the odds? Click here.

Damion James – James now has four years of NBA experience and an NBA championship ring to his name, despite playing all of 623 NBA minutes. So he’s been opportunistic with his NBA gigs. All time not spent in the big D-League has been spent in its little brother, where a 12 game hot streak of 21.1 points, 11.3 rebounds and 2.6 assists per game averages earned James an April call-up to the Spurs. The 6’7 James rebounds and passes well, but is a bit positionless defensively, better and more willing to defend the paint despite having an NBA small forward’s physique. His offence is opportunistic with no go-to moves, and while he does enough to stay on the edge of the big league, he doesn’t have the one bankable trait to keep him there.

DeAndre Liggins – Another former Van Gundy player with the Magic, Liggins spent 10 days with the Heat last season, and spent the rest of the time in the D-League. Given the opportunity to make quite a lot of plays, Liggins managed only a 4.7/3.0 assist to turnover ratio and just isn’t that effective or efficient of one. He can see over the defence, drive the ball and has improved his three point shot to mediocre levels (and now takes too many), yet he is not good enough to merit the ball at the NBA level, and is not much use without it.

David Lighty – This is Lighty’s third straight summer league, and it’s going to lead to his third straight season in France, having already signed with ASVEL Villerbanne for next season. Last year in his second season with Nanterre, Lighty averaged 8.7 points, 3.5 rebounds, 2.5 assists and 1.3 steals in 26 minutes per game, playing his familiar brand of versatile role playing defensive combo guardyness. It’s probably not ever going to lead to an NBA gig – Chris Babb got one, but he’s a better catch and shoot player. But Lighty should churn out some more good European years yet.

Ian Miller – Miller can score, and Lord does he try. He is a shooter, a good shooter, and a very very enthusiastic shooter. Despite being 6’3 and roughly 200lbs, he is not a point guard or a creator – he can get the ball over halfcourt for you, but he’s not going to collapse and kick, hit a roll man, or do anything especially point guardy. He has the ball up top a lot, but it’s in the hunt for a shot.

Miller was pressed into this point guard masquerade in his time at Florida State, an act to which he committed his best. Miller can make the simple passes and handle the ball up top safely enough, which sufficed. It had to. His handle in traffic is less secure, however, and while he can use his good speed to get to the basket off ball screen action, he struggled to finish there, and instead settled for jumpers and floaters. Miller can nevertheless create jump shots for himself with his speed and agility, pulling up on a dime and shooting a step back, and can make tough, contested shots. He has a quick release and NBA range (and if he doesn’t have the latter, he soon will do), and can hit shots falling in all directions. Frankly, though, he chucks a few. He cannot end team scoring droughts in any way other than by chucking a shot, because he cannot consistently create them. And defensively, while Miller’s good size and speed are good for the point guard spot, he gets lazy defensively at times and is too easily hung up on screens to prevent the drive.

Players such as Jannero Pargo and Ian Clark have made the NBA with similar skill sets, but Miller has never really shown NBA talent. Bundesliga talent, yes.

Tony Mitchell – Mitchell only played 79 NBA minutes last season, but they were 79 good ones. You shouldn’t extrapolate much from such limited time, but it’s fun to do so, so why not. He barely got a chance at the big league level due to the continued mandatory persistence of the Josh Smith thing, and spent some time in the D-League. Down there, the reviews are mixed, averaging roughly 7 points and 7 rebounds in 23 minutes a game, also averaging a block and two turnovers per game. Mitchell is 22 now and cannot stay raw forever, and the Pistons are facing a bit of a roster pinch. He may especially feel it given that, as we see here, Stan Van Gundy seems to really want a stretch four, and Mitchell is not in. Nevertheless, his length, athleticism, rebounding and rim protectioon are still intriguing facets, even if his develop is going very slowly.

Peyton Siva – Siva has a contract for next year, but his spot is far from secure. He was the third point guard in the Pistons’s rotation at that position, but despite Brandon Jennings’s continued proving of the fact that he is not a lead guard, and Will Bynum’s continued limited play (a score first player without three point range who turns it over too often ans is a very weak defensive player), Siva was still the last resort option and still worse. Siva struggled badly on the offensive end, committing many passing turnovers and unable to consistently finish any shot from any area. He did have some good outings in April once the season was effectively over, but that’s small redemption for what was in total a wasted yet. He is here, then, with something simple yet important to prove – is he NBA calibre?

Tristan Spurlock – Spurlock just graduated from UCF, where he averaged 11.0 points, 5.5 rebounds, 1.2 steals and 1.1 blocks in 28.5 minutes per game as a senior. He also shot only 41.7% from the field for the second straight reason, largely because – what are the odds? – the 6’8 forward likes to take his three pointers. Half of Spurlock’s field goal attempts were three pointers, and he shot only 33,1% on them, which wasn’t anomalous. He always shoots in the low thirties on his threes, and has always taken a lot of them. But then, Spurlock is neither a scorer nor a rebounder. He is a finisher, athlete, dunker, catch-and-shoot player and transition runner at best; he does not take it in the post, and while he wants to be a face-up scorer, he cannot get to the rim consistently and has next to no mid range game. What Spurlock does have is good size and strength for the three position, athleticism and decent defensive instincts, plus the frame to employ them. You can be a wing player in the NBA even if you can’t take a dribble. Gotta shoot higher than those low 30’s, though. Spurlock has nice jump shot form that suggests he can improve in this area, but he also has a history of inefficiency that confirms that he needs to.

Markel Starks – Starks is an extremely solid point guard in all facets of the game, be it as a scorer, playmaker or defender.

As a defender, Starks fouls little and reads plays well, and generally puts forth a decent effort level albeit whilst slightly prone to giving up when beaten. He is small for the position and can be shot over, but it is not for a lack of contesting, and he moves his feet well to try to stay in front, rarely going for the steal. On offence, Starks rather lost his three point stroke last season and struggled to shoot over those bigger than he, which was quite a few. But inside the lane, he is very creative and skilled, with a strong mid-range game. Starks likes to attack the lane and gets there with body control, good feet and a relentless aggression; once there, he finishes fairly well at the basket for a small guard but better from slightly away from it, hitting floaters and runners and shooting pull-up jump shots very well. Starks is a regular users of screens, and can either drive or pull-up in screen action, as well as being able to do that thing so few collegiate point guards can do and actually hit the roll man. He has great body control, decent speed and runs the break fairly well, and although there are some bad decisions on both passes and jump shots along the way, Starks nevertheless much improved his IQ throughout his Hoyas career and became a leader of his team. He finds team mates, hits cutters, and has got the speed.

This ultimately is a package that may struggle to translate at the NBA level, due to his size. Starks struggles against bigger guards, and NBA guards are mostly going to be bigger than he is. However, if he gets the pull-up three to the same standard as the pull-up two, he has a chance some day.

Christian Watford – Oh look, another stretch forward. Since he was last profiled at last summer league, Watford has spent a year in Israel with Hapoel Eliat, averaging 9.8 points and 5.2 rebounds in 26 minutes per game, taking almost three three pointers per game, but hitting only 30.6% of them. He still wants to be a shooter, but he wasn’t that good of one last year, as opposed to the 40%+ of his junior and senior years. Committing himself to the rebounding glass will make him not be so reliant on the jump shot to be effective, though he seems not to want this. Watford can score inside the arc, draw fouls, post and drive occasionally, yet it is apparently Brian Cook he is targeting, so hopefully they’ll make friends.

2014 Summer League rosters – Boston

July 6th, 2014

O.D. Anosike – Anosike played in summer league last year with the Nuggets, then split last year between Italy and France. He started in Italy with Pesaro, and averaged 14.3 points and a league leading 13.1 rebounds in 35 minutes per game. He then bought himself out of his contract in May and finished the season with Strasbourg, where he did little in six games, averaging only 4.5 points and 3.3 rebounds in 19 minutes per game. The 6’7 Anosike is self-evidently an extremely proficient rebounder – strong, relentless, a decent athlete and a tireless worker, he uses his strength and determination to clean the boards, box out and rebound out of his area. The offensive skills, however, are lacking – Anosike posts little, shoots less, has no range and a very poor free throw stroke, good for some occasional pick-and-roll action but a finisher in the paint at best, and even then not the best one. Given his size, the fact that he is exclusively a paint player and the fact that he does not protect the rim, Anosike has few hopes of joining the NBA level. But Italy will have him back for many a year to come.

Chris Babb – Babb started the season with the Celtics and also ended it there. He is signed through 2017, albeit all unguaranteed from here on out, and played 14 games with the team down the stretch. He didn’t play them well, exclusively casting up threes and missing most of them, but he played them nonetheless. In the time in between, Babb played 33 D-League games with the Maine Red Claws and averaged 12.0 points, 6.1 rebounds and 3.3 assists in 37.5 minutes per game. As effective of a role player as Babb is – demonstrating good IQ, moving the ball around, throwing the occasional nice pass, rebounding a bit, and of course catching and shooting – it is a bit odd why the Celtics see so much in a player who just isn’t that productive and who is merely a decent shooter on low volume, wide open attempts. They clearly like his chances of being a quality defensive player at the two guard position, despite being slightly small for the position and not a great athlete. It’s a generous projection. But given that Babb contributes a bit of everything (save for penetrating the first line of a defence or contributing any offence inside the arc) whilst making strikingly few errors and playing hard, it’s easy enough to see what they like. They might run out of roster spots, though.

Dairis Bertans – Davis’s brother is smaller at 6’4, older at 24, and is a slightly undersized (for the NBA) shooting guard instead of a forward. He is something of a classic Eastern European guard, a pick-and-roll role player who runs around a lot but doesn’t leap, who defends by rotating and fouling (they’re told to) rather than being able to lock anyone up, and who shoots well without being exceptional at it. Save for his occasional secondary ball handling and pick-and-roll action. Bertans only really contributes as a scorer, prepared to go into the trees off a screen with a decent change of speed but struggling against size while in there, and even more prepared to pull up for a jumper or catch and shoot from long range, whilst taking a few more than he should in the process. It might translate to the NBA if he was bigger, but it’s not going to at a grounded 6’4.

Daniel Coursey – Coursey is the type of summer league discovery that makes you glad you take notes on absolutely everybody you watch, even when that somebody is just a 10ppg power forward from Mercer. Mind you, there weren’t many of them. Here they are quoted verbatim.

Very good shot-blocker, team’s only one. Good rebounder. Efficient, no range. Lefty. Not powerful. Finisher. Lefty hook out of the post but not much from down there. Great timing from the help side. Very lefty. Bites on perimeter fakes.

Colton Iverson – The Celtics’ draft pick from last season, Iverson turned down a training camp invite to go to Turkey with Besiktas, to continue the strong legacy of Iversons with that team. In 29 games of Turkish league play, he averaged 6.2 points, 4.3 rebounds and 2.3 fouls in 14.9 minutes per game, shooting 51% from the field and 49% from the line. Iverson is in to fulfil a role – offensive rebound, putbacks, finish around the rim and push everybody around. It’s a limited if useful role, but without being much of a rim protector and with very limited scoring talent and range, it’s likely not an NBA one.

Edwin Jackson – Long since on the NBA radar, Jackson went undrafted in 2011, and this is his first time in any summer league. The 6’3 French-American combo guard has become one of the best players in his domestic league, averaging 18.0 points and 2.3 assists in 32 minutes per game, and is certainly an NBA calibre scorer. He’s also an NBA calibre athlete, undersized for the shooting guard position but with long arms and good speed, adept at finishing around the rim (and getting there) despite his size and able to shoot over everybody. The knock on Jackson has always been that he takes too many jump shots, and he still does – he is a good not great shooter who could see a spike in his percentages once he realises an improvement in his shot selection. Nevertheless, the guy really knows how to score, in a Leandro Barbosa type of way. It’s a translatable skill, easily, and he has a chance at the NBA.

Chris Johnson – Johnson is also signed through 2017 and being taught to become the next Keith Bogans. Corner threes, catch and shoots, decent if slightly overstated man to man perimeter defence, and the like. He misses quite a lot of open shots from the corner and the wing so it’s going swimmingly so far.

Mike Moser – Moser is a fairly quirky player who apparently has decided that he wants to be a three point shooter. Historically, he has not been good at this, but an uptick as a senior to 37.8% at least justifies it a bit. now. Not strong or wide, the 6’8 Moser is not built to play the traditional power forward spot at a professional level that he has done so much at the collegiate level, but he nonetheless is a good rebounder with a motor and some athleticism.

What Moser could be is a face-up four in a small forward’s body. He likes to get out in transition and is a good athletic finisher, who finishes looks on offence rather than creates them. He catches and shoots despite his flat footed release, he finishes around the basket, and he gets a few off of putbacks. Moser’s shot selection is not the best, especially with the jump shot he continues to adore, but he can put the ball on the floor against flat footed opponents (especially after up-faking a closing-out defender), utilises a spin move, can pass off the drive, and somewhat makes up for poor defensive effort with his nose for the ball.

All of which is going to make him a solid Israeli league player.

Devin Oliver – As a senior, Oliver averaged a solid but unremarkable 11.9 points, 7.7 rebounds and 2.3 assists per game, but certainly enjoyed the benefits and was a big part of Dayton’s tournament run. He has spent the last couple of years adapting his versatile game to being more perimeter centric, as that is what his 6’6, 225lbs frame is catered for. He has added a catch and shoot three, which is much improved and which should translate, even though he barely jumps on it. He is still not the best ball handler, at all, especially with the right hand, but he can straight line drive it and cut to the rim off the ball. And while his perimeter defence is a bit unproven given the amount of time he spent defending the paint, he ought be fast enough to keep up there. If the versatile and high IQ Oliver can become more of a full time perimeter player, then his strong post-up offensive game becomes a big mismatch weapon.

Kelly Olynyk – Save for the fouls and turnovers, Olynyk had a decent rookie season. He rebounded, played his high IQ game, shared the ball, and scored if not entirely efficiently on offence. He might not be fast enough to play the stretch four spot, and although he has bulked up, maybe he’s never going to be big enough to play the five spot. Projecting a position for him defensively isn’t easy. But he’s plenty solid enough.

Phil Pressey – Pressey is an excellent passer out of the pick-and-roll. Very excellent. And his overall floor game continues to develop – an assist to turnover ratio of nearly three to one is good from anyone and very much so from an overmatched rookie. But overmatched is the big word there. The small Pressey just looked like he couldn’t make a shot at the NBA level, even though he continues to try, a great passer and terrible scorer who still tries to score. He still takes ones he can’t make, and while it is understood he needs defences to respect the jump shot so as to be able to penetrate them, he can’t shoot and it hurts the team when he tries. With two other non-shooting point guards in the fold next year, Pressey’s position and his unguaranteed contract are under threat. Best get them shots up in practice.

Marcus Smart – Smart can’t shoot, that much we know. He’s not a half court point guard, either, not even especially close to what John Wall was at this age, back when John Wall wasn’t much of a half court point guard either. As much as he attacks, throws himself to the rim and gets to the line, he also drives into trouble without knowing why at times, looks to score before he looks to pass, and seems to not have the best offensive IQ. Smart’s physical stature allows for some slightly quirky usage as a point guard, not just driving around screens but also setting them, which might be fun to see with Olynyk down the road, but at this point his passing vision, consistency and understandings of time and score all need a lot of work, work that comes through experience. He seemed to struggle much more against better quality competition, which doesn’t bode well, and was pretty inconsistent. The biggest thing Smart could do to help himself is to stop taking overconfident jump shots early in the clock, many of which would be bad shots even for good shooters, which he certainly is not. Maybe he learns, maybe he doesn’t. His offensive skill set in the half court is a legitimate concern and needs a lot ot work.

However, ignore that for the moment. Look at the defensive play. Smart has greater size, greater athleticism, terrific lateral quickness and a high motor. He should dominate the point guard position on defence. Smart is disruptive, persistent and energetic, an absolute harasser on that end. He is strong, he is fast, and he gets to the spot before the defender. Smart takes charges, flops egregiously (which is sort of a virtue, however noxious), and has chase-down blocks in a way that no other point guard really does. He is not ready made on this end, and will probably make some rookie mistakes with fouls and missed rotations in the early days. But he is so, so projectable on that end.

There’s a long way to go on offence. But just being as athletic as he is will be half the battle won.

James Young – Young came into his freshman with a great reputation, one partly born out of his supposed offensive instincts. But they weren’t on show. Players with offensive instincts should not look as lost and motionless as he did when off the ball. They should move, cut, get open, and not just stand there. Players with offensive instincts should not jump to pass several times a game like Young did. Players with offensive instincts shouldn’t drive into traffic relentlessly without knowing why they are doing it, without it being the percentage play, without there being any real chance of getting to the rim or drawing a foul because the defender got into position about half an hour before the drive even started. But Young did all these things all year young, showing only slight improvement by the year’s end. His fundamentals were weak, his IQ low, his passing vision and decision making poor. He rarely used screens or fakes, threw it away so often, and his shot creating abilities involved either the aforementioned drives to nowhere or just raising up and shooting.

Mind you, he’s been drafted low enough to get away with it. Because the potential is there. Young is a big wing with fluid mobility and an extra gear at times, who could be an excellent shooter and an excellent defender. The jump shot form is decent enough, and the results mostly good – if he hones it further, improves his consistency, improves his selection and learns how to create better looks like fakes, jab steps and the like, he could be one of the league’s better shooters. And with his size and quick release, it will be tough to block. Young is confident, we’ll give him that, and is no shrinking violet which will help his shooting prowess. His handle is sloppy and he ought never be expected to be a regular slasher to the rim, but if he can better recognises what is already a decent pull-up jump shot, that will give him some effectiveness inside the arc too. He can run the court and finish at the rim, which would suffice as an offensive package were he never to develop much of a slashing game or learn how effective dive cuts can be. The same package is true of his defensive projection, where his size, long arms and mobility bode well, although he needs to plug in all the time and want to attack the glass. He is of course young and in a situation where he can develop, so there’s plenty of scope for improvement, and plenty of reason to expect it.

But, meh. Long way to go. Long long way to go.

2014 Summer League rosters – Indiana

July 6th, 2014

Lavoy Allen – Allen was the third part of the Danny Granger/Evan Turner trade, but has barely improved in three years. He is still one of the most inefficient scorers in the league – he can hit a mid-range shot, but he only takes them, and there’s nothing efficient about a mid range jump shot. You have to hit 50% of them just to score a point per possession, with very few foul shots in the process, and Allen has yet to add the three point range to it. On the plus side, the rest of his game outside of scoring is very solid. He picked up his rebounding rate last year, still passes well, and defends through physicality, temperament and IQ rather than length or athleticism. Allen is said to already have agreed a deal to re-sign with the Pacers, which makes plenty of sense, because he is a very solid backup power forward. They can now waive Luis Scola, save money, and lose little.

Eric Atkins – Atkins is very hardy, playing huge minutes in almost every game. In those minutes, he is a very steadying presence, sporting an assist/turnover ratio of slightly over 2.5 to one and making very few mistakes. The trade-off is an absence of dynamic play.

Reasonably big for a point guard, but not especially fast or athletic, Atkins does not has the speed to consistently penetrate the first line of the defence and collapse it. He racks up his assists through feeding the post and moving it around without making bad passes, rather than through drawing the defence. Atkins is not a particularly bold or audacious ball handler, either, but he keeps the dribble alive and rarely loses it, partly because he rarely takes it into traffic but also because of the same attention to not making mistakes. He is a good shooter with good shot selection, who can shoot off a screen when off the ball or off the catch and shoot, albeit not being as good off the dribble. His lack of athleticism make it difficult for him to ever be a great slasher to the basket or finisher once he gets there, but Atkins plays within these limitations and exhibits strong discipline and good IQ. The same story carries over to the defensive end, where, despite being outquicked at times, Atkins uses poise, position and IQ to do a decent job of keeping opposing guards out of the lane, and where his size is more of a virtue.

This doth not an NBA player make. But it certainly does make a pro, and Atkins will make money somewhere.

Dee Bost – Waived by the Blazers out of last year’s training camp, Bost went to the D-League to form an insanely dynamic back court with Pierre Jackson. He averaged 15.2 points, 8.4 assists and 2.1 steals in 40 minutes per game of all 50 contests, and did the majority of the ball handling that allowed Jackson to do what he did best. Bost has many faults – he is still a poor shooter, still acts like he isn’t, is still a bit ineffective in the lane however well he can get there, is still sporadic defensively, and still gets very careless. But when he’s on, he is incredibly dynamic, fast, impossible to stop in transition and a real nuisance. He’s the opposite of Atkins, actually.

Jackie Carmichael – After summer league last year, Carmichael initially landed one of the few spots available to American rookies in the Spanish ACB when he joined Bilbao, but he rather struck out and came back to the D-League with the Iowa Energy. In 39 games there, he averaged 23.3 minutes, 9.3 points, 6.4 rebounds and 1.4 blocks per game, shooting 49% from the field and 68.8% from the line. Carmichael plays in the paint on both ends, where he rebounds, posts, seals and finishes, and protects the rim quite well while wanting to step out as little as possible. He made quite a few mistakes with the Energy and was quite inconsistent, but another year there might do him wonders.

Frank Gaines – Gaines won the D-League Most Improved Player award last season, which unlike the NBA MIP documents improving within one season, not from season to season. He spent the year with the Maine Red Claws and started from the bench, but quickly showed he was too good to stay there, and was soon in a starting role getting as many minutes as he could handle. Gaines ultimately finished the season averaging 22.4 points in only 35.4 minutes per game, with some huge scoring nights along the way, including a 47 pointer. The pace of the D-League helped him there, especially the frenetic pace the Red Claws played at in the second half of the year, but it’s not as though everyone else was doing this. The lefty 6’3 or 6’4 off guard is a bit undersized, but his scoring instincts are impeccable, his skills well developed, his aggression unrelenting. Gaines also does it while playing little isolation ball, and scores without the ball in his hands much – running the court unstoppably, cutting off the ball, spotting up and using some screen action to absolutely make the most of his touches. He wrong foots defenders on closeouts rather than breaking them off the dribble, drives both ways, hits tough ones, and has the athleticism to get where he wants go to. Hitherto overlooked, Gaines made himself unmissable last year, and although he has already signed for next year with JuveCaserta in Italy, this won’t be his last rodeo.

Solomon Hill – Hill’s rookie year wasn’t great. Per 36 minutes, he averaged only 7.5 points, 6.5 rebounds and 1.9 assists per game, shooting 42.5% from the field and 30.8% from three for a 7.6 PER. Some of his main virtues include his IQ high play, his unselfishness, his recognition of his limitations and his discipline to play within them. But he’s not going to survive if he’s THAT passive. Improving the catch and shoot jumper will stand him in great stead, as long as he’s willing to take them.

DeQuan Jones – Jones spent last year with the Reno Bighorns of the D-League, unable to get another season in the NBA. He shot 40.4% from three point range on his way to 13.6 points in 30 minutes per game, and finally showed some signs of being the athletic three-and-D role player Orlando seemingly thought he could be. It still doesn’t explain why they signed him so early, long before he had evidenced this, but Jones did half of what he needed to do. Now he really needs to commit to his man-to-man D.

Kevin Jones – Jones spent most of last year with the Canton Charge of the D-League once again, averaging 16.9 points, 8.0 rebounds and 2.6 fouls per game, and then went to the Philippines after being unable to get an NBA call-up in order to get some money. For some reason, Jones – who shot 40% from three as a sophomore and was a real stretch four threat – has put the outside shot away, hitting only one three pointer in the D-League last season on six attempts. This would be fine if he made up for the efficiency in other ways, but Jones rarely gets to the line, shooting one free throw for every 4.5 field goal attempts. Jones is offensively very talented and very smooth – a finisher around the basket, a transition player, a finesse post man with touch and a pick-and-pop option, who for some reason these days only pops from two. He rebounds well, is athletic and plays with a motor, but is not strong nor a rim protector and needs that offensive efficiency to maximise all his talent. Take a step back, Kevin! Stretch fours who rebound as well as you do are coveted these days!

C.J. Leslie – In 34 games last year for the Erie BayHawks, Leslie averaged 13.3 points, 5.9 rebounds, 1.3 assists, 1.0 steals and 0.8 blocks in only 24.5 minutes per game. He also recorded two turnovers per game and insisted on taking 41 three pointers, even though he still can’t shoot them. This is the frustrating thing with Leslie – an athletic specimen, Leslie just wants to be an alpha scorer, a shooter and a perimeter player, an isolation player, a wing threat. And he isn’t. If he could settle for occasional driver and defensive disruptor, this would be grand, but he has yet to embrace a role other than ‘star’, and he hasn’t star talent.

Roger Mason – Mason’s presence on this roster is an odd one. It’s strangely pleasing to see him be willing to do what it takes to get back into the NBA, rather than wait for the phone to ring and slowly becoming forgotten, but the book on him is well established – he’ll catch and shoot threes, has pretty much lost his defence, and that’s about it. Mind you, it worked for Rasual Butler, who fell out of the NBA for the entire 2012/13 season but who made it back for 2013/14 after joining a summer league team. And where did he do that? Indiana.

James Nunnally – After a year and a half with Orlando Johnson, the Pacers are bringing in another UCSB Gaucho in the form of Nunnally, who played in the NBA last year with both the Hawks and Pacers. Nunnally has developed a strong all-around game – efficient, versatile, a scorer and passer, a defender and decent athlete. He stands out in no one facet of the game, perhaps, but he contributes everywhere. Indiana might be a tough spot to get minutes, however, given their wing depth. They already have Solomon Hill and Chris Copeland, they’re bringing in C.J. Miles and Damjan Rudez, and Nunnally is not replacing Lance Stephenson any time soon. Nevertheless, Nunnally remains in the conversation of a midseason call-up, because he is good.

Jake Odum – Odum is one of only two first year players on this team, fresh out of Indiana State and the beneficiary of hometown ties. But he is also here on merit. Odum averaged 13.1 points and 4.6 assists per game, alongside 1.9 turnovers per game, shot 8.6 field goals and 6.7 free throws per game, but made only 22 three pointers per game, and made only 74 in his collegiate career. He is a big point guard at 6’4, but not a fast one, which hinders him defensively along with the shot that hinders him offensively. What he can do is get to the basket and into the paint regularly off of screens, whereby he can kick to the corners, drop it off, and the get the ball to wherever it needs to go. He will take the contact, finish tough runners and high bankers even when smothered by size, and attack the rim at every opportunity. A true point guard with vision, unselfishness, creativity and the ability to get passes through the tightest of angles, Odum has big limitations and never did learn to shoot, but pick-and-roll play like that is great for certain European leagues. So if he gets any minutes, he’ll be hoping the European scouts are watching.

Arinze Onuaku – Onuaku popped up briefly in the NBA with the Pelicans last year, and spent the rest of his time in the D-League. In 32 games with the Canton Charge, Onuaku averaged 14.8 points and 10.0 rebounds, good numbers that become brilliant when you consider he started only 11 games and averaged 24 minutes a contest. Onuaku always had amazing touch around the rim and was always a threat to catch, seal and finish with either hand, but he has spent the past two seasons rebounding the bejeezus out of the ball. He is undersized for the centre spot, turns 27 next week, is not very athletic and projects as a poor interior defender at the NBA level, not being a rim protector and exposable with his lack of lateral quickness. He is also exposable offensively with his lack of range and dreadful foul shooting. But my word he got productive lately. If you need extremely efficient layups and plenty of rebounds, this is your man.

Sadiel Rojas – Rojas spent his third straight season with the Fort Wayne Mad Ants, and has improved in each one of them. Last season he recorded 12.5 points, 8.8 rebounds and 1.9 steals in slightly more than 30 minutes per game, shooting 44.9% from the field and 36.3% from the field. He is a tough, aggressive and relentless wing defender who over time has been adding to his offensive game, most evidently by the addition of a catch and shoot three point shot. He handles little and still is not much of a creator, limited to fairly rudimentary drives, yet he plays within his limitations whilst constantly pushing back at them, and . Rojas is undersized for an NBA wing and not hugely athletic, and is still therefore unlikely to make the NBA as a three and D role player. But he’s become a very good one at the D-League level, and won’t be faulted for his toughness or energy ever. Very likeable, if limited.

Donald Sloan – Sloan spent the whole of last season with the Pacers, having had $350,000 of his contract guaranteed for the season, but in his first full NBA season, he struggled considerably. Sloan played 48 games and finished fourth last amongst qualified players (434th out of 437) in real plus-minus, ahead of only Byron Mullens, Elliot Williams and Dennis Schroeder, and was last on the Pacers in net points by quite a long way. He played point guard exclusively, but he just cannot run an NBA offence – it was always the question about him, but now it’s proven. And if he’s going to possibly be a shooting guard, he needs to be able to shoot much better than that. Sloan can defend the point guard spot, but he can’t play it on offence, and he doesn’t defend it well enough to obscure this.

Tyler Stone – As a senior at SE Missouri State, the 6’8 230lbs Stone averaged 19.3 points, 9.5 rebounds, 1.9 steals, 1.5 blocks and 1.0 steals per game, shooting 54.4% from the field and 33.8% from three. He is athletic, with long arms and wiry strength, but slightly undersized for the power forward spot, and the three pointer is a new development to aid the transition to the combo forward spot. Stone also shoots mid-range jumpers, and, if he adds that range, projects nicely as a face-up smaller four. He handles the ball little and is caught between positions a little, very untested at this point, but his athleticism is ready to go. Summer league will be a good barometer for him, should he get much court time. Stone has already agreed to sign with Besiktas in Turkey for next season, but can nevertheless lay some ground work here for future years.

2014 Summer League rosters: Philadelphia

July 5th, 2014

Nerlens Noel – Noel will be the best player from the 2013 draft, barring more significant injuries. There is no reason why this as-near-as-is 7 footer with wingspan, athleticism, instincts, anticipation, body control and hustle should not average 10 points and 3 blocks per game at his peak. The offensive end is less certain, as is the fit alongside Joel Embiid, but that’s all stuff that can be worked out down the right. As of right now, the Sixers landed the two best talents in back-to-back drafts without a number one overall pick to do so. And the fact that both have been injured sufficiently to keep the tank open is even better.

Casper Ware – Ware is signed through 2017 with the Sixers, although this being they, that does not mean much, as it is all fully unguaranteed from here on out. He squeaked into nine games with the team at the end of last season and did what he always does – score. He also defends well for his size, moving the feet well and being generally pesky, even when generally pesky. It is going to be a problem for Ware that the Sixers have obtained the draft rights to Pierre Jackson, because as good as Ware is for a 5’10 scorer with a merely adequate floor game, Jackson is a better. Ware, then, needs to win (or hold) his spot through this defensive pressure.

Ronald Roberts – Roberts was one of the best athletes in this draft, or indeed in any draft. He has a decent frame, decent wingspan and decent strength, terrific leaping ability, good speed, and a LONG first step. His athleticism is magnetic and tantalising, because few can impact a game through their ability to jump alone in the way he can.

There is a modicum of skill to go with it, but not as much as the athleticism. Roberts shoots a mid-range jump shot, but he shoots it flat and he does not shoot it very well, things both also true of his free throw stroke. He occasionally drops a hook shot, but is not asked to isolate down low often at all. Rather, he is a finisher on offence, not a creator. Roberts will clatter his way to the rim at times with that long first step of his, and draws plenty of fouls called on him as he is completely unafraid to take it at people, but the offence is a continued work in progress. The best part of his offensive game is the offensive rebounding, yet Roberts negates this by being a distinctly poor defensive rebounder, born out of a lack of desire to box out. He remains very much a project, then.

Defensively, things are going better. Through his speed alone, Roberts is a weak side presence and constant help defender, who plays tough. He moves around well – how could he not? – and generally plays hard without committing too many fouls, save for occasionally quitting when beaten. He projects well on this end, as long as he can clean the glass and develop the offence a bit. Roberts’s athleticism, speed, hands and transition game already translate, but he needs to develop his skills and cut down the mistakes. It will be interesting to see if this summer league spot is a precursor to a training camp contract on a small guarantee, itself a precursor to a season in the D-League, where the Sixers can monitor him, develop him, and be ready to pounce. In fact, I think I expect this.

Aaron Craft – Aaron Craft is the Derek Jeter of basketball, universally lauded by every broadcast team that ever took to the sport and universally loathed by everyone other than fans of his team precisely because of this undue love. He is lauded in his way basically for his effort, but also because of the perception of IQ this gives off. He ‘plays the game the right way’, ‘knows how to play the game’, and of course, he ‘does whatever it takes to win’. As long as whatever it takes to win is within his very limited skillset.

Craft is known for his physical, tenacious defence. He moves he feet well, uses his strength and bodies up everyone, with a terrific motor, good hands, good anticipation and the relentless desire to be an absolute pest. He is relentlessly aggressive and never seems to run out of energy and hustle, which is the guaranteed way to win the hearts and minds of observers disdainful of everyone who doesn’t do this. He gets away with things others never could in the process, and does dirty things at times, but it’s all a part of the package. It’s also pretty much all of the package, because offensively, Craft offers little. He is certainly a willing ball mover and a pass-first point, and boasts decent passing vision at times. But he is also thoroughly undynamic, rarely penetrates the first line of the defence, and is more steady than probing. And his own scoring skills are lacking – the unathletic and undersized Craft does very little in the paint, and is a poor shooter both off the dribble and off the catch.

By moving his feet quickly and being really annoying to his opponents, Craft has won over the very types of people who make the sort of decisions he is now faced with. But the NBA has mostly moved on from its Eric Snow, Kevin Ollie and Rick Brunson days. Craft is too small, slow, unathletic and undynamic to make it as an NBA defensive specialist point guard. You have to be Patrick Beverley to do that now. And Aaron Craft is no Patrick Beverley.

Isaiah Sykes – Sykes is a quirky player who lef UCF in pretty much every category, with one big drawback. A ball dominant lefty shooting guard, Sykes’s game is hindered by a lack of jump shot. He hits a few mid range shots, but takes much more than a few, and lacks three point range. Given his established lack of jump shot and proven driving game, he is always given the jump shot if he wants it, and he almost always takes it, with a long and slow release that doesn’t even disguise it. This does not work out. And it follows logically that he is also a poor foul shooter.

Sykes makes up for it elsewhere on offence by doing it all. He is always looking for the drive, and gets there with craft rather than explosion. He has a very solid handle of the ball for an off guard, can drive both ways (albeit always finishing left), shoots bankers, and makes enough contested ones from midrange. Sykes was asked to be UCF’s option every trip down, and while this slowed the game up and he was guilty of stopping the ball at times, he was also their best option in the halfcourt, demonstrating good vision whilst carrying much of the scoring load. He will make mistakes at times, and is not efficient because of the lack of shot, but he will push the ball and rebound the glass, going coast to coast at times. He consistently makes tough ones and he consistently had to. Defensively, he needs to improve his rotations and help defence, but with his size and decent athleticism he can keep an opponent out of the paint, as well as crash the glass.

Ultimately, the profile and projection is all hindered by the lack of a shot. With it, his inefficient game would be a lot more efficient. But even with it, Sykes is sufficiently ball dominant that it’s a mystery how he would fit alongside a point guard of some calibre. He can’t be the primary playmaker if the team is to be any good, for he is too inefficient and mistake prone. So it is tough to project a fit for Sykes.

Hollis Thompson – Thompson played 1,742 minutes as a Sixer last year, getting 41 starts. He showed some signs of being a three-and-D role player, hitting 40.1% of his threes on the season. It was a very low number of shots, though, making one three pointer every 26 minutes, and was somehow still the majority of his offensive game. Thompson barely troubled the glass, did not create for himself or others, and really was quite limited in his role – he shot the ball if he was open, either moved it on or never caught it in the first place if he didn’t. On the defensive end, he was athletic and keen, much keener than the rest of the backcourt he was playing with, and certainly an improvement upon them. He was heady and disciplined, contesting without fouling or overplaying, moving his feet and rarely quitting on any plays. But he wasn’t exactly locking anyone down either. And so while his presence last year was refreshing in light of the deliberately poor situation he was put in, Thompson is one of the very players the deliberate losing seeks to seriously upgrade. He could stick as a role player, but he’s going to have to shoot more, because this is not Bruce Bowen.

Travis Bader – Bader is a very good shooter with a quick release, plenty of action off of screens, and the ability to go straight up, quickly. He is of course consciousless from three, willing to take any look he is given, yet he does not take poor ones often, always willing until he has a little bit of space. And he only needs a little bit of space. Bader is a very hardy soul, playing almost every minutes of every game, and is in constant motion in that time, trying to get free. Should he not get entirely free, he can hit when contested, and can shoot off the move with a decent change of speed. Bader is not entirely limited to the three, either – he can step in for a two, step back for a tough two, and very occasionally barrel into the trees off a curl if the defence overplays for the jump shot.

Scoring, though, is all Bader does. He does not rebound, he rarely handles, and as much as he tries on defence, he is not big or fast and has no great gifts with his hands. He only gets to the line the decent amount that he does because he is the team’s designated foul shooter, so even the ridiculously good free throw percentage does not add much value as he rarely takes them. He looks to have little passing vision, and is not a playmaker for anyone other than himself. He is in only to score, and even that is almost always a jump shot. Said jump shots come around screens and off catches, not off the bounce, and he is only as good as the looks he is given. If they are not there, nor is he. Bader, then, is very very one dimensional. He’s not Ethan Wragge out there, yet there’s mot as much in it as you might hope. And Wragge is at least bigger.

Is it enough to get to the next level anyway? Yes, possibly. But this is not a Kyle Korver level of shooter right here. Not yet, at least. Given a smaller offensive responsibility, maybe we will start to see that he is.

Jerami Grant – Grant fell down boards, despite his athletic prowess, on account of not having one go-to facet of his game. His biggest virtue is looking the part – very athletic, long and wiry strong, he has what would be an ideal small forward’s body type. But as it is, he’s a power forward through and through.

Grant is a very poor shooter who also displays little handle on the ball. He has body control and likes a spin move, but the ball doesn’t always come with him when he performs it. A long way short of being a small forward, Grant is not even close to being a regularly effective face-up power forward at this stage. Nor indeed are his skills as a traditional paint power forward all that much more advanced. Grant rarely posts and looks unready when he does, and offensively is a finisher at best.

What he does however bring are the unmissable physical tools, and an idea of how to use them regardless of the limitations of his skill set. Grant runs the floor on offence and finishes well at the rim, and also cuts to the rim in timely fashion to finish without having to handle too much. He can sneak through gaps with great body control, and also can do the one or two dribbles necessary to get to the rim past slow or overplaying defenders, where again he can finish explosively. The defensive end is the one where he is set to thrive – disruptive and committed, Grant can stay in front of wing players and does a fairly good job of bodying up opposing power forwards like himself. He needs some more weight, but that will come.

Grant looks a pro, and surely will be. There’s a long way to go yet, but then again, what rush were Philadelphia ever in?

JaKarr Sampson – Sampson is one of the best athletes on the list. A really tremendous leaper with length and great size for the position, on physical tools alone, he is the template you would draw a small forward from if such a small forward template service was available. The skills are less templatey, though.

Sampson is old for a sophomore, having turned 21 in March, and there is a lot of work to do. Some of it is in the frame – thin and wiry, Sampson can be muscled off the spot when driving and on the glass, two areas which need to be mainstays of his game. He will not attack a shot-blocker despite his leaping ability as he struggles to take the contact, But some of it is just a lack of skill. Sampson’s dribbling ability is entirely with his right hand – it’s a high dribble which he cannot seem to change direction from, and he cannot normally stop once he’s started. He barrels in blind and makes bad decisions once there, that bad decision normally being one that involves continuing to barrel in. There exists the occasional pull-up jump shot, but the form on that and any jump shot is really rather ugly and snatchy, and Sampson lacks any range because of it. He is also a poor foul shooter and rarely gets there due to his lack of handle and strength, which when combined with his absence of a three point stroke, makes for quite the inefficient dunking machine.

Mind you, the athleticism cures these ills pretty well. The handle is not great, as explained above, but Sampson can go from the arc to the rim in one power dribble, so often times he doesn’t need much more than that. Sampson can dunk everything, from out of nowhere at times, and is always a threat for a lob play. Furthermore, his length is a defensive deterrent – his defensive focus and effort are not consistent, but so long and bouncy is he that he can recover quickly and shut off driving lanes just by sticking his arms out. He runs the court well and sometimes hustles off the ball for looks. But like the rebounding, he needs to do those things more than he does.

This is the issue with Sampson. He does some things well, and some things badly, yet he won’t stick to that which he does well enough. The athleticism is tantalising, but it doesn’t take long to look beyond.

Talib Zanna – Zanna was covered comprehensively in the 2014 NCAA senior centres round-up. Click here.

Ed Daniel – Daniel was with the Hawks last year in summer league following his senior season at Murray State in which he was a nightly double double. In the time hence, he has been in Italy with Pistoia, averaging 8.7 points, 7.6 rebounds, 3.2 fouls and 2.2 turnovers in 26 minutes per game. He is an athlete and a very good athlete at that, a hectic player who crashes the glass, attacks anyone in his path both offensively and defensively, and plays with a lot of energy. He uses his physical tools to win possessions, posts on occasion, plays physical and drives into contact willingly, whilst also swatting and deflecting some shots and passes in the painted area. Unfortunately for Daniel, he is a power forward in a small forward’s 6’7 frame. And for all the small adjustments he is making to his game to try and become more of a perimeter forward, he still is best around the basket and surely always will be. Damion James is a similar sort of player who has managed a few NBA seasons with a similar skill set, but he is slightly bigger, slightly better with the handle and the shot, slightly better on perimeter defence and a much better passer. And James has never exactly stuck himself. Daniel, then, is up against it.

Seems the Sixers are really targeting their athletes right here, by the way.

Jamelle Hagins – Hagins was in summer league last season with the Nets, but that was as good as his first professional season got. He started the season with Roanne in France, but averaged only 3.4 points and 4.8 rebounds in 9 games (taking one foul shot in that time), then returned to America and joined the D-League’s Rio Grande Valley Vipers, where he averaged 5.5 points, 4.2 rebounds, 1.3 blocks and 3.0 fouls in 16 minutes of 22 games. Hagins has developed a fairly solid frame over time that he still chooses not to use on offence, settling for mid-range jump shots and moving screens, and while his main virtue comes from his defence and rim protection, he cannot seem to do it without fouling. At 6’9 and 235, Hagins has the right frame for a power forward, has clearly defined strengths and weaknesses, and is certainly a talented and willing shot blocker. But he needs more discipline for it to be worth anything.

Melvin Ejim – Ejim scored a lot of points as a senior, including his 48 point outing versus TCU that got so much publicity. He is an explosive athlete who catches and finishes, spots up, finishes with authority, runs the floor and dunks as much as he can. He finishes high percentage looks, utilises a runner when driving and makes them appear through his physical tools. Ejim creates little in the post, utilising only fairly rudimentary footwork and having no touch, but he can always go over and finish with authority given half a yard.

Inadvertently, however, that 48 point outing also highlighted some of the flaws in his game. Ejim shot 20-24 from that night, which is brilliant, but there were only two three point attempts and six foul shoots on the way. It mattered not on that night, obviously, but he needs more of those and fewer twos. Ejim recognises this and is developing the three point stroke, hitting 34.7% of them last season in his first year of taking quite a lot of them and it needs to continue.

If it does, Ejim has a chance of making it as a small forward. At 6’6 and 220, this is how it’s going to have to be. As of right now, Ejim is more of a face-up four, a very good rebounder for height but with little handle, high turnovers born out of his attempts to handle it anyway, and still working on his perimeter instincts. He runs some pick-and-roll, which is helpful, but through body type alone, small forward is the best bit. His rebounding will be a big advantage at that position, and while his perimeter defence is largely untested, he demonstrated a good motor that ought combine with his physical tools that make him projectable on that end. Can he further improve the shot, manage what Marcus Landry never quite did and stick around? Possibly. Maybe he ought go to the D-League and prove it.

Pierre Jackson – The Sixers acquiired Jackson’s draft rights on draft night for those of Russ Smith, which is odd, because Jackson is better. Last season in the D-League, he proved he was hardy, fearless and extremely productive, averaging 29.1 points per game (second only to Manny Harris) alongside 6.2 assists in 40.9 minutes a game. He showed he could shoot over anyone, get to the rim against anyone, make tough ones, create his own shot, and change a game with his offensive output. And yes, of course he is small. That doesn’t change what he did and doesn’t change what he could go on to do as much as we might think. He’s a scorer, and he can do that anywhere. Anyone who tries to change his game so as to shore up his 6.2/4.0 assist to turnover ratio runs the significant risk of taking Jackson away from his strengths. He’s a scorer and he’s 5’10. Come to peace with them both because he cannot change either.

2014 Summer League Rosters – Orlando

July 4th, 2014

Kadeem Batts – Batts is somewhere in between Mike Davis and Mike Scott. He is a wiry strong finesse power forward whose game is based around the mid-range jump shot and who rarely creates. Be it through the pick and pop, the pick-and-roll, cuts to the basket or through running the court in transition, Batts generally only finishes looks others or opportunity created for him. Even when he posts, it is normally only to a jump shot. He has the frame to do more in the paint, but not the game. He’s a finesse player who will take some contact, but hasn’t that much power. He just is. So be it.

On the glass, Batts uses his activity and length to keep balls alive and is a good offensive rebounder for this reason, but is less effective on the defensive glass where he can be outfought. Similarly, he defends the perimeter well, but is not much of a rim protector. He struggles to do much in the post on both ends when up against players of true size, and though he anticipates well and hedges hard, he has not the power of a power position player. Batts has good speed and a good motor, and can seal and finish down low on smaller opponents, but there aren’t going to be smaller opponents at the highest levels. And while he can occasionally spot up from three and drive the ball from the line, he can also barrel people over and has yet to add consistent three point range.

What separates Mike Davis and Mike Scott? Scott is smarter, tougher, competes defensively even when overmatched and has a little bit of three point range. Batts ought to channel some of this. He could make the league despite his rebounding and his defensive deficiencies, just as Scott has, if he can make enough shots. Scott is learning the three. Batts must too.

Matt Bouldin – Four years after his first summer league, Bouldin is back for more. He spent last year in the D-League, and after starting the season so far down the L.A. D-Fenders’s bench that he could hardly get a minute, he got free and pretty much evenly split the season between the Delaware 87ers and Fort Wayne Mad Ants, guard-starved teams that gave him free reign to create offence. Bouldin responded to the tune of as-near-as-was 15 points, 4 rebounds and 4 assists per game, shooting 37% from three point range alongside 1.5 steals a contest. And if that looks pretty much identical to his numbers as a senior, that s not a coincidence. The slow ball-dominant high IQ good passing good shooting sorta-combo guard has battled injuries as a pro and has not been able to expand his game, but last year gave him the opportunity to prove he was healthy. He also proved he was still good. But not NBA good.

Seth Curry – Steph’s brother had multiple NBA looks last season, including one game each with both the Grizzlies and the Cavaliers. Reportedly, he turned down the contract Scotty Hopson later mistakenly received – either Cleveland didn’t offer him the same deal that Hopson eventually got and that information was wrong, or Curry made a grave error. Between NBA contracts, Curry spent the season with the Santa Cruz Warriors of the D-League and averaged 20.4 points and 5.7 assists in 45 games, shooting 37.8% from three point range. He certainly plays like big bro. But he has not that talent level. Given the opportunity in the D-League to show he was more than just the shooter he had been at Duke, Curry did so, but he still nevertheless showed he was mostly just a shooter. And at his height, he’s going to have to be an even better one to make it.

Dewayne Dedmon – Dedmon signed about thirty five contracts last year and eventually wound up signing with the Magic through 2016. He is a fairly unique player, a prolific rebounder and decent defensive presence in the lane who takes quite a lot of mid-range jump shots offensively, a factor of the game at which he continues to improve. His frame, mobility and hugely long arms were built to play the NBA pivot position, and Lord knows he can do for years if he can rein in the fouls and mistakes a bit. Dedmon’s contract is unguaranteed for both this year and next, but given how Orlando is in the midst of a rebound, they ought stick with Dedmon and see what develops. They will not likely find a better centre prospect elsewhere.

Asauhn Dixon-Tatum – Dixon-Tatum was covered at length in the 2014 NCAA senior centres round-up. Click here. Spoilers: He’s not a better NBA centre prospect than DeWayne Dedmon, but he is kinda fun.

Kim English – Dixon fell out of the NBA last year and initially went to Italy, where he joined one time powerhouse and now bankrupt fourth divisioners Siena. After their EuroLeague exit, English moved to France and played the rest of the season with Roanne, for whom he averaged 11.2 points in 26.4 minutes for the remainder of the season. English can still score without the ball in his hands much, no doubt, but he also still needs to prove he has that NBA range, shooting only 34.5% from three in the French league. His jump shooting peers can, so he must.

Aaron Gordon – I love Aaron Gordon. He could be the second best player in this draft class. So much has been made of his athletic abilities prior to and since the draft that it obscures his skills. Particularly his defensive ones, which are so very good for a freshman.

Gordon is an athlete, a passer, a defender and finisher. He is a high IQ player with some holes in his skillset but nothing he can’t work out. On the defensive end of the floor, he is so advanced for his age. Gordon steps up well on D, steps out well on D, and demonstrates great discipline and good effort to go along with his length and speed. He rotates well, makes few mistakes, reads well, takes charges and has the length to block his man. He stays home, not biting on too many fakes, and recovers when he needs to. Combined his timing and anticipation with his activity on the glass, and you have yourself a defensive presence. Add a little strength, and you have yourself an NBA defensive presence.

The offensive end is a little far behind, but even there, Gordon showcases one skill that just can’t be taught – his passing game. Gordon is a tremendous interior passer, so much so that he’s even run a pick-and-roll as the ball handler on occasion. He passes on the move better than pretty much every other big man in the game, can hit a cutter when facing up on the perimeter, and can kick it back out when down in the post. His individual offence is a work in progress – most significantly, Gordon is a God awful free throw shooter who is fouled a lot accordingly, not with the worst form in the world but with hands that could probably use a little realignment. He has no go-to move, though he does like a little floater when on the drive and shoots jump shots better than his foul shots suggest. The handle is not especially smooth and the post-up play limited, but Gordon will at least run the court and dive to open spots to get looks, and he finishes well.

Some of the skills need developing, but some are already so developed. Gordon has the body type, size, length, bounce, second jumpability, defence, IQ and potential to be one of the best at his position. I will be sad if he doesn’t because I’m all in on this one.

Luke Hancock – Hancock, who will join the team for the Vegas summer league only, was profiled in the Rockets summer league roster roundup.

Cameron Jones – Jones is a testament to the fact that the Development League really can be used to develop your game. He has put in three seasons there now and has become a go-to scorer, averaging 20.2 points on 46.5% shooting and 40.8% from three point range, throwing in 4.4 rebounds and 3.5 assists per game on the way. He always was a good scorer, both in his previous two years and his collegiate career, but he has taken it to the next level, mostly through the addition of the three pointer. Always a good mid-range shooter, Jones added the range, and with that comes efficiency and output. These things complementing his high IQ game, good athleticism and solid man to man defence, he is now on the cusp of the NBA. And if he doesn’t make it this time, it’s probably time he left the D-League and starts drawing in the big paychecks that he can.

Vernon Macklin – Macklin is two years removed from the NBA, and has been on a tour. He has played in Turkey, the D-League, the Philippines and China’s secondary league, and does the same thing in all of them. He pushes, he bruises, he drops righty hooks from the post, he never leaves the paint, and he fouls. Macklin is 27 years old and slightly undersized for the centre spot that his groundedness and reliance on the post demand he play. Lacking finesse, skill, a foul stroke, rim protection despite his long wingspan, and three inches of height, he is not likely to make it back to the big leagues. But old school post bruisers are always needed somewhere else.

Josh Magette – Magette (pronounced Ma Jet, not the same as Corey Maggette) made the Grizzlies summer league team in 2012 after finishing up a senior season at Division II Alabama-Huntsville in which he averaged 12.7 points, 8.9 assists and 2.7 steals per game. He spent the first year of his professional career in Holland and then spent last year with the L.A. D-Fenders of the D-League, averaging 10.4 points, 6.9 assists, 1.9 steals and 1.6 turnovers per game, shooting 38% from three. Magette, clearly, is a pass first point guard. He keeps the dribble alive, dribbles with no flair but no danger, executes simple passes routinely and makes scant few mistakes. He also takes few risks, rarely probing beyond the first line of the defence and very rarely foraying in the paint, dribbling back out quite often when he does. Magette’s physical profile is very unfavourable for the highest levels of basketball, a 6’1 point guard with short arms, no speed and no explosion, but he has a lot of IQ and headiness that make him likeable. He plays within his significant limitations and betters any offence with his decision making and jump shot from both mid and long range, both off the catch and off the dribble. But given that he can neither create his own shot nor defend his position with any physicality, relying upon his hands and reads only, and is merely a decent jump shooter, he is probably right where he is.

Roy Devyn Marble –

Marble is an unconventional guard, a 6’6 off guard with point guard tendencies who relies on IQ and versatility rather than any explosive. Save for a mediocre free throw stroke and a tendency to drift at times, he contributes a bit of everything and has no glaring weaknesses. A much improved long range shooter and defender, Marble is much more efficient than his 42% field goal shooting suggests due to the high volume of threes he takes (albeit at only 34%) and the high number of times he gets to the foul line. He has added range to his mid range jump shot and the ability to create spacing for the jumper with a step-back, jab steps and a pull-up, as well as shooting off curls.

Without the speed to collapse a defence on the regular, Marble finds seams using his body control and will take contact at the basket. He is not an especially good finisher at the rim, but he will get to the line as much as he can. Marble spends more of his time playing more away from the rim and using screens, either as the curler around them or when calling for ball screens when serving as the primary ballhandler, as he can occasionally do. When running the offence, Marble plays the pick-and-roll well and demonstrates solid vision and decision making – he will never be a lead guard at this level, but it helps. And defensively, while Marble is still prone to reaching in and gambling for steals rather than moving his feet, caught looking in help defence situations all too readily, he is improved in man to man defence and uses his size to deny passes.

This all sounds a bit like Matt Bouldin, admittedly. But he’s slightly bigger, slightly faster and slightly better. Which suffices.

Victor Oladipo – As customary as it is for rookies to attend summer league no matter how high they were drafted, there doesn’t seem to be any great reason for Oladipo to be here. Maybe it’s just to get familiar with Payton and Gordon, in which case they might as well have sent Nikola Vucevic here as well. Nevertheless, congratulations to Orlando for drafting the second best player in two consecutive drafts. Maybe.

Romero Osby – After being cut by the Magic last training camp, Osby is back for a second go, despite the power forward spot he plays being even fuller than it was last time with the addition of Gordon and the breakout of the sneakily good Kyle O’Quinn. In the year hence, he has been in the D-League with the Maine Red Claws, where his task was to rein in his mistake making. He failed. Although he poured in 16.2 points and 6.4 rebounds in only 27 minutes a game, there were also 3.3 fouls and 2.8 turnovers per game in that time. A quality offensive talent, Osby still does not know how to use what he has. He can use summer league as an opportunity to showcase what he does have, at least, as well as prove his return to health after season ending shoulder surgery in January.

Elfrid Payton – The Magic traded the rights to Dario Saric at #12, a future second-round pick, and a future first-round pick (sort of) in order to get Payton at #10. They then waived Jameer Nelson, partly to save some money, but in doing so opening up the point guard spot for Payton to play as much as he can/ And they even went as far as to waive Nelson’s backup, Ronnie Price. The keys are with Payton and Oladipo. No pressure, then.

Kendrick Perry – Perry dragged Youngstown State to respectability pretty much single handedly for the last three seasons and ranked amongst the best scorer and steals-racker-uppers in the country. He is a 6’0 guard that plays mostly off the ball as a secondary creator, with a want and need to primarily score first, but this does not make him a chucker. Indeed, Perry probably could have played full time point (and likely will do from here on out), having evidenced decent passing vision and decision making in the halfcourt, playing some pick-and-roll at times and feeding the post quite well for one so small. He is extremely dynamic in the full court, going as far as to run on makes, and certainly wouldn’t struggle with that part, either.

As a scorer, Perry uses his great speed and explosion to constantly attack the basket. He is a leaper given the opportunity, and is willing to throw himself at the basket to take the contact, struggling to finish over size yet not letting this stop him from trying. This is not a reckless style of play, though – Perry is very efficient from the field and commits few turnovers, and picks his spots in a timely, high IQ fashion. On his drives to the rim, Perry is driving to score not to kick, yet he gets there consistently with his speed, agility, spin moves and body control. He splits double teams, drives with both hands, attacks closeouts, and finds it easy to get to the rim if the defence is not fully set. In terms of shotmaking, Perry has added a runner over time, and while the jump shot is not the biggest part of his offensive arsenal, it is decent enough. Perry jumps high on the jump shot, shoots off the dribble and around screens, can stop on a dime for a pull-up two, and although he shoots slightly on the way down at times hits enough jump shots to open up the drive. No one part of the jump shot game is as good as the drive, but it’s good enough, and when combined with his defensive effort and great hands make for an effective, controlled two-way pest of a guard.

Very solid all-around player, then. He’ll even do his turn on the rebounding glass. But also a very small and unproven one. This should be a nice measuring stick for him.

Augustine Rubit – Rubit is a 24 year old 6’6 front court player who turns 25 next month. For all those things to be true and for him to still be here in an NBA summer league coached by NBA personnel means he must be must be pretty good. And he is, in a couple of ways. Rubit is a very good rebounder and aggressive if scrappy offensive player who has the size, athleticism and long arms of a small forward, but who has hitherto been a power forward. He tried to adapt his game to suit his professional projection as a senior, most notably hitting 21 three pointers on the season after none combined in his previous three years, and slashing to the rim as ever without forgetting to use his length, reach and motor to attack the glass and defend the paint. However, mostly untested in his perimeter defence thus far, Rubit might have too much still to prove. It is nice for a player from such a tough background to make it as far as he has, but it will be very difficult to make the final leap into the NBA. Yet if he is prepared to tour the world for a few years, he has plenty of money to make.

Incidentally, Rubit’s Jaguars profile lists his hobbies as “hanging out, playing basketball and talking with his girlfriend”. There’s a lot going on there.

Scott Suggs – Suggs spent last year in the D-League with the Erie BayHawks and showed the continued expansion of his game that has been going on for the last three years. He is still best known and most effective as a catch-and-shoot player, as evidenced by the 40.3% three point shooting on a high volume of attempts, but he has improved at turning those three point attempts into high percentage two point jump shots. He is still not effective nor predisposed at forays all the way to the rim, limiting himself to pickig his spots in that regard, but he is diversifying the game beyond the catch and shoot to incorporate some off the dribble. Smooth and agile if slender and a bit soft, Suggs is a high IQ and efficient offensive weapon. But he needs to prove he can defend the position.

Darrius Williams – Williams is an extremely random choice for summer league, a 6’4 wing player from Division II Morehouse who left school last year and was most recently found playing in the UBA with the Georgia Spartans. As a senior, he averaged 18.2 points, 8.4 rebounds and 2.6 assists, and hit zero three pointers on the way. He is a former football player who is built like one, and who lives to slash to the basket. Anything other than that would be mere guesswork.

2014 Summer League rosters – Houston

July 2nd, 2014

Miro Bilan – The 6’11 Bilan turns 25 later this month, yet this is his first foray into the NBA. He has long been on the radar of clubs around the world, appearing in European championships at various age levels, and finally cracking the Croatian national team this past season. Bilan has never really broken out, however, merely making steady improvements to his game year on year. A brief spell in the EuroLeague in 2012/13 coupled with a longer spell in the EuroCup last season to allow him to take on the best European centres at his position, and he held his own on the offensive end at least, where his post and pick-and-roll play helped him to 8.8 points in 18.4 minutes on 58% shooting, alongside 13.3 points in 22 minutes per game of Croatian league play. Bilan is a prototypical European big man – big enough and offensively skilled, but unathletic, and a defensive factor only by the virtue of giving a good hard foul. He can make shots around the basket and from mid-range, but neither his physical tools nor style of play are ideally suited for the NBA and he is probably best where he is. Greg Smith admittedly played a bit like this while being slightly smaller, but Greg Smith was faster and had hands like mattresses. Or like Tim Howard.

Tarik Black – Black was covered emphatically in the 2014 NCAA Senior Centres round-up. Click here.

Jabari Brown – Brown plays and photographs with a permanent look of insouciance. He never ever smiles, save for one time after a game winner. It does not undermine his skill set, but it would have helped his draft credentials a bit better had he looked like he was enjoying himself.

Brown played alongside Earnest Ross on Missouri’s wings last season, where his role was not to chuck as much as Ross did. He is aggressive as a scorer, hunting his shot and taking plenty of them, but not an undue chucker, a player who will take some quick shots at times but not too egregiously. An excellent shooter who merits such looks, Brown shoots off the catch and off the dribble from both two and from three, shoots a pull-back, and can make jumpers off a spin move. His drives to the rim are a bit unceremonious at times, but they result in many fouls calls, as Brown is fully prepared to take the contact and finds plenty of ways to create scoring opportunities for himself.

The downside unfortunately is that Brown cannot create for others at all. He only looks to score, and it is the only thing he is good at. Brown will occasionally throw a nice pass, but he does not feed the post, has little handle, and, on his rather wild forays to the rim, it is to shoot or get to the line, not to pass off. Brown is also a concern defensively – as evidenced by his exceedingly low foul rates, Brown does not always compete defensively, and lapses at times. And despite having a decent frame for the shooting guard position, Brown is not tall, long or elitely athletic, and thus has not the physical tools to make up for this coasting. He seeks only to score and can only be relied upon for such. It is fortunate then that the jump shot is good enough to cure these ills.

In a high tempo game where he can push the ball (which he loves to do), shoot quick and shoot often, Brown thrives. He’s going to love summer league, then.

Jahii Carson – Carson plays big minutes of every game and dominates the ball throughout. He plays a lot of pick-and-roll action, and succeeds in it, even though he cannot drive left and even though he is usually using the screen to try and score. He is a committed and fearless driver who uses his hardiness, toughness, speed and tight low dribble to get into the paint, whereby he will use his body control to get a look around the basket, compensated with floaters and runners should he be smothered at the rim. Although Carson at a mere 5’11 does not take contact very well, he will take the contact anyway and try to finish, getting to the line a huge number of times per game, and is adept at jinking his body around anyone in his path. He often has to resort to contested runners, but he makes enough of them for this to be a weapon in the halfcourt. Also, given the opportunity, he can really get up.

Underpinning all this however is a poor jump shot, one born out of bad mechanics. Carson has improved his three point stroke to the point it can just about be classified as mediocre, but the mid-range shot is still absent, and the form is inconsistent. Carson tries to play like a shooter anyway, be it through step-backs and the like, but it is a weakness in his game, so much so that he is also a poor foul shooter (not helped by an unnecessarily leaning back on the release). He takes some bad shots, particularly bad jump shots, and tries to play too much isolation ball, particularly down the stretch. The dribble is always alive with Jahii Carson, and he can drive right into and right out of the trees in a manner reminiscent of Kirk Hinrich’s younger days, but he primarily looks to score, drives into trouble, has no left hand, has not the greatest floor awareness (missing, or perhaps ignoring, better matchups elsewhere) and is not a good catch-and-shoot player off the ball. And defensively, he is just too small, bumped off the spot too easily and not seeing as committed on that end as on offence.

As a point guard, Carson is always attacking and pushing the pace, but is nonetheless primarily a scorer. Give him a poorly communicated defence, and he will attack it. He too should love summer league, then. But going forward, while the athleticism and aggression are nice, there are too many question marks for the NBA.

Chris Crawford – Crawford was the fourth guard in Memphis’s four guard lineup last season, and did a little bit of everything for the team. Best known as a shooting specialist, Crawford is a very good catch-and-shoot player who struggles much more when shooting off the bounce, but who can fill it up with the feet set. He also masquerades as an occasional point guard – Memphis were catered for in his position by Joe Jackson and Michael Dixon last season, but Crawford can fill in for possessions at a time, and was similarly relied upon for versatility defensively. Too often forced to guard bigger forwards and defend the paint, Crawford was never all that effective, given how easy his 6’4 frame was to shoot over, but he used his strength to body up as best he could, and win some occasional possessions with his anticipation.

However, all language used above to indicate intermittent effectiveness is deliberate, because there is nothing profoundly secure about Crawford’s production. His defence seems to be tied to his scoring output – when he’s shooting well, he defends well, attacking the boards and competing on D. But when he’s not, he will lazily reach, overplay the passing lanes, forgo the glass and close out slowly. Even when plugged in defensively, he is quite slow laterally, undersized and easily gotten around by opposing guards, so he needs maximum effort to compensate and it is not always there. This is not something that he phased out as an upperclassman, either – indeed, Crawford was arguably more liable to switch off and play soft as a senior than in any previous year. And he also seemed to get slightly stockier. On offence, Crawford’s mid-range jump shot is nice, but he won’t use it, and despite his decent athleticism and solid enough handle, it is a wonder why he so often refuses to use them on the drive. It is not an especially nuanced handle, and Crawford rarely gets beyond the first line of the defence, instead racking up his assets from a willingness to pass and moving it around the perimeter. He never gets to the foul line, is not a speedster, heat checks too often, and does not even work as much off the ball as you would want a shooter to do.

Crawford never improved a great deal in his time at Memphis. It is true that he didn’t have to improve much to be a contributor, but it is a big hindrance at this next level. Crawford is an occasional shooter, occasional point, occasional ball handler and occasional defender who will be advertised as having defensive versatility, but he is also streaky, undersized, not hugely athletic and unassertive who never made himself all that reliable. It is not too late to start, but these ills will not be cured in or before summer league. Wayne Ellington has a similar physical profile and skill set, but Ellington competes and moves off the ball.

Troy Daniels – Houston signed Daniels down the stretch of the season to a contract with a team option for 2014/15, and an actual team option for 2014/15, not an unguaranteed contract merely reported as one. They then declined it, which was expected considering their cap space aspirations, but they then extended Daniels a qualifying offer. Under the 2005 CBA, qualifying offers only had to be guaranteed for the same percentage of guarantee as the final season of the previous contract, but under the 2011 CBA, they have to be fully guaranteed regardless. So Daniels now has a $1,016,482 qualifying offer out to him that is fully guaranteed, that he can accept any time, that is his cap number, and that is twice the size of the $507,336 roster charge that Houston would have had had they declined the option and renounced his non-Bird rights. It is odd. If they wanted to retain him as a player, they could have exercised the option, had him enter the same restricted free agency next offseason and keep him dirt cheap in the interim, and while they could always rescind the QO if they needed to and maybe just extended it to keep his price competitively low should anyone come bidding, they could also have not taken the risk. It is odd, especially given Daniels’s number of suitors. The Rockets will not have Bird rights on Daniels, remember, and will likely have to match with cap room or an exception, depending on the amount he signs for. Nevertheless, it is known what Daniels does – catches and shoots. And it works. And Houston seems to want him back. And that’s all good. Although the predominance of shooting guards on this list might mean they are open to reason.

Andre Dawkins – Dawkins is a shooting specialist, a very good shooting specialist, and little else. And it took until he was a senior to even be consistently aggressive in taking shots.

Off the ball, Dawkins puts in the work to get open. On the ball, he….well, he’s never on it, so it’s tough to say. Dawkins is very much a specialist – it’s all jump shots, and they’re all off of other people’s work. There is a floater in the lane every now and then, but it is rare, as are any two point field goals. And foul shots are rarer still. Dawkins passes little, and struggles to create his own shot, let alone for anyone else. On the defensive end, Dawkins has good size and has developed some strength (aided by having some extra pounds of fat that he shouldn’t), and chases around off the ball, but is ineffective at keeping anyone in front of him. He is, then, pretty much as one dimensional as can be. It is his mercy then that he is big enough and good enough of a shooter to compete at any level. And at least he plays within the confines of his role.

To be blunt, Dawkins benefits greatly from the name of the program from which he graduated. This is not to say his shot is not NBA calibre – it is. And he is just about big enough, if not overly athletic. But the NBA can afford to be picky, and must be considered highly likely to prioritise slightly lesser shooters with better defensive profiles to become their next three-and-D role players. The door is just about still open for Dawkins, but he might have to go through it the Troy Daniels way.

Oh look, he’s on the same team as Troy. What are the odds?

Luke Hancock – Hancock is determined to make the NBA. He was an excellent collegiate role player who did multiple things on successful teams, who does a bit of everything.

Offensively, specifically as a scorer, Hancock mostly takes threes. He takes quite a lot of them, availed by the talent around him and Louisville’s fast pace, casting up 5.5 per game in only 23 minutes. He also however only hit 34.5% of them, down from 39% as a junior, and much more in keeping with the numbers he shot on much lower usage with George Mason. The 39% is the outlier, not the 34.5% – Hancock, then, is a good but not great shooter. He however did pick up his percentages throughout the year, finishing the season well after being down to 24% on threes at one point while struggling with the adjustment to a new shooting technique, a technique that when honed will give him a quicker release with more arc, so there is potential for the uptick to sustain, even if the 34.5% suggests not.

Elsewhere on offence, Hancock is an excellent passer, a very willing one and a good entry feeder who betters any offence he is in with heady, high IQ play. He is a crafty occasional right-hand-heavy driver with a solid handle, endlessly throwing fakes that always seem to get bites, an efficient offensive player despite his near-40% field goal shooting because of his high numbers of threes and foul shots. Without being all that explosive, Hancock can occasionally get up and is deceptively quick, and attacks the contact, even if he cannot finish through it. And defensively he plays well within the team concept and plays with effort, committing far too many fouls but not giving away anything for free.

The NBA is still a big ask, as there is no one stand out skill. But Garrett Temple and Antonio Anderson made similar skillsets work. And they couldn’t shoot at all.

Geron Johnson – Johnson was Crawford’s team mate at Memphis for the last two years, and played off the ball just as much as he did in an entirely different way. The hallmarks of his game are playing hard and playing athletically, and he thrives on all the things those things avail. He runs the court, is always pushing the ball, and can drive to the rim and finish explosively. He really is a dynamic full court player, a tremendous rebounder for a 6’3 guard, and, at times, a quality defensive presence. Johnson’s speed and hands make him a very capable defensive player of both guard positions when the tenacity is there (and it normally is, but there are lulls). Strong with a long wingspan and a great leap, Johnson’s physical profile belies his lack of height for the two guard position, and yet he can also masquerade as a point, bringing the ball up when needed and a good extra passer, if not a defence collapser.

All good so far. Sounds like the upcoming Chris Kramer if Kramer could do something with the ball, if he had longer arms, and if he was even more athletic. Indeed, Johnson shares Kramer’s poor shooting ability, struggling with any form of jump shot and yet not letting that stop him from trying them. The comparison goes further – Johnson struggles to create his jump shots or any offence of his own, cannot shoot off the dribble at all and struggles with poor touch around the rim, but is a good extra passer and has good hands and drives open lanes. Johnson can split a double team and drive baseline in ways Kramer can’t, but there are many similarities nonetheless. Yet what really separates them is Johnson’s knack for turnovers, stemming from forcing the issue, not being able to dribble at the same speed as he can run, throwing the ball away and making too many poor decisions. Johnson makes much happen when he is on the court, but when he’s on the ball, those things are all too often not good things.

This all lends itself terrifically to a workout setting, and Johnson played himself into fringe NBA range in that period. But it may be as close as he gets.

Nick Johnson – Johnson put up ridiculous numbers at the combine, which cemented his already fairly well cemented draft prospects. Yet for all those measurements, he doesn’t play in the overly athletic style of, say, Geron Johnson. Instead, Johnson picks his spots and uses more skill than physical tools, knowing they are in the back should he need them.

Johnson is a fairly complete player on both ends. Defensively, he plays tenaciously, using his foot speed to stay in front of opposing guards and blessed with the ability to clean strip it from them. He moves quickly to recover and rotate, and plays strong help from the guard spot, going down to double cleanly and quickly and yet being adept enough to recover back should he need to. Better than the help is the man to man defence, where Johnson shone as one of the better man to man perimeter defenders in the country at either guard spot.

Offensively, Johnson was also the Wildcats’ highest scorer, doing so in a variety of ways. He is best as a slasher, attacking the rim with craft and guile, and, should he need it, that extra level of explosiveness. Given a clear lane to drive, he can get up and finish – given an unclear lane to drive, he can contort through the defence, use fakes and find seams. Johnson also does a good job on drive and kick action, and racks up decent assists totals despite only very occasional point guard turns. Johnson can also be run off the ball to spot up for jump shots, and drive off of curls all the way to the rim, utilising a floater in the lane and finishing well for a smaller guy. He does not prioritise the jump shot, but can still create ones for himself on occasion with step-back and crossover moves. Not isolating much, not the best three point shooter and not big enough to shoot over anyone on the perimeter, Johnson nevertheless maximises his offensive talents with judicious shot selection and high IQ, low mistake play.

There are no big weaknesses to Johnson’s game, unless we were to nitpick and say his height. It is the ideal point guard’s body he plays in, but slightly too small for an NBA two. But let us not overevaluate that. Without ever really hitting dominant scoring stretches, and while not projecting quite so favourably on the defensive end at the NBA level due to said height, Johnson nonetheless just gets it done. And by “it” I mean a bit of everything. He’s just good.

Chris Kramer – Kramer has long been in the NBA conversation, and has signed contracts with the Bucks in the past. It’s been a while since then, 2010, although Kramer has done enough to keep himself on the NBA’s radar in that time. On the face of it, it is hard to see why – a 6’3 26 year old defensive combo guard who can’t shoot and has every single facet of his offensive game in question at this level. But then you see his athleticism, tenacity and relentless defensive pressure, and it starts to make some sense. Kramer keeps coming back because he is the type of player a coach wants to coach, and the kind of player a team so badly wishes its projectable 6’7 long and athletic wings would channel. But Kramer can never be a 6’7 long and athletic wing, and so it will never work out. Mind you, he’s got more chance than Aaron Craft.

Maarty Leunen – Leunen is something of a forgotten man from an NBA perspective, but is a fixture in Italy, where he has spent the last five years. In each of those last five years, he has shot better than 40% from three, save for one season at 39.6% to which we’ll grant a mulligan. Leunen is not aggressive with this shot – last season for Cantu, he scored only 7.2 points in 31 minutes per game. He also only rebounded for 5.4 per game in that same time, a very poor return for a 6’9 starting power forward, and barely shot more than one free throw per contest. Leunen is about as unpowerful as a ‘power’ forward can be. But what he does do is take his unathletic face-up game and make the best of it, shooting timely shots, moving the ball around, passing very well, occasionally driving, and so often making the right place. This does not lend itself too well to an NBA which, much as it likes a good stretch four these days, requires its stretch fours to actually hunt and take shots. But at least it is pleasingly different from all the things summer league is normally known for.

Jermaine Marshall – Marshall has a pretty ideal profile for a high quality European import off the ball player. Playing alongside Jahii Carson, Marshall was all the things Carson wasn’t – efficient, low usage, fairly big, playing off the ball. He could actually stand to do this last thing a little better, as he is a very good catch and shoot player, yet he does not put in as much movement off the ball as he ought. Nevertheless, he affected the game through his scoring without doing so because of excessive touches.

Marshall will occasionally be called upon to run a pick-and-roll play, but is mostly a jump shooter. His shot selection is fairly good, save for the occasional bad one, yet that was partly due to the nature of the team’s style. When slashing, he demonstrates a sneaky hesitation dribble and can finish with a floater, yet this is not a part of his game he favours. Rather than attack the basket or the shot-blocker, Marshall prefers to shoot, and the jump shot is the biggest part of his arsenal. Its efficiency is also currently a one year outlier, which is mildly uneasy. Nevertheless, Marshall showed last year that he can score, he will score, and he can be an effective and efficient weapon on medium usage. Defensively, Marshall plays hard and contests even when beaten, with long arms and anticipation and a consistent defensive effort, all of which overcome a lack of ideal size. He is not standing out in this facet of the game, but he is not sitting down either. And he’ll take a charge when he can.

At times, he gets wild, and there is no one amazingly strong facet of the game. But Marshall is versatile and efficient, doing a bit of everything. This is always marketable. NBA? Probably not. But certainly somewhere.

Akil Mitchell – As a senior, Mitchell completely lost the free throw stroke he had built up to mediocrity as a junior, and his 42.7% shooting from there made him a liability. He rushes the release on the shot and snatches aggressively at it, and has absolutely no rhythm on it nor any jump shot. Given what an offensive liability he became from the line, this also affected his minutes, and as good as Virginia was last season, Mitchell had to watch some of it from the bench, averaging only 25.7 minutes per game.

Mitchell nonetheless played a big role for the Cavaliers, mostly defensively and on the glass. He is a good leaper with a high motor, who returns a very good rebounding rate and embraces his role as a dirty worker. He uses this motor in a similar fashion on the defensive end, where, despite an average amount of lateral quickness that his jumping ability rather masks, and despite a lack of optimum size for post defence, he nevertheless contests on everything. Mitchell hedges hard on pick-and-roll actions and can stay in front of driving big men, but he can be blown past on closeouts given that he does not change direction too quickly, and sometimes those pick-and-roll hedges are a little too hard. He nonetheless moves his feet as best he can, has some shot blocking timing around the rim, and is a nuisance defensively if not a lock-down player at any position.

There is occasionally some offence from Mitchell, who is not Reggie Evans out there. He runs the court hard and can finish around the rim if set up, throwing a little spin to a righty hook if impeded and going straight up if not. He has not the best footwork, has very little handle, has even littler of a jump shot and travels a bit, but his sprightliness and cuts to open spots give him a purpose offensively, and he stays within that role. Players who recognise their limitations and play within them are always fun to be coached, and Mitchell is so capable of and willing to embrace his interior role playing status that he has made it all the way up to this level. But at 6’8 and 230lbsish, anything further is a long shot.

Omar Oraby – Oraby was covered emphatically in the 2014 NCAA Senior Centres round-up. Click here.

Richard Solomon – Solomon never developed all that much offensively in his career at Cal, but is a tremendous rebounder and sometime defensive pest who somehow does it all without looking like he is trying all that hard. That is not to say that he isn’t, save for some defensive lapses, and he is especially active on the glass. Sometimes, though, that activity is tied to his scoring output. If he’s not scoring, he’s not fighting. For the most part, though, Solomon boxes out on the glass and uses his height and length to clean up loose balls in and around his area. He is mobile and athletic, if a bit thin, and is also a weakside shot-blocking presence on the interior. Solomon fouls a lot and can be pushed out of position all too easily, but he is long if not strong and pursues the ball, improving throughout his Cal tenure as the back piece of the zone.

Offensively, Solomon is a finisher, not a creator. His athleticism allows him some looks at the basket and the occasional ugly drive to the rim, but he has poor touch on pretty much every type of shot, and especially struggles to finish against strength. He does however use his mobility well to dive to open spots and run the court in transition, and makes enough mid-range jump shots, putbacks and wild flails to make defenders at least play him. In the post, Solomon rather premeditates his moves instead of reading and reacting, and is not consistent down there, save for his consistent desire to go to his right hand, but he can nevertheless be effective through the length alone on his occasional post-ups, and utilises a spin move to a righty hook and reasonable footwork. Coupled with the occasional mid-range jump shot, and even the very occasional turnaround from the post, Solomon is a passable offensive player, if highly unpolished.

Can he make it in the NBA on the rebounding alone? Probably not at a thin 6’10, no. But summer league is not just an NBA audition, and Solomon will no doubt be in Israel or something soon.

Chris Udofia – Udofia puts up highly entertaining stat lines, especially from a player standing only 6’6. He averaged 2.2 blocks and 1.5 steals per game on the defensive end, 12.0 points and 3.9 assists per game on the offensive end, and 5.3 rebounds per game in between. This somehow put him in the top 100 in the nation in both blocks and assists per game. And that fact is magnetic.

Denver struggled badly to score, which worked for and against Udofia. Their lack of shot creation and scoring let him play a point forward role, and he led the team in assists, but he also has a poor jump shot of his own and couldn’t answer their need for a primary scorer. He is a sharer of the ball without the handle to create the assists are more from him being easily the best talent on the team rather than because he is a primary playmaking option. Nonetheless, Udofia plays both posts and is a good passer from either, playing both halves of the pick-and-roll at times.

Physically, Udofia is a very good athlete, an NBA calibre one in an NBA’s body. A dunker who will run when he can, Udofia figures to have no problem defending the small forward position, despite playing a lot of power forward to date. He moves well laterally and has the length and anticipation to be a disruptive presence in help defence situations, while also being a committed man to man defender. If he could shoot, this would be a quality three-and-D candidate. But the shot is a problem. He’s going to have to defend perfectly to overcome the lack of it.

Pendarvis Williams – Penny worked out for the Rockets before the draft, fresh off of a senior season at Norfolk State in which he averaged 15.6 points, 4.9 rebounds and 2.6 assists per game. The 6’6, 195lbs combo guard has a good frame for the NBA wing position and is a decent enough athlete, and plays good defence at the position. His 35.5% three point shooting as a senior was lower than the near 40% he shot in the previous three years, and, capable of taking over the point guard duties in a pinch, is a very versatile player who contributes in all facets. Williams is not an offensive creator and does not do much with the ball inside the arc, but he plays accordingly, shoots 49% from the field, and is a projectable under-the-radar role player who should make his money somewhere.

The Louis Williams/Lucas Nogueira Trade

June 28th, 2014

(originally published elsewhere)

In a trade agreed to last night, and perhaps already to have been made official by the time this sentence is finished, the Toronto Raptors agreed to trade John Salmons and his partially guaranteed contract to the Atlanta Hawks in exchange for Louis Williams and the draft rights to Lucas Nogueira.

Toronto were previously on the cusp of trading Salmons to Memphis on draft night, along with the #37 pick, in exchange for Tayshaun Prince and the #22, the theory being that they intended to draft Canadian guard Tyler Ennis with their #20 pick and then taking young project Bruno Caboclo at #22. But when Ennis was taken 18th by Phoenix, the plan was scuppered, and the deal pulled. The Raptors would instead choose to wait for a better spot in which to use Salmons’s valuable unguaranteed contract. And they have now found it.

Nogueira, the #16 pick in the 2013 draft, had been shopped by Atlanta in recent times. Despite averaging a very solid 6.3 points, 4.1 rebounds and 1.6 blocks in only 16 minutes per game of Spanish ACB league option last season, the Hawks seemed to have other priorities, and have used those once-valued rights merely to dump some salary. Perhaps prompted to by Nogueira’s ongoing tendinitis problems – which are worryingly recurrent and severe for a 21 year old center whose game is largely based on his athleticism – Atlanta soured on this potential piece for the future in order to prioritise their present.

They are not trading for John Salmons the player under any circumstance. Salmons has declined significantly, and despite a big minutes yield for the Raptors last season, he was mostly ineffective, shooting 36% on his way to a 7.6 PER. Nevertheless, his contract, which calls for a $7 million salary next season, is guaranteed for only $1 million if waived by the end of today. Whoever waived him then is guaranteed immediate savings, and while Toronto could always use those savings themselves, they are not overly threatened by the luxury tax and can exploit that in using Salmons’s salary as a trade chip from those that are pressured by the tax, or who have cap space ambitions. If they have a bad contract, Toronto will take it for the right price, the price being an additional asset.

It would follow logically from here if Williams was a bad contract that had no benefit to a team. But this is not the case. Williams is a productive player, and always has been.

He is not, admittedly, as productive as he was. In January of 2013, Williams tore an ACL that ended that season, and seemingly heavily affected last season too. After scoring more than 20 points per 36 minutes in his previous two seasons with Philadelphia, with PER’s over 20 both times, Williams was down to 15.6 points per 36 this year alongside a 14.2 PER. Very solid numbers, to be sure, but quite a way removed from where he was. He was restricted from playing back-to-back games at the start of the season, seemingly struggling at times with both the physical and mental hurdles of coming back from such a severe injury, and at one point, he was benched purely because Mike Budenholzer preferred the more conventional (and at that time, more effective) play of Shelvin Mack.

Truth be told, though, the drop in production had happened before the ACL injury did. And thus despite how automatic of an assumption it is to conclude that the ACL caused the drop-off, they cannot be tied exclusively together. In the 39 games of the 2012/13 season that he managed, Williams’s numbers were already down (17.7pp36, 15.9 PER), as he began his transition from rim attacker to three point gunner. Never an efficient player from the floor (career 41.9% shooter) save for the anomalous 2009/10 season in which he shot 47%, Williams has slowly moved his game further and further away from the wing, beginning by first developing a short range floater, then taking more and more long two point jump shots, and now taking a high volume of three pointers, attacking the rim and getting to the foul line less than ever. The ACL can be said to be why, but it was happening anyway. And as a low to mid 30% three point shooter at best, Williams is not even that good at his new found game.

Nevertheless, Williams is still good. The transition might not have helped his disruptiveness, but it has actually helped his efficiency – save for the 2009/10 anomaly, Williams’s two seasons with the Hawks have been the two most efficient of his career. Never a good defender or a pure point, Williams has to constantly be on the attack to overcome his shortcomings, and he has not been so lately. But when he played like this consistently, he was so very good at it that he was a game changer off of the bench and a highly underrated player. Aged only 27, this player has not necessarily left us for good yet. It is still there in spurts, as Toronto will find out. They are not trading for a dead salary. They are trading for one definite asset and one who might yet be one again.

Atlanta are doing it because they have cap space aspirations of their own. Assuming the waiving of Salmons, and the renouncements of Cartier Martin, Elton Brand and Gustavo Ayon, Atlanta have a cap number of $47,075,564, a shade over $16.1 million in cap space, and $4.45 million more than they would have had were it not for this trade. That is enough for one or two quality players, better players than Lou Williams and Bebe Nogueira. The Hawks have traditionally struggled to lure big time free agents, yet they made one of the better free agent signings in several years last season in getting a heavily discounted Paul Millsap, and even if the arena is too empty, the team is nonetheless in a city NBA players (apparently) love. They have a chance of making waves with the cap space, even if it is from steals and asset acquisition rather than signing the stars.

Meanwhile, Toronto are already engaged in asset acquisition. They are not fundamentally changing the team, nor preparing for fundamentally changing it. Rather, they are just adding free assets. There was possibly some thought given to having Williams come in as an insurance in case Kyle Lowry leaves in free agency, but this trade does not change their intent to re-sign him. They also presumably intend to re-sign Greivis Vasquez, one of the league’s best backup point guards to whom they just extended a qualifying offer. And they also extended offers to Patrick Patterson and Nando de Colo, with Patterson incredibly likely to re-sign and de Colo now a strong candidate with his guaranteed QO in toe.

To fit them all in and stay under the luxury tax just got a little more difficult. Waiving Tyler Hansbrough’s unguaranteed $3,326,235 salary (guaranteed for only $1 million) would have helped, but the deadline on that was yesterday, and it did not happen. Nevertheless, the Raptors should be able to fit in new salaries for Lowry, Vasquez, Patterson and de Colo in, along with any new additions, keeping together a good team at good enough prices to keep the roster movement going forward nice and fluid. Ujiri has picked up picks and unsigned draftees for only the costs of eating some salary and unwanted pieces. It is going well so far. And if Atlanta can land someone significant with that cap space, or pull another Millsap deal, they win too.

The fourth and probably final part of the Tim Duncan/Zach Randolph contract saga

June 24th, 2014

Further to this, this and most recently this.

In the last update, I explained how Tim Duncan had had his contract modified, but Zach Randolph had not. And yet what I could not explain was why Tim Duncan had had his contract modified, but Zach Randolph had not. Was it because simply no one had noticed, or because of some other technicality I could not otherwise foresee that made the otherwise identical situations different? Couldn’t say.

Can now, though. It certainly wasn’t the former.

Apparently the reason why Duncan’s contract (which he has opted into, thus transitioning this whole endeavour from being an interesting aside into something with a palpable if not exactly massive affect on the NBA landscape) was modified, but Randolph’s was not, is because Randolph’s was “too old”.

This does not however mean that the fact it was signed under the 2005 CBA (and not the 2011 CBA like Duncan) played a part in this differentiation. Instead, I am told it instead merely means they took that as a legitimate reason for looking the other way, through avoiding the issue altogether, rather than having a technical reason for addressing it in this way. So, yeah.

Zach, if you’re out there, and you’re planning on opting in and signing an extension…..start chasing this up. There could be a million dollars in it for you.

(The very full details of what is being discussed here can be found at the previous links. Especially the first one.)

Tampering, What It Is, And How Not To Not Quite Do It

June 22nd, 2014

(originally published elsewhere)

A report from the Chicago Sun Times’s Joe Cowley is currently doing the rounds, providing as it does an intriguing look into the conduct of Chicago Bulls head coach Tom Thibodeau, and a fresh perspective on the comprehensively documented possibility of Carmelo Anthony joining the Chicago Bulls.

The report focuses on Thibodeau, and his garnering of background knowledge on Anthony from those connected with him in the past. This is a perfectly acceptable and normal thing to do. What stokes the fire in this instance, however, is that the report uses rather incendiary language that suggests things are not as perfectly acceptable as they ought be.

It starts thusly:

According to one of Anthony’s former coaches, Thibodeau has reached out to him and to several other coaches who have worked with Anthony with numerous calls.

This sentence reads in more than one way, but if the ‘him’ is assumed to be the former coach that Cowley spoke to, things are all right so far. There is nothing wrong with talking to someone outside of the NBA in an attempt to garner information about someone inside it.

Later on, however, things get more contentious:

That the Bulls are in full-court-press mode on Anthony comes as no surprise, considering center Joakim Noah courted him during All-Star Weekend in February and continued the recruitment throughout the second half of the season.

That is probably not good. Players talk to each other and certainly are permitted to do – a situation by which they could not do so at all would be patently ridiculous. But they cannot talk about certain things.

Tampering is not an especially well understood concept amongst fans and media alike, yet it is clearly defined. Section (e) of Exhibit A of the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement defines tampering by players, and its penalty, as follows:

(e) Any Player who, directly or indirectly, entices, induces, persuades or attempts to entice, induce, or persuade any Player, Coach, Trainer, General Manager or any other person who is under contract to any other Member of the Association to enter into negotiations for or relating to his services or negotiates or contracts for such services shall, on being charged with such tampering, be given an opportunity to answer such charges after due notice and the Commissioner shall have the power to decide whether or not the charges have been sustained; in the event his decision is that the charges have been sustained, then the Commissioner shall have the power to suspend such Player for a definite or indefinite period, or to impose a fine not exceeding $50,000, or inflict both such suspension and fine upon any such Player.

Cowley’s phrasing makes it sound as though Noah directly attempted to persuade Anthony, which would tick this box. Nevertheless, the problem here – and what is often the problem with tampering – is that there is no proof. Noah et al can just claim Cowley made it up, and that rather shuts any investigation into down.

However, Cowley goes on to mention further parties to the practice, specifically Thibodeau:

And it would seem Noah isn’t alone. Point guard Derrick Rose reportedly has gotten involved, too, and Thibodeau has used back channels to let Anthony know his addition could mean big things for everyone involved.

Articles 35(e) and (f) of the NBA Constitution & Bylaws define tampering by non-playing personnel. 35(f) defines tampering by non-playing personnel towards playing personnel as being thus:

No person may, directly or indirectly, (i) entice, induce, persuade, or attempt to entice, induce or persuade, any Player who is under contract to, or whose exclusive negotiating rights are held by, any other Member of the Association to enter into negotiations for or relating to his services or negotiate or contract for such services or (ii) otherwise interfere with any such employer-employee relationship (or prospective employer-employee relationship in the case of a Player subject to exclusive negotiating rights) of any other Member of the Association.

35(e) says exactly the same, except for the word “Player” is replaced by “Trainer, General Manager or any other person”, and the bit in brackets is omitted.

Essentially the same language, then, between tampering by players and tampering by executives and coaches. But what certainly is not the same in the event of non-playing personnel tampering is the potential penalties involved. They are defined later in Article 35(f):

The Commissioner, either in his discretion or at the request of any Member who alleges that its
employee has been tampered with, shall conduct an investigation into whether a person has violated the anti-tampering rule set forth in the prior sentence. In the event that, following such investigation and a hearing at which the person (and the Member employing the person allegedly tampered with) has an opportunity to be heard after due notice, the Commissioner determines that the anti-tampering rule has been violated, he shall have the power, in his sole discretion, to impose a penalty for such offence, which penalty may include (without limitation) the suspension of such person for a definite or indefinite period; the prohibition of the Member employing or otherwise affiliated with the offending person from hiring the person being tampered with for a definite or indefinite period; the forfeiture of Draft picks held by the Member employing or otherwise affiliated with the offending person or the transfer of such Draft picks to the Member aggrieved by the tampering; and/or the imposition of a fine upon the offending person and/or the Member employing or otherwise affiliated with such offending person in an amount not to exceed $5,000,000. In the event that the Commissioner imposes a fine, he may direct that some or all of the fine be paid directly to the Member aggrieved by the tampering.

Quite a bit stiffer than $50,000 and a suspension, then.

Cowley’s phrase ‘used back channels to let Anthony know his addition could mean big things for everyone involved’ could perhaps be interpreted indirectly attempting to entice a player who is under contract to another member of the association (which Anthony is until the end of June 30th) to negotiate a contract for his services. Perhaps, armed with this, the Knicks will feel as though they have the ammunition to launch a tampering claim.

Tampering claims are invariably brought by teams. The opening line in the possible penalties quoted above states that the Commissioner can act of his own volition, or at the prompting of a team who feel their employee is being tampered with, but in practice, it is almost always the latter. And in practice, the latter does not happen nearly as often as it could do.

The problem touched on above, whereby it is extremely difficult to ever prove anything, is highly problematic in tampering claims, which is why there are not that many. There have however been two recent examples. One was the very recent case of new New York Knicks President Phil Jackson, who publicly if rather vaguely alluded to the possibility of Derek Fisher (still technically contracted to the Oklahoma City Thunder as a player, and also sought after by the L.A. Lakers) joining his team as their new head coach. The other involved the Cleveland Cavaliers, who were said to have launched quite the tampering claim in the wake of LeBron James’s departure to Miami, despite initial reports that they would not do so.

Jackson was fined – given that he was filmed with the words coming out of his mouth to dozens of reports, there was not much scope for denying it. It is not known what came of Cleveland’s attempts – considering James was technically signed and traded to Miami, the Cavaliers may have been advised that this undermined any claims that they were manipulated. Additionally, the accusations of tampering in that instance all seemed to be concerned with player-to-tampering, which, as evidenced by the difference in penalties outlined above, is considered to be not nearly as gross of a violation. Indeed, this is confirmed in the previously linked report on the matter by Marc Stein:

Stern, however, has made it clear that he would not punish player-to-player interaction with the same vigor that the league threatens to punish team contact with players that they don’t employ, suggesting that it is unrealistic to try to put limits on or police player fraternization.

The Noah and Rose talks, then, may have been technically violations, but they are not policed violations. It is a different matter, however, if Thibodeau is found to be doing it.

Thibodeau clearly was not going to do anything, and has not done anything, that was direct or public with regards to enticing Anthony to his time. He is not a fool. Yet there is nonetheless a public story out there that states he has apparently done so indirectly. Whether or not it is true – and whether or not this is provable – it nevertheless could be a sufficient piece of ammunition for the Knicks to lodge a tampering complaint to the Commissioner.

If a tampering complaint is lodged with the Commissioner, it will be investigated, and the league as seen is much more inclined to act upon non-player tampering (and is much more empowered in what it can do should it find it). If it finds evidence of tampering, it can act upon it with big fines, the removal of draft picks, and, if it sees the fit, the reallocation of said money and draft picks to the team it felt had been tampered with. And there is precedent here – in 1996, the Knicks received a first-round draft pick and $1 million in a settlement with the Miami Heat when they were found to have been tampering with then-Knicks coach, Pat Riley.

This report, then, cuts a little close to the mark. If they are to get Melo at all, the Bulls will likely have to hand over some draft picks to New York in a sign-and-trade transaction. They had best not make the cost any steeper than it already is.

Heat: What went wrong and how they can fix it

June 17th, 2014

Let us begin with the great unspoken truth about the Miami Heat over these last four years – they have done nothing to their roster.

Obviously, they did quite a bit in the summer of 2010. They re-signed half the team, traded for LeBron James and Chris Bosh, and painstakingly crafted all of the other ludicrously well-documented cap wrangling to create the Big Three and add some role players. And yet in the time hence, they have added very, very few impact players.

Since then, the most impactful players they have signed have been Shane Battier, Ray Allen and Chris Andersen. They signed veteran role players to play veteran roles, and it briefly worked. But those veteran players, specifically Battier and Andersen, ran out of gas. More worryingly, Dwyane Wade ran out of gas too. And with them went Miami into what might be a terminal decline.

In these past four years, the Heat have had only one first-round pick, Norris Cole, who is frankly one of the most overrated role players of a generation with a career best PER of 8.8. They have garnered nothing with multiple second rounders (the only one they still have, 2012 second rounder Justin Hamilton, they already waived once), and they have almost entirely held off signing young non-drafted players, save for a brief flirtation with Terrel Harris, whom they did their best to convince the fan base was a prodigal young all-around combo guard talent despite him never showing it before or since.

Teams do not have to go young for the sake of going young. But almost universally, young players bring with them a hunger. A change of speed. A dynamicism and a fire, a need to impress and get paid that manifests itself in winning possessions. They bring more mistakes, generally, but such is the trade-off. That is why there must be a balance between youth and experience.

Miami did not have balance. With the obvious exception of LeBron, they looked limp, flummoxed and overmatched. They looked older than the famously long-tenured San Antonio trio. They were run off the court. They looked as though they were not competing even when they were competing because San Antonio got to every spot on the court first. They didn’t have the balance of want-to and know-how. They were moribund. They were old.

For this, they can look at the superfluousness of the roster. They never needed to have both Rashard Lewis and James Jones, for example – you can never have too much jump shooting, as San Antonio showed, but you can have too few roster spots and too many specialists. They never needed the much-declined Udonis Haslem, and Lord knows why they gave him a five-year contract at the age of 30 in the first place. They did in theory need Mike Miller, but not at the price they gave him, and the subsequent signing of Allen meant they did not need him at all in the end either.

They never needed Mike Bibby, Juwan Howard, Zydrunas Ilgauskas, Jerry Stackhouse, Eddie House, Erick Dampier, or indeed any other of the veterans whose main virtue lay in ‘being veterans’. They never needed Joel Anthony (and Lord knows why they even gave him five years in the first place either), and they never needed the unused Toney Douglas that they got back in trade for Anthony in this season’s deadline trade. And yet what they do now need is the first and second round picks they gave away to make that trade happen.

The Heat relied upon retreads and reclamation projects at the bottom of their roster. Perhaps they felt it was a luxury they could afford when you’re so stacked at the top, yet it was not a successful strategy. It worked once with Andersen, a player cast free by the Denver Nuggets due to his age, knees, cost and an ugly off-court situation not of his own doing, whose career they resurrected and who was a valuable contributor during the last championship run.

But it did not work with Greg Oden, who played very few minutes and underwhelmed in those that he did, or the unlikely revisit of Michael Beasley, who still needs three plays to make one good one. And nor did it work with Eddy Curry, because, really, how was it ever going to?

Furthermore, they have been a little spendthrift. The narrative is that owner Mickey Arison is so rich that he can, and does, operate the team at whatever cost it takes to be competitive.

Certainly, Miami went into the luxury tax in the past three seasons. Nonetheless, there have been cost-cutting measures – an unused mid-level exception this season, the salary dump of Anthony that cost the team future draft assets (assets that had only been obtained in the first place by trading away, and thus avoiding paying, a 2012 first-round pick), no attempts to use this supposed financial clout in the draft (their one pick acquisition, James Ennis, was obtained for a future pick only), and the dumpings of Dexter Pittman and Roger Mason that cost them at least one further draft pick. Miami got old by choice, so age is no excuse for their demise.

The fact that they were still winning when all this was going on did not mean that it was OK for all this to be going on. Miami never looked towards the future at any point during this run. Their one lump sum infusion of talent was so great that they never sought to add any more. They acted as though they did not have to.

When they were winning titles, they might have been right. But the run might be over now. If the future is now, it is not good viewing. There seems to be little available to refuel, to reload, to reignite this downtrodden team. Miami were really good at times this year, but only because LeBron made them so. The rest of the team fell off around him, however, and it is his turn next.

So, from where do the answers come? Everything is reliant upon LeBron, of course, which no one can deny. Beyond him, everything is a question.

Miami are in a very strange position right now whereby they are both staring down the barrel of having (or much less likely choosing) to disband the Big Three, while fully aware of (and said to be exploring) the vague allusions to the possibility of making it a Big Four. The chances of this are very slim and surely getting slimmer as the cold hard truth kicks in. Nevertheless, it speaks to the lure of the franchise as a free agent destination. They were able to land Allen and Battier on what were at the time sharp discounts because of the lures of the city and the winning.

They can still promise the former. They can still promise the latter if they do things right. But first of all, Miami must address the situations of Bosh and Wade. Both players have the ability to terminate their contracts early this month, and also have player options for the 2015-16 season.

It is possible that either or both opt out this offseason so as to receive the last big contract of their careers – they will not get paid as much in the next two years as they would if they opted in, but the trade-off of the security of the two or three additional seasons after that would be the lure, just as it so often is in this situations.

Zach Randolph is a candidate to opt out of his contract for the same reasons, and Richard Jefferson once famously opted out of $14 million for one year to take $40 million over four. His decision worked out, and it did not go unnoticed.

Both, however, might be more inclined to opt out next season instead. This is particularly true of Bosh, whom, despite completely disappearing in the Finals, is an irreplaceable part of the team going forward. His status as a faux-star rather misrepresents the fact he is pretty much a role player, but as role players go, he is about as good of one as you can get. Miami needs to keep him around if they are to win again in the LeBron era, and they surely already know it.

The Wade situation, though, is less clear. He is declining and he is declining rather quickly. He is no longer able to be the game changer he once was, and nor is he able to play three quarters of a season’s schedule. As his speed and athleticism disappear, we are starting to see that on pure basketball talents alone, he never was that great of a fit alongside James, the clear-cut alpha dog.

In the full court game, they were born to co-exist, but that game is leaving them now. In the halfcourt, Wade is becoming increasingly awkward – he never could shoot, and hasn’t the change of pace to fly to the rim like he once did or cut so sharply off the ball. And defensively, where his decline is even more apparent, Wade is almost a liability, one LeBron no longer has the stamina to cover for.

There are much more than just basketball factors at stake here, however. In the summer of 2010, Wade openly courted the Chicago Bulls – however legitimate his intention of perhaps signing there ever was, he certainly told them it was a possibility, and visited accordingly. But when he passed on their overtures to stay with the team that drafted him, Wade cattishly cited ‘loyalty’ as a reason for his decision.

‘Loyalty’ is a driving force behind player’s signing decisions. These hulking warriors are really just puppy dogs needing to be loved and Wade publicly decried the Bulls for not showing enough loyalty to their former players, citing as evidence the lack of former players within their front office personnel. The claim was never especially fair to begin with. Nevertheless, Miami embraced it, using the loyalty to convince Wade to be loyal to them and compounding it with further hirings (e.g. Tim Hardaway) to confirm why Wade was right.

Now, with Wade’s decay, comes a real test of loyalty. Every championship the franchise has ever won, every success they have ever had, he brought them. Yet he now seems to no longer be capable of bringing them more. Are they going to let him leave, to be disloyal (perceived or otherwise), because they are not getting enough from him anymore? He has always tried his best, as a player and a recruiter – are there any circumstances at all by which they can possibly let him leave?

If they have to overpay for his future services in recognition of his past ones, is it worth it? Can they do a Kobe with Wade? Can they afford not to? They lose a lot if they clog up salary for diminishing returns, but do they lose even more if they reject the concept of loyalty they had previously dined out on?

Miami has to keep Wade, then, and they might have to keep him at a cost ill-fitting of his abilities. Arison or not, there is a spending limit, and this will smart. To get around it, then, they need to change tactics. They need to get younger, hungrier, faster. With prudent scouting, a change in roster management philosophy and a blank chequebook, Miami’s championship window is not shut. But there is a lot more to do than four consecutive NBA Finals would suggest.