Answer after the jump. (this is the jump) The answer is Jusuf Nurkic of the Denver Nuggets. His contract calls for 108% of the scale in year one ($1,562,680), 107% in year two ($1,642,000), and then 120% in years three and four ($1,921,320 and $2,947,300 respecitvely). That adds him to an exclusive and small club of non-120%ers, including Raul Lopez, George Hill, Ian Mahinmi, James Anderson, Sergio Rodriguez, MarShon Brooks, and probably some others. It is believed that Nurkic, a #16 pick, is the highest drafted player to ever not receive the full amount.
The bulk of free agency is behind us, maybe, but we’re far from done. There follows a look at how much cap space NBA teams still have outstanding, which, with the exception of the occasions I blatantly do the opposite, will be presented without analysis as to how the situation came about. All the teams that have cap space, or have had cap space this offseason, are included in the list. That is a total of fifteen teams and half the league. The other fifteen – Boston, Brooklyn, Denver, Golden State, Indiana, L.A. Clippers, Memphis, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma City, Portland, Sacramento, San Antonio, Toronto and Washington – are not mentioned at all. All salary information is taken from this website’s own salary pages. All figures taken from the day of publication – if subsequent trades/signings are made, then adjust accordingly. It is vital – VITAL – that you understand what a “cap hold” is before you read this. An explanation can be found here. Players with asterisks by their names are not under contract with the team, and cap holds are separated from active contracts by the use of a simple link break. Atlanta Hawks Committed salary for 2014/15: $48,416,058 (view full forecast) Remaining cap space: $10,839,436 Atlanta has made only one signing in free agency, facilitated by one trade, and the money jointly spent on Thabo Sefolosha and John Salmons is actually less than the money they were due to spend on Louis Williams. They started with cap space, added more possibly unnecessarily, and still haven’t used up the extra bit, let alone dip into the reserves. I say “possibly unnecessarily” because it does not appear as though they have looked to do much with it, got shot down when they did, and the list of candidates is […]
At the end of the July Moratorium each year, the league sends out a memo containing all of the findings from the audit it conducted during it. That audit is what the moratorium period is for – the moratorium is one long end-of-season book-keep in which it crunches all the numbers related to revenue, BRI, escrow, tax and the like, and makes determinations on both the past and the future. That memo generally filters through to the mainstream media – it has to, because it contains all the things that will make the league work next year, such as the salary cap numbers and exact size of the luxury tax threshold. It also contains things such as the latest projection of the season after next ($66.3 million salary cap, $80.7 million luxury tax threshold) and the sizes of next year’s exceptions. This year, however, the league sent out a second memo. Entitled “Consideration in Trades and Trade Structure”, it is a reminder and/or clarifier to teams about some of the specifics of what they can and cannot do in trades. Seemingly, they felt this was necessary Considering the presence of this memo suggests that some teams do not entirely understand the rules (or, perhaps, have been intent on pushing them back a bit), it is self-evidently the case that those of us outside of the league will not fully know them either. So, here goes. The memo is divided into two parts. The first part of the memo deals with what constitutes ‘consideration’ in trades, and is itself split into two parts. Part two of this first section concerns consideration in trades for non-playing personnel. Seemingly, in light of recent de facto coaching trades (whereby a team receives compensation for letting a non-playing member of staff out of their contract […]
Further to this, this and most recently this. In the last update, I explained how Tim Duncan had had his contract modified, but Zach Randolph had not. And yet what I could not explain was why Tim Duncan had had his contract modified, but Zach Randolph had not. Was it because simply no one had noticed, or because of some other technicality I could not otherwise foresee that made the otherwise identical situations different? Couldn’t say. Can now, though. It certainly wasn’t the former. Apparently the reason why Duncan’s contract (which he has opted into, thus transitioning this whole endeavour from being an interesting aside into something with a palpable if not exactly massive affect on the NBA landscape) was modified, but Randolph’s was not, is because Randolph’s was “too old”. This does not however mean that the fact it was signed under the 2005 CBA (and not the 2011 CBA like Duncan) played a part in this differentiation. Instead, I am told it instead merely means they took that as a legitimate reason for looking the other way, through avoiding the issue altogether, rather than having a technical reason for addressing it in this way. So, yeah. Zach, if you’re out there, and you’re planning on opting in and signing an extension…..start chasing this up. There could be a million dollars in it for you. (The very full details of what is being discussed here can be found at the previous links. Especially the first one.)
This post is essentially the conclusion to a post from nearly two years ago, dated July 22nd 2012. That post was itself a follow-up to this post, published three days prior. The two posts combined to document an issue, or was at the time a potential issue, of a mistake in a contract. Sitting in the crowd at the 2012 Las Vegas Summer League, I was talking to someone about the market value of power forwards today. The discussion followed a fairly predictable route, and before long we got to talking about Zach Randolph, who in April 2011 signed an extension with Memphis that was to keep him with the team through 2015. Specifically, we were wondering how much he was due to get paid. In accordance with the universally held but entirely unspoken rule whereby no-one in, around, covering or even vaguely interested in the NBA is any good with facts without a computer in their hand, I could not remember how much his extension was for. (Trade secret there. To a man, they/we have nothing.) So I pulled out my mid-90’s notebook and had a look for the specifics of Randolph’s deal. It was there and then that I noticed for the first time a problem with Randolph’s contract, an error which I, and apparently everyone else involved, had not noticed in the fifteen months prior. Randolph’s extension called for base compensation of $17,800,000 in 2013/14, and $16,500,000 in 2014/15. (The contract also contains a ream of bonuses that make it deviate from those exact figures, yet they change not the general principles to be espoused here.) The 2014/15 is a player option season. This all looks like standard enough fare. However, a piece of CBA minutiae states that the salary in a player or team option year […]
(originally published elsewhere) Cleveland committed their future to Kyrie Irving. They picked him first overall, gave him all the reins, and gave him all the plaudits. And yet now there are reports that they do not want to give him a maximum contract extension. Whether or not Irving is worth the maximum salary is not really relevant here. The point is loyalty, and, more importantly, the perception of loyalty. It is not automatically disloyal to offer less than the maximum salary in an extension to a player you (rightly) do not feel is worth it, but to the player and his powerful agent, it is perceived as so. Anything less than undivided love is insufficient love, because the assumption – fuelled by perception – is that undivided love is available elsewhere. If you show anything less than undivided love, you do not show sufficient loyalty. And NBA players are driven by loyalty. Offer them less than the maximum and they will point to all those beforehand in comparable situations who received it. Blake Griffin, for one, or fellow point guards Derrick Rose and John Wall (particularly Wall, who had a long way to go at the time he received his deal, moreso than Rose). It matters not if they are not worth the maximum – the assumption was always that they were going to get it, especially after picking him first overall, openly stating he is the future and the foundation, and when given that they are one of the few bright spots for the franchise in the last three moribund seasons. The fact that the last three years have been poor is partly Irving’s fault, of course, but that is not how this particular process works. It could, then, be a situation headed for a messy divorce. Especially if […]
[Originally posted on Hoopsworld, 5th November 2013.] In February 2010, NBA commissioner David Stern spoke ominously of the league’s forecasted $400 million loss that financial year, as well as hundreds of millions more in losses over the previous few seasons. His words were one of the earliest warnings of an impending lockout, a threat that became a reality 16 months later. Financial inequalities and a broken system supposedly saw 22 out of the 30 NBA franchises losing money, and something had to be done to install some parity. Three months after Stern spoke, the NBA ratified the sale of the New Jersey Nets to Mikhail Prokhorov. Parity, it is said, is supposed to level the playing field between the large- and small-market teams. The reality of this market inequality is an unavoidable one, founded in socioeconomic factors far outside of the NBA’s control. It is what it is. The NBA’s self-imposed duty is to level the playing field within its control as much as possible. They do this in various ways. The draft, of course, is one – parity is not just financial remuneration, but also the opportunity for all teams to compete on the court. There is also, as of the new CBA, a new revenue sharing system ostensibly designed to make big brother pay for little brother, a significant development in the NBA’s hitherto limited revenue sharing history. And there’s the concept’s most public weapon – the luxury tax. Since its inception in 2001, $923 million has been spent in luxury tax by 24 franchises. Of that $923 million, some $568 million has been spent by only four of those franchises – the Dallas Mavericks, New York Knicks, Portland Trail Blazers and Los Angeles Lakers. That is one seventh of the teams spending three fifths of the money, […]
[Originally posted on Hoopsworld, 29th October 2013.] The vast majority of players signed for training camp are signed to contracts without any guaranteed compensation on them. This, certainly, is no surprise, as it has long been known that most players signed for training camp are not expected to make the team. A few players have fairly nominal guaranteed portions – for example, Dee Bost received $50,000 from Portland, Dewayne Dedmon $25,000 from Golden State, and Trent Lockett $35,000 from Sacramento. Most, however, do not. Teams are not involved in bidding wars for the Trey McKinney-Jones and Carlos Morais types, and thus there is no incentive to give any guaranteed money away. Not all unguaranteed contracts are the same, however. Some utilize a contract provision called Exhibit 9. Unless you’re an agent, it is a little known device of potentially huge importance. Exhibit 9 of the Uniform Player Contract is applicable only to those summer contracts fully unguaranteed and for only one season in length. Its purpose is to reduce a team’s liability in event of injury to a player it intended to sign only for training camp. It states thusly: if the player is injured as a direct result of playing for the team and, accordingly, would have been entitled but for this Exhibit 9 to compensation, the team’s sole liability shall be to pay the Player $6,000 upon termination of the Player’s Contract. The operator ‘sole liability’ is vital here. Without an Exhibit 9, the Uniform Player Contract normally calls for teams to pay any ‘reasonable hospitalization and medical expenses’ for players injured whilst directly participating in team activity, whilst also guaranteeing the payment of their compensation, however unguaranteed it was, until such time as they are fit to return to play, up to a maximum of the end […]
[Originally posted on Hoopsworld, 15th October 2013.] Unguaranteed or partially guaranteed final seasons are quite the trend nowadays in the NBA, and they have these days almost completely superceded team options. In fact, excluding rookie scale contracts, there are only eight team options in the entire league, belonging to Chauncey Billups, Darius Morris, Timofey Mozgov, Marreese Speights, Carrick Felix, Chandler Parsons, Jae Crowder and Rodney Williams. All other contracts referred to in the press as ‘team options’ are, in fact, unguaranteed salaries. There are very few instances in which contracts must be guaranteed. In fact, there are only two; the first year of a signed-and-traded contract, and the first two years of a rookie scale contract (which must be guaranteed for a minimum of 80 percent of the scale amount). Nothing else has to be guaranteed. It is self evident why so many contracts are nonetheless fully guaranteed – players want that, and teams want players to want them. Yet the unguaranteed contract fad has its basis in logic. Essentially, unguaranteed contracts function much like team options do. However, there are some significant advantages to doing it in this way, which is why it happens. The differences: 1) Non-rookie scale team options have to be decided upon by the final day of the previous season. Seasons change over on July 1st, and thus team options must be decided on or before June 30th. This is not the case with unguaranteed contracts, which either have guarantee dates that can be negotiated to different dates, or which have no guarantee date at all. A lot of unguaranteed contracts have some guaranteed money, becoming fully guaranteed upon a certain date, or no guaranteed money at all becoming slowly guaranteed upon several dates; for players earning the minimum salary it is often the latter, […]
[Originally posted on Hoopsworld, 7th October 2013.] The most fun part of preseason is being able to get wildly carried away with the results and performances in the mostly meaningless games. This is particularly true of the performances of individual players who simply were not expected to shine, but did. Two such players have already shown their faces, in Houston’s Omri Casspi and the L.A. Lakers’s Xavier Henry. Casspi shot 9-10 for 20 points on his debut, whilst Henry topped that with 29 in his, an impressive amount for a player whose career high to this point is only 19. Whilst this level of production is obviously not sustainable, Casspi and Henry are set to earn only the minimum salary next season. Casspi’s is fully guaranteed, but Henry’s isn’t even guaranteed for one single dollar. These two players, then, have shown they could potentially be valuable contributors for as good of as value as is possible. Casspi has struggled since his rookie season when he showed true promise as a free roaming off-the-ball offensive player, but who started to succumb to similarly free roaming tendencies defensively. Henry, meanwhile, was nothing short of poor in his first three seasons, struggling badly to make a shot from any portion of the court, not being able to create any, and not being consistent with his potentially good defence. There’s a reason these players were available for so cheap – they weren’t working out, and multiple teams had given up on them ever doing so. However, this doesn’t mean the players are, or suddenly became, talentless. Casspi and Henry were first-round picks as recently as four and three years ago, respectively, and are 25 and 22 years old. There is still some talent in the fire. Someone just needs to throw a log on […]
Despite it running in the initial instance with a rather significant error in it – I spent a lot of time breaking down how the Bulls had arrived at, and would extricate themselves from, a luxury tax position that they weren’t actually at – the previous post entitled How Do You Solve A Problem Like Taj Gibson? received a remarkably hearty welcome. So, thank you for that. However, as is always the way with pieces that deal with salary minutiae and machinations, and appraisals of team’s proximities to the salary cap and luxury tax thresholds, there has been some misunderstanding of what was said and meant. This considerably briefer follow-up will hopefully clarify these issues. 1) The fact that Taj Gibson has these unlikely bonuses that the Bulls may find necessary to alleviate via a trade does NOT mean that Taj will be the one traded. This seems to be a conclusion that a lot of readers have drawn, and it is one with which I couldn’t disagree more. Taj is neither the problem nor the solution here – indeed, there isn’t really a problem, and even if there was, it is one much more easily solved via trades of others. Mike Dunleavy Jr, say, or Kirk Hinrich. Or even Tornike Shengelia again. This is not to say that Taj cannot or will not be traded – he might. He is coveted and sought after, and competitively priced. However, if he is traded, this isn’t why. 2) I agree that the bonuses are not all that likely to be met, and particularly the all-defensive first team one. The Bulls presumably know that too. But they have to operate on the basis that it might, on the basis that it might. 3) The fact that the Bulls can pay the luxury […]
(click here for the Instant Gratification Version) Determining a team’s luxury tax number is not quite as simple as looking at their payroll and comparing it to the luxury tax threshold. This is about 98% of the job, of course, but there are a couple of other tweaks. For salary minutia fans like myself, these tweaks are important. The following list of adjustments is quoted from Larry Coon’s CBA FAQ, a page from which my entire career is sourced. 1) Cap holds and exceptions are ignored. 2) Any “unlikely bonuses” that were actually earned are added to the team salary. 3) Any “likely bonuses” that were not earned are subtracted from the team salary. 4) Any trade bonuses for players received in trade after the last regular season game are added to the team salary. 5) Any amounts from settlements of grievances are added to the team salary. 6) Players who signed as free agents (i.e., not draft picks) and make less than the two-year minimum salary are taxed at the minimum salary for a two-year veteran and not their actual salary. For minimum salary players whose salary is partially paid by the league only the amount paid by the team (the two-year minimum salary) is taxed. The salaries of players waived via the Amnesty provision are exempt from the luxury tax. A team’s luxury tax number is taken from the last day of the regular season, then adjusted for the above criteria. We of course aren’t at the last day of the regular season yet, hence the title of this post, so points 2, 3 and 4 can be ignored for now. (Bonuses are adjusted with hindsight. For now, we can only work with what we know.) Point number 1 means removing the cap holds and unused exceptions that […]
The previous post attempted to explain how much cap room all NBA teams would (or wouldn’t) actually have in this upcoming free agency period. It was a bit presumptuous. It had to be. Now, we can be reflective. Here’s what’s left. All salary information is taken from this website’s own salary pages. All figures taken from the day of publication – if subsequent trades/signings are made, then adjust accordingly. No trades are assumed to be taking place here. Guesswork and speculation aren’t helpful. It is vital – VITAL – that you understand what a “cap hold” is before you read this. An explanation can be found here. Atlanta Hawks Committed salary for 2013/14: $53,314,578 (view full forecast) Possible cap space: $6,878,477. Committed salaries: Al Horford: $12,000,000 Paul Millsap: $9,500,000 Jeff Teague: $8,000,000 Kyle Korver: $6,760,563 Lou Williams: $5,225,000 Elton Brand: $4,000,000 DeShawn Stevenson: $2,240,450 Dennis Schroder: $1,348,200 John Jenkins: $1,258,800 Jared Cunningham: $1,208,400 Shelvin Mack: $884,293 Mike Scott: $788,872 Jeremy Tyler: $100,000 Cap holds: Lucas Nogeira: $1,419,200 Ivan Johnson: $1,250,854 Anthony Tolliver: $884,293 Total: $56,868,925 = $1,810,075 in cap room. This amount can be increased. Stevenson is unguaranteed with no guarantee date, as is Mack, and Scott can be waived for no cost before August 15th. Waive them three, renounce Johnson and Tolliver, and, after adding two roster charges, Atlanta now has cap space of $6,878,477. With a cap room MLE to spend after that. Note, however, that DeMarre Carroll is to be factored in. His signing is agreed upon but not yet finalised, and when it happens, figures are to be adjusted accordingly. Charlotte Bobcats Committed salary for 2013/14: $52,392,131 (view full forecast) Possible cap space: $6,222,408 Committed salary: Al Jefferson: $13,500,000 Ben Gordon: $13,200,000 Ramon Sessions: $5,000,000 Michael Kidd-Gilchrist: $4,809,840 Cody Zeller: $3,857,040 Bismack Biyombo: $3,049,920 Josh McRoberts: […]
Happy? You should be. Keith Bogans has an uncanny knack for being in the right place at the right time. He has become throughout his NBA career the archetypal three-and-D wing role player, the kind of piece you want around star point guards or big men (or both), who’ll defend opposing stars for a few pesky minutes a night and not risk anything more offensively than taking some open threes. Yet despite not being significantly above average at either, and in no way any more of a stand-out talent in relation to the dozens of other suitable candidates for the role, Bogans’s medicority is nonetheless a sure thing, a known commodity, a risk-free contributor who’ll neither say nor do nothing confrontational. Teams like that, and, because of this, he has time and again landed starting roles, often on competitive teams. In a talent vacuum, he’s not worth this opportunity or luxury, yet by continuing to land these gigs, Bogans is doing something right. Normally, of course, this role doesn’t earn very much. Keith has mostly been a minimum salary player throughout his career, only rarely exceeding it, and this reflect his minimal contributions. None of this is meant pejoratively – Bogans plays a role, plays it fairly well, and yet the role is small and replacable, so so is its salary. This, however, is all change in light of Keith’s new contract. The rebuilding Boston Celtics insisted upon Jason Terry (and, primarily, his salary) being included in the Paul Pierce/Kevin Garnett trade with the Nets. Either he or Courtney Lee. Brooklyn could afford it and were prepared to pay it, but, in light of all their recent roster turnover, they didn’t have the necessarily medium-size expiring contracts that are so useful in trade scenarios that would have facilitated it. In […]
Gustavo Ayon, thinking of victims A month ago, it was widely reported via all media outlets (though seemingly originating from Mexico) that the Bucks had picked up Gustavo Ayon’s team option for next season. This week, the story’s doing the rounds that the Bucks need to pick up his option. This, on the surface, rather counters the former. In reality, both are right. The confusion stems from the terminology used. Only one is actually an option – the other just functions much like one. An explanation follows. As explain in a couple of blog posts, but firstly this one of 2010, no one really gives out team options any more. All rookie scale contracts have two of them, but very very few other contracts do – indeed, headed into this offseason, there were only six in total in the entire league (Francisco Garcia, Dante Cunningham, Jodie Meeks, Mario Chalmers, John Lucas III and Ayon). With all of those having been decided upon this summer, we see then that, unless only fresh ones were given out in this summer’s contracts – and none have as of yet – there will be no non-rookie scale team options in the league at all. That’s how rare they are. Ayon, though, was one of the rare few to have one. Yet his case is itself a further exception. You’d think that team options gave you a year. They do, pretty much – a team option is a decision at the team’s discretion as to whether they wish to extend the contract for one season at prearranged terms. And they can only ever be for one year – not two, nor three, or part of one, but for one whole year. In saying yes and exercising the team option, the team validates the year’s contract, […]
In light of one or both of these two being about to be traded, there exists a new realm of questions about this two unusual, nearly-novel deals. The questions surround what they’re being paid, and what they’re being charged to the salary cap. People don’t know which set of figures to believe, and the confusions stems from the fact that those two questions actually have two different answers. “Salary” and “cap number” are usually assumed to be synonymous with each other on account of the fact that they normally are, with rare exceptions. Occasionally, exceptions can be found in buyout agreements (I believe, though cannot say decisively, that the Blazers were still playing Shawn Kemp up to and including last season), but not with valid contracts. These deals, then, are an exception. And that’s why they need clarifying. Using the Arenas provision, Lin and Asik signed for the most Houston could give them over three years – $25,123,938. The contracts called for them to be paid an even $5 million in 2012/13, $5.225 million in 2013/14, and $14,898,938 in 2014/15. For the purposes of where we’re going, it doesn’t matter how these figure was arrived at, only what they are and where we’re going. The cap number for these contracts calls for that $25,123,938 contract to be split evenly across all three years, i.e. $8,374,646 each season. This is true despite of the actual payment schedule being what it is above. So when someone asks “what are Lin and Asik getting paid?”, the answer could be either, technically. On a literal interpretation of the question, the payment schedule is the right answer. Yet when people ask that, what they really want to know, even if they don’t know there’s a difference, is what is their cap number. That’s the one […]
Several years ago, I wrote a piece called Creative Financing in the NBA, that sought to address and highlight a few quirky salaries and salaries mechanisms handed about that season. In that piece, I also spent a long time addressing the difference between team options and unguaranteed salaries. Often times, unguaranteed salaries are reported in the mainstream press as being team options, even though the two mechanisms are different. And often times, this is fine, because the differences don’t really matter. Not to the casual fan, at least. Nevertheless, differences do exist. Some of the initial post is quoted below that explains these differences: Unguaranteed or partially guaranteed final seasons are becoming quite the trend in the NBA, and they are quickly replacing team options. In fact, there are only 11 team options in the entire league […] There are very few instances in which contracts must be guaranteed. In fact, there are only two; the first year of a signed-and-traded contract, and the first two years of a rookie scale contract (which must be guaranteed for a minimum of 80% of the scale amount). Nothing else has to be guaranteed, but it is self-evident that almost all are. Would you accept an unguaranteed contract as a player? Not without incentive to do so, no. It is self evident why so many contracts are fully guaranteed. Yet the unguaranteed contract fad has its basis in logic. In a lot of cases, unguaranteed contracts function much like team options do. However, there are some significant advantages to doing it in this way, which is why it happens. The differences: 1) Team options have to be decided upon by the final day of the previous season. Seasons change over on July 1st, and thus team options must be decided upon by June […]
After going undrafted out of Creighton in 2007, Anthony Tolliver played in summer league for the Miami Heat, and was granted the honour of being the 16th overall pick in the 2007 Continental Basketball Association draft. These things eventually parlayed themselves into a training camp contract with the Cleveland Cavaliers. Tolliver’s contract with Cleveland was a typical ‘summer’ (read as ‘training camp’) contract. It was a fully unguaranteed rookie minimum salary contract, which, in the 2007/08 season, was worth $427,163. Tolliver was one of several camp signings for the Cavaliers that season – alongside Noel Felix, Chet Mason, Hassan Adams, Darius Rice, and a re-signed Dwayne Jones – and was an outside shot to make the roster based purely on the numbers game alone. Concurrent with these moves, Cleveland was embroiled in the long-since-forgotten-about holdouts of Anderson Varejao and Sasha Pavlovic. Both restricted free agents out of contract that summer, both unhappy with Cleveland’s best offer, and yet both seemingly unable to get more on the market, the two held out of training camp, waiting for enormous deals that never came. From memory, Pavlovic wanted roughly six years and $40 million, while Varejao wanted $10 million per annum. The two held out all through the free agency period, all through training camp, all through preseason, and into the regular season. It is precisely because of this that Tolliver, as well as Demetris Nichols, made the Cavaliers roster that season. Pavlovic was the first to crack – he agreed to re-sign to a partially guaranteed three-year, $13,696,250 contract that he was waived after only two years of. He signed this contract on October 31st 2007, the second day of the regular season. And when he did so, Tolliver was waived to open up a roster spot. It seemed mostly innocuous that […]
All salary information is taken from this website’s own salary pages. All figures taken from the day of publication – if subsequent trades/signings are made, then adjust accordingly. NOTE: All cap space amounts are calculated to an estimated salary cap of $58.5 million. This inexact figure is the most recent (and thus accurate) projection released yet, and will suffice for now. When the actual amount is calculated/announced, the sums below will be altered accordingly. It is vital – VITAL – that you understand what a “cap hold” is before you read this. An explanation can be found here. Atlanta Hawks Committed salary for 2013/14: $22,497,415 (view full forecast) Projected cap space: At most, $35,504,580, but not really. If Atlanta renounce (or lose) Josh Smith, and renounce their remaining free agents (Kyle Korver, Devin Harris, Zaza Pachulia, Johan Petro, Ivan Johnson, Jeff Teague, Dahntay Jones, Hilton Armstrong, Erick Dampier, Etan Thomas, Randolph Morris and Anthony Tolliver), waive DeShawn Stevenson ($2,240,450, fully unguaranteed with no guarantee date), Shelvin Mack ($884,293, fully unguaranteed with no guarantee date) and Mike Scott ($788,872, fully unguaranteed until August 15th, thereafter $100,000 guaranteed) and sell or renounce their first-round draft picks (#17 and #18, cap holds of $1,348,200 and $1,280,800), they will have a cap number of $22,995,420 (the committed salary plus nine minimum salary roster charges of $490,180 for having less than twelve things on the cap). (If you want to get really absurd, they could even amnesty Al Horford. Hypotheticals are fun.) This is, however, a maximum amount. And it’s not a realistic one. Smith’s cap hold will be equal to the maximum amount for a nine year veteran, and, while this amount will not be known until the new salary cap figure is determined, a slight increase in the cap will mean a slight […]
