Paul Millsap

Paul Millsap
PF - 6’8, 246lbs - 33 years old - 12 years of experience

After the big money move to bring him in, Millsap had an underwhelming first season due to injury. When he did play, he played mostly well, being the bit-of-everything player that he has successfully turned into near-All-Star-calibre production overall. But in playing only 38 games, his absence was what cost the team a playoff spot. And perhaps fuelled by this injury, the decline in his play has begun.

Healthy Millsap did his usual baseline and post stuff, the rare example of the post player who would rather shoot from seven feet away than two, but as he ages and loses yet more explosion, he has begun to take a lot more set-shots. These are quite good, but not elite, and if they continue to become the focus of his offensive game then they will have to continue to improve. Losing that explosion is also affecting his ability to defensively rebound outside of his area (career-low rebounding percentage of 12.1%), having long ago lost the offensive rebounding, as well as struggling at times to defend the perimeter, an increasingly important requirement of a power forward.

Healthy Millsap is nonetheless a very good passer of the ball, a cerebral player who reads the game well, and is consistently so much better than first glances indicate when protecting around the basket. This in theory makes him an excellent pairing for Jokic, a similarly cerebral player who does not offer than rim protection. But for it to work optimally, healthy Millsap must accept his declining offensive role and keep the ball moving.

Player Plan: Two years and $60,230,769 remaining, the last year of which is a team option. Next year is a given, but the last year is negotiable, if likely.

Paul Millsap
PF, 6’8, 246lbs, 32 years old, 11 years of experience

Retooling rather than rebuilding and remaining competitive so as to avoid the doldrums will only have worked if Millsap is either retained, or if value is gained. Notwithstanding the declines in his games played, scor-ing efficiency (by more than the uptake in his three-point rate can justify) and rebounding rates, he would be worthy of a three year, $85 million contract given the circumstances. But it will surely cost more than that, especially in terms of the committed years. If he is retained, the trade must remain a possibility. Having lost Al Horford and DeMarre Carroll for nothing, Atlanta cannot easily afford it to happen again. But he is not an at-any-price player. If he is brought back at some price, the team must still get younger around him, retaining flexibility and a shred of competitiveness while still planning ahead.

Player Plan: Has declined a player option for $21,472,407 and thus heading to UFA. Would be eligible for a $200 million deal. Do not give him it. But do give him a lot. Re-signing him will almost certainly involve committing to a fourth year he will not sustain his performance for, but so be it.

These deals are less common, due in no small part by the shortening of the maximum contract lengths under the 2011 CBA, but also due to more conservative spending in general. The $19 million Paul Millsap received this year is further impressive when compared to the $37.5 million Rip Hamilton received five years ago in a very similar situation.

Paul Millsap – Atlanta Hawks

Millsap signed with Atlanta for two years at $9.5 million per year, a significant chunk of cap space for a team who have worked so diligently to cut as much payroll as possible. Reversing the direction of the franchise is initially tough to reconcile, yet it is worth it because of how good of value his deal represents.

Millsap is signed to an amount comparable to his talent, for a short period of time. His deal only being two years long is of big help to the Hawks, both on their court and potentially on other teams. He provides Atlanta with the talent boost that will keep them out of the cellar – if you want bums on seats, you need that – while this contract makes him extremely tradeable. Millsap is a valued commodity around the league as a quality, versatile, two-way role player, and by getting him at the right price, Atlanta put themselves in a position to take advantage of that. And as long as they do, he’ll help them significantly as a player.

Even rebuilding teams need that.

Deals are judged by the comparable ones of others, and the obvious and necessary comparison here is with Paul Millsap, Jefferson's running mate as recently as five months ago. Millsap signed with Atlanta for two thirds of what Jefferson did ($9.5 million annual compared to $13.5 million for Al), and for two thirds of the time (two years instead of three). Logically, this would suggest Millsap is two third of the player. But he's not. Without wanting or needing to fully compare the two, we can all hopefully concede that they are about the same, give or take. But the price is very different.

Millsap is signed to an amount comparable to his talent, for shorter time. He provides Atlanta with the talent boost that will keep them out of the cellar - if you want bums on seats, you need that - and his contract makes him extremely tradeable. Millsap is a valued commodity around the league as a quality, versatile, two-way role player, and by getting him at the right price, Atlanta put themselves in a position to take advantage of that. And until they do, he'll help them significantly as a player.

Charlotte, however have paid the 'Bobcats tax' and will suffer for it. Jefferson is, at best, at the very top end of the acceptable overpay range, and probably slightly beyond it. Yet it is that third year that makes it extremely difficult to trade him before the summer of 2015. Rebuilding teams need as much flexibility as possible - with his undervalued, very competitively priced skills and short contract, Millsap could be traded for a quality return as soon as February. Jefferson can't. He costs too much and he's under contract for too long to be highly prized. Indeed, he may not be tradeable at all. This is not all bad, as it will mean a quality player will stay with them for three years.

At some point, a rebuilding project needs to involve actual building. At some point, you need to start acquiring quality - you can't forgo all talent acquisition just to stay bad just to hopefully get lucky in a good draft class. Charlotte have reached that point. Atlanta have somewhat, too. But in these respective signings, the Hawks and Bobcats have put themselves in far different positions. One team landed a quality player on a great price who will help the team in both the immediate future and (via trade), likely the long term. Meanwhile, Charlotte spend $21.5 million more to achieve less.

It was the right idea, but not the right execution.