|2008 NBA Draft||NBA||Drafted 26th overall by San Antonio.|
|23rd September, 2008||NBA||Signed four year, $4,250,277 rookie scale contract with Indiana. Included team options for 2010/11 and 2011/12.|
|28th October, 2009||NBA||San Antonio exercised 2010/11 team option.|
|20th October, 2010||NBA||San Antonio exercised 2011/12 team option.|
|2011 NBA Draft||NBA||Traded by San Antonio to Indiana in exchange for the draft rights to Kawhi Leonard (#15), the draft rights to Davis Bertans (#42) and the draft rights to Erazem Lorbek (#46, 2005).|
|13th July, 2012||NBA||Re-signed by Indiana to a four year, $40 million contract.|
|7th July, 2016||NBA||As a part of a three team deal, traded by Indiana to Utah in exchange for the draft rights to Taurean Prince (#12, 2016).|
|10th July, 2017||NBA||Signed a partially guaranteed three year, $57 million contract with Sacramento.|
|8th February, 2018||NBA||As a part of a three team deal, traded by Sacramento to Cleveland, along with the draft rights to Arturas Gudaitis (#47, 2015), in exchange for Iman Shumpert, a 2020 second round pick, the rights to Dimitrios Agravanis (#59, 2015) and cash from Cleveland, as well as Joe Johnson from Utah.|
|7th December, 2018||NBA||As a part of a three team deal, traded by Cleveland to Milwaukee, along with a 2021 second round pick, as well as Sam Dekker to Washington, in exchange for Matthew Dellavedova, John Henson, a protected 2021 first round pick and a 2021 second round pick from Milwaukee, as well as a 2022 second round pick from Washington.|
|2004 - 2008||IUPUI (NCAA)|
|June 2008 - June 2011||San Antonio Spurs (NBA)|
|June 2011 - July 2016||Indiana Pacers (NBA)|
|July 2016 - June 2017||Utah Jazz (NBA)|
|July 2017 - February 2018||Sacramento Kings (NBA)|
|February 2018 - December 2018||Cleveland Cavaliers (NBA)|
|December 2018 - present||Milwaukee Bucks (NBA)|
September 12, 2018
After LeBron's departure, the Cavaliers have had a very quiet offseason. They extended Kevin Love to consolidate his value, but have otherwise largely stood pat, and the above three remain with the team despite their large contracts. Each of these contracts runs through 2020, yet each also has a very large expiring portion on their 2019/20 salary, making them essentially expiring if so desired. This in theory also gives them good trade value, as those salaries can be used to facilitate trades. Given their inaction, it remains to be seen what strategy the Cavaliers will choose to employ to find a path back to competitiveness; right now, it appears as though the aim is to tread water until next summer. And with that in mind, if any or all of these three make it beyond the February trade deadline with the team, they all become very strong candidates for March buyouts.
June 29, 2018
PG/SG - 6’3, 188lbs - 32 years old - 10 years of experience
This, frankly, was a poor year for Hill, both for Sacramento and Cleveland. Hill arrived with the Kings as a player who had made his trade as an unconventional largely off-ball point guard, who thrived off of cuts, movement and intricate sets, and thus who had just had a career-best year with Quin Snyder’s Jazz who did exactly that. Coming to Sacramento, however, none of that was in place, and Hill struggled.
Hill then got what he wanted; a move to a contender. A team in which he needed only to spot up, cut and defend to look good. And yet he still struggled. Why?
Defensively, Hill looked a step slow. He deflects the ball well, makes good reads, and has good size for the switches, but speedier point guards can just get to the spot before him. Offensively, the three-point shooting that had been among the league’s best in his time with the Kings regressed to the mean, and Hill largely stood idle offensively, waiting for spot-ups. A player who should have been getting busy with the cuts and transition to feed off of LeBron’s defensive pull, didn’t.
Hill got the opportunity, talent upgrade and money he wanted. And yet he never came through with any of them. Cleveland needed an upgrade at point guard, acquired Hill, and yet they still do.
Player Plan: Two years and $37 million remaining, but only $1 million of the final year’s $18 million is guaranteed. Due to the new CBA’s rules about how unguaranteed salary is handled in trades, that unguaranteed portion has value in trade this upcoming season that it won’t next season, so if Cleveland has designs to load up on salary in order to get quality, Hill won’t stay put for long.
June 29, 2017
PG, 6’3, 188lbs, 31 years old, 9 years of experience
The only problem with Hill’s season was the injuries. Hill managed only 49 regular season games and missed time in the playoffs, and with him out, the Jazz had no chance. That speaks partly to the struggles of the players behind him, but also to Hill’s efficiencies and abilities. On minimal dribbles, Hill scores efficiently and in a variety of ways, be it shots around the basket or on corner threes, a very snug fit in the Jazz’s deliberate offence that allows (and is designed) for an off-ball point. His defence also blends in precisely with what they do on that end. So while it is about to get expensive, re-signing Hill to a $20 million+ per annum deal is worth it. If they were not prepared to pay the cost to keep him, they ought not to have brought him in.
Player Plan: Entering unrestricted free agency off of only an $8 million contract. With Paul off the market now, Hill could become coveted, but he needs to be kept. Hopefully it costs closer to $80 million rather than $100 million to do so, More than that would be too much, although the lack of options to replace him are noted and do affect his price.
March 2, 2017
At the 2016 NBA Draft, a few trades occurred, and some others were agreed upon that for salary cap purposes only were fully finalised two weeks later. This is all normal.
Quite a few of these trades involved draft picks, picks for both that year and the future, and quite a few of those draft picks were first rounders. This is also normal.
The perceived value of them, however, was abnormally inconsistent.
#12 pick Taurean Prince was traded by the Utah Jazz in a three team deal that netted them George Hill straight up.
#13 pick Georgios Papagiannis was combined by the Phoenix Suns with #28 pick Skal Labissiere and 2014 #27 pick Bogdan Bogdanovic, then shipped to the Sacramento Kings for #8 pick Marquese Chriss.
#20 pick Caris LeVert was traded by the Indiana Pacers, along with a future second round pick (protected 45th through 60th from 2017 to 2022 and only thereafter unprotected, thereby almost certainly ensuring the pick will be a high second rounder), to the Brooklyn Nets in exchange for Thaddeus Young.
#21 pick Malachi Richardson was traded by the Charlotte Hornets to the Sacramento Kings in exchange for Marco Belinelli.
And finally, #31 pick Devonta Davis and #38 Rade Zagorac pick were combined by the Boston Celtics and sent to the Memphis Grizzlies in exchange for a 2019 first round pick, protected through the first eight picks.
In summation, the #12 pick had seemingly enough value to obtain a very high quality starting point guard in the prime of his career, while the pick immediately after it had to be packaged with two other first rounders just to move up five spots in a weak draft. Similarly, while admittedly packaged with a likely decent second rounder, the #20 pick was deemed sufficiently good to get Young, a valuable and versatile contributor in the prime of his career with at least two years to run on his contract, whereas the pick below it yielded only Belinelli, a journeyman backup shooting guard on an expiring contract who, while fine, is demonstrably less effective than Young as an NBA player, and who was coming off of the worst season he has had since his rookie campaign. [...]
March 15, 2012
Indiana is middle of the pack in terms of team points per game, yet they shoot only 43.2 percent as a team, 5th worst in the league. This is due to a lack of creative ability in the half-court offense. In spite of the promising start to his career, Darren Collison has rather tapered off since his trade to Indiana, a very solid player who just doesn’t have the talent level to take a team far as a lead guard. (The new Jarrett Jack, if you will.) George Hill similarly thrives in a bench contributor/spot starter role, but he too doesn’t have the ability to lead an elite half-court offense. And Danny Granger’s shot-creation ability is limited to just taking them. Indiana have a lot going for them, and two good options at every position. Since Collison is struggling to be it, the Pacers could use a calibre half-court point guard.
June 25, 2011
[...] Stu Scott informs us that Kawhi's mother will move to Indianapolis to be near her son, now a Pacer. Hold that thought, Ma'am - even though ESPN's broadcast does not get to the news for about half an hour, the internet is already running the news that Leonard will instead be traded to the Indiana Pacers in exchange for George Hill. Within a week of trying to move Tony Parker to get into the lottery, the Spurs instead move his backup and get into the first pick immediately after the lottery, an immeasurably better deal. Indiana, meanwhile, gives up a player who would otherwise have been something of a steal, purely so that they can get a backup point guard. Hill is a solid, talented and entertaining two-way player, but he's also a backup point guard. You can get other backup point guards. Apparently they didn't want to.
August 12, 2010
It is customary for players to sign for 120% of the scale. In all the years I have done this [not including this year; more on that later], I only known of four players that haven't; Sergio Rodriguez (signed for 100%), George Hill (signed for 120% for the first two years, then 80% for the final two), Donte Greene (signed an incentive laden contract that he hasn't yet got up to 120%) and Ian Mahinmi (all over the show). More specifically, as mentioned above, it is customary for players to sign for a guaranteed 100% of the scale, whilst earning the last 20% in incentives.
[...] The Spurs use this creative manipulation of the rookie salary scale protocol all the time. In fact, they're worse for it; there were no incentives that George Hill could meet in order to get his 120%. He was getting only 80% regardless (and since 80% of the third year of George Hill's rookie contract actually worked out to less than the minimum salary, he had to be bumped up to that by the league instead.) The Spurs knew what they were doing here, just as they did when they did it to Anderson last week. The only people who didn't know were the fans, and that's because no one sought to tell them.