The CBA Glossary
An explainer thing for the NBA's Collective Bargaining Agreement
Cap circumvention
The NBAs Collective Bargaining Agreement contains an article - Article
XIII - which seeks to define both the nature of, and punishment for, circumvention.
And if for whatever reason you were hearing this term in the news cycle surrounding
your favorite NBA team right now, it probably behoves everyone involved to
get fully up to speed on what that Article XIII says - and what possible
punishments might befall any team found to be engaging in the practice.
General prohibition
Cap circumvention, as the name suggests, is conduct designed to circumvent the salary cap. It is distinct from tampering (the practice of a teams representatives speaking to players on rival teams to attempt to lure them to join their team) and collusion (coordinated behavior between multiple parties to manipulate the market or avoid competition). Section I of Article XIII lays out the general prohibitions of the practice.
The NBA and the Players Association
agree that all of the CBA's major vehicles must be respected as intended.
No team, player, agent, affiliate or representative can make agreements or
structure transactions whose real purpose is to bypass or undermine those
rules, even if the arrangement technically appears legal on paper. Parties
cannot use creative contracts, side eals, or transactions to evade the spirit
of the salary cap and other CBA rules. ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 1 (General Prohibitions):
(a) It is the intention of the parties that the provisions agreed to herein,
including, without limitation, those relating to the Salary Cap, the Exceptions
to the Salary Cap, the scope of Basketball Related Income, the Escrow and
Tax Arrangement, the Rookie Scale, the Right of First Refusal, the Maximum
Player Salary, and free agency, be interpreted so as to preserve the essential
benefits achieved by both parties to this Agreement. Neither the Players Association,
the NBA, nor any Team (or Team Affiliate) or player (or person or entity acting
with authority on behalf of such player), shall enter into any agreement,
including, without limitation, any Player Contract (including any Renegotiation,
Extension, or amendment of a Player Contract), or undertake any action or
transaction, including, without limitation, the assignment or termination
of a Player Contract, which is, or which includes any term that is, designed
to serve the purpose of defeating or circumventing the intention of the parties
as reflected by all of the provisions of this Agreement.
Any agreement between a team and
a non-team entity that agrees to pay any player of that team for their basketball
services - even if it is dressed up as non-basketball services - counts as
a circumvention violation. And the CBA also gives the NBA the power to infer
this form of agreement, based on the size on either or both of the players
playing contract and/or their third party agreement. Basically if a team is
underpaying a player, and knowingly engages with another party to massively
overpay them for something else outside of their official NBA contract as
a form of topping up their overall take-home pay, they can be deemed to be
engaging in salary cap circumvention. ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 1 (General Prohibitions):
(b) It shall constitute a violation of Section 1(a) above for a Team (or Team
Affiliate) to enter into an agreement or understanding with any sponsor or
business partner or third party under which such sponsor, business partner,
or third party pays or agrees to pay compensation for basketball services
(even if such compensation is ostensibly designated as being for non-basketball
services) to a player under Contract to the Team. Such an agreement with a
sponsor or business partner or third party may be inferred where: (i) such
compensation from the sponsor or business partner or third party is substantially
in excess of the fair market value of any services to be rendered by the player
for such sponsor or business partner or third party; and (ii) the Compensation
in the Player Contract between the player and the Team is substantially below
the fair market value of such Contract.
It is further expressly precluded
for a team to pay a player not currently a member of their roster. This prevents
teams from informally paying or rewarding free agents before they sign. This
does not however prevent a team from paying money that a player already earned
under an earlier contract but agreed to receive later (deferred compensation),
so if a retired or former player is still receiving installments from a contract
signed years ago, those payments are legitimate. ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 1 (General Prohibitions):
(c) It shall constitute a violation of Section 1(a) above for a Team (or Team
Affiliate) to have a financial arrangement with or offer a financial inducement
to any player (not including retired players) not signed to a current Player
Contract, except as permitted by this Agreement.
(d) Nothing contained in Section 1(c) above shall interfere with a Team’s
obligation to pay a player Deferred Compensation earned under a prior Player
Contract.
Specifically prohibited conduct
The CBA cannot pre-emptively legislate for everything, because not everything is forseeable. But it tries, and expressly prohibits multiple potential means of cap circumvention in Section 2. Prohibited behaviour includes:
● Any form of agreement or promise, express or implied,
about future player contracts (that is to say, any form of sign cheap
now and well take care of you in your next deal type of deals;
bear this in mind, as this will also crop up later on); ⓘArticle XIII
(Circumvention) Section 2 (No Unauthorized Agreements):
(a) At no time shall there be any agreements or transactions of any kind
(whether disclosed or undisclosed to the NBA), express or implied, oral or
written, or promises, undertakings, representations, commitments,
inducements, assurances of intent, or understandings of any kind (whether
disclosed or undisclosed to the NBA), between a player (or any person or
entity controlled by, related to, or acting with authority on behalf of, such
player) and any Team (or Team Affiliate):
(i) concerning any future Renegotiation, Extension, or other
amendment of an existing Player Contract, or entry into a
new Player Contract [...]
● Any extra or hidden compensation not in the Uniform
Player Contract; ⓘArticle XIII
(Circumvention) Section 2 (No Unauthorized Agreements):
(a) At no time shall there be any agreements or transactions of any kind
(whether disclosed or undisclosed to the NBA), express or implied, oral or
written, or promises, undertakings, representations, commitments,
inducements, assurances of intent, or understandings of any kind (whether
disclosed or undisclosed to the NBA), between a player (or any person or
entity controlled by, related to, or acting with authority on behalf of, such
player) and any Team (or Team Affiliate):
[...] (ii) except as permitted by this Agreement or as set forth in a
Uniform Player Contract (provided that the Team has not
intentionally delayed submitting such Uniform Player
Contract for approval by the NBA), involving compensation
or consideration of any kind or anything else of value, to be
paid, furnished, or made available by, to, or for the benefit
of the player, or any person or entity controlled by, related
to, or acting with authority on behalf of the player [...]
● Any hidden investment or business opportunities linked to a team. ⓘArticle XIII
(Circumvention) Section 2 (No Unauthorized Agreements):
(a) At no time shall there be any agreements or transactions of any kind
(whether disclosed or undisclosed to the NBA), express or implied, oral or
written, or promises, undertakings, representations, commitments,
inducements, assurances of intent, or understandings of any kind (whether
disclosed or undisclosed to the NBA), between a player (or any person or
entity controlled by, related to, or acting with authority on behalf of, such
player) and any Team (or Team Affiliate):
[...] (iii) except as permitted by this Agreement, involving an
investment or business opportunity to be furnished or made
available by, to, or for the benefit of the player, or any person
or entity controlled by, related to, or acting with authority on
behalf of the player.
It is also a violation not only
for a team to actually make an unauthorized deal of such nature,
but also for either the team or player to try to make one, or
intentionally ask for one. That is to say, even if one party rejects the circumventory
overtures of the other, the violation has nevertheless occurred. Any attemot
try to create, solicit, negotiate or encourage circumvention of the salary
cap suffices as a violation. ⓘArticle XIII
(Circumvention) Section 2 (No Unauthorized Agreements):
(b) In addition to the foregoing, it shall be a violation of this Section
2 for any Team (or Team Affiliate) or any player (or any person or entity
controlled by, related to, or acting with authority on behalf of, such player)
to attempt to enter into or to intentionally solicit any agreement, transaction,
promise, undertaking, representation, commitment, inducement, assurance of
intent, or understanding that would be prohibited by Section 2(a) above.
There is, however, one exception
- the complicated subject of passive investments. The CBA acknowledges that
in real life, wealthy people (both players and team owners) often cross paths
in business, running the risk of the optics of circumvention should they be
brought together in any off-court business ventures. But it draws limits to
prevent disguised compensation. Specifically, while teams and a player can
both invest in the same business, it is only permissible if: ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 2 (No Unauthorized Agreements):
(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, it shall not be a violation of Section
2(a) or 2(b) above solely for a Team Affiliate and a player (or any person
or entity controlled by, related to, or acting with authority on behalf of,
such player) to each passively invest (i.e., invest with no management, governance,
voting, or executive role or other operational rights or role) in the same
third-party entity, provided that (i) neither such Team Affiliate or such
player holds more than a twelve and one-half percent (12.5%) interest in such
third-party entity, (ii) the Team Affiliate’s investment and player’s investment
are not made in coordination or in consultation with each other, and (iii)
the investment opportunity was not furnished or made available to the player
by the Team Affiliate (or vice versa).
● Each owns 12.5% or less of the business.
● Their investments are independent (i.e. not coordinated or discussed with each other)
● The business opportunity did not come from one to the other (i.e. the team affiliate did not give the player the deal, or vice versa).
● Both are purely passive investors with no management or control role.
To illustrate that by way of example, If both a player and a team owner's investment fund independently buy small stakes in the same startup, this is generally allowed. But if a team executive invites a player to buy into a private company as a reward for signing with the team, it is a violation.
Importantly, the NBA does not require
concrete proof (such as recorded conversations or written contracts) to find
that a violation occured. Violations can be deemed proven by direct
evidence (emails, contracts, testimony), of course, but the CBA expressly
states that circumstantial evidence (facts that strongly suggest wrongdoing)
can suffice. For example, if a players salary is way below market value,
but he suddenly gets a business deal with a team owner worth millions,
that pattern can be deemed enough to prove a violation, even without express
confession. ⓘArticle XIII (Circumvention)
Section 2 (No Unauthorized Agreements):
(d) A violation of Section 2(a) or 2(b) above may be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence, including, but not limited to, evidence that a Player Contract or
any term or provision thereof cannot rationally be explained in the absence
of conduct violative of Section 2(a) or 2(b).
On a related note, if someone suspects
a violation but waits until more evidence is available before filing a case,
that delay cannot automatically be used against them. That is to say, the
NBA will not assume a claim is weak simply because the complaining party took
time to gather evidence first. ⓘArticle XIII
(Circumvention) Section 2 (No Unauthorized Agreements):
(e) In any proceeding brought before the System Arbitrator pursuant to this
Section 2, no adverse inference shall be drawn against the party initiating
such proceeding because that party, when it first suspected or believed that
a violation of Section 2 may have occurred, deferred the initiation of such
proceeding until it had further reason to believe that such a violation had
occurred.
A player will not be found liable
if a team intentionally delays submitting a signed contract to the NBA, and
the player did not know the team was doing it. This ensures that a player
is not responsible for a team's behind-the-scenes misconduct if the player
was unaware of it. ⓘArticle XIII (Circumvention)
Section 2 (No Unauthorized Agreements):
(f) A player will not be found to have committed a violation of Section 2(a)(ii)
above if the violation is the Team’s intentional delay in submitting a Uniform
Player Contract to the NBA and this was done without the player’s knowledge.
Player-coaches
Supp
Endorsements
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Payments to retired players
The CBA also seeks to prevent teams from paying players after retirement as a disguised reward for past discounts. That is to say, they are trying to get out ahead of any conversation along the lines of we will pay or have paid you less than you could have earned during your career, but we will make it up to you after you retire.
If a team signs a retired player
to a non-playing role within five years of them playing for that team, the
retired player is paid more than $10,000 or gets an investment/business opportunity,
and the player was deemed to have been underpaid during their playing career
(below fair market value), the NBA reserves the right to investigate, if it
feels it has the grounds to claim that the retirement deal is actually overpaying
for whatever services the retired player provides, or that their investment
deal is not commercially fair. ⓘArticle XIII
(Circumvention) Section 5 (Transactions with Retired Players):
(a) If (i) a Team or Team Affiliate enters into a transaction after the date
of this Agreement with a retired player who played for the Team within the
five-year (5) period preceding such transaction and the terms of such transaction
provide for the retired player to be paid compensation or consideration in
excess of $10,000 or to be provided with an investment or business opportunity,
and, if (ii) the compensation the retired player received from the Team when
he was a player was substantially below the then fair market value of such
player’s basketball services under the Salary Cap system, then the NBA may
challenge the transaction, pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section
5(b) below, on the ground that: (A) the compensation or consideration to the
retired player substantially exceeds the then fair market value of the services
or other consideration provided by the retired player in the transaction;
or that (B) the amount of the retired player’s investment or the benefit conferred
upon the retired player as a result of the investment or business opportunity
is not commercially reasonable, given the relative risks and rewards of such
investment.
If a challenge is raised, the NBA
and NBPA are to jointly pick a neutral "business valuation expert".
If they cannot agree on one, a formal arbitration-style selection process
is used to appoint one. At any hearing, the burden of proof falls onto the
NBA to prove its case that the non-playing role contract is in fact being
used to supplement underpayments as a player. The CBA mandates that said hearings
must be quick, with decisions reached within 15 days, and appeals to be filed
within ten more. ⓘArticle XIII (Circumvention)
Section 5 (Transactions with Retired Players):
(b) (i) Any challenge under this Section 5 shall be filed in writing with
a business valuation expert jointly selected by the NBA and the Players Association.
In the event the parties cannot agree on the identity of a business valuation
expert, a business valuation expert shall be selected in the same manner set
forth in Article XXXI, Section 7 for the selection of a Grievance Arbitrator
in the absence of an agreement between the parties. The business valuation
expert shall conduct a hearing in which the retired player, the Team and/or
Team Affiliate, the Players Association, and the NBA are afforded the opportunity
to appear and participate. The NBA shall have the burden of proof in the proceeding.
The business valuation expert may permit discovery of relevant documents necessary
to undertake the valuation, and shall render a decision within fifteen (15)
days following the conclusion of the hearing. Within ten (10) days of any
decision by the business valuation expert, any of the parties may file an
appeal with the System Arbitrator, who shall conduct a hearing and render
a decision within twenty (20) days of the filing of the appeal. In any such
proceeding, the System Arbitrator shall apply an “arbitrary and capricious”
standard of review. There shall be no right of further appeal to the Appeals
Panel.
If the NBA wins its case and the
deal with the retired player is ruled improper, the primary resolution is
that the excess value of that deal is thereafter to be deemed as team salary
- and will count on the cap. The difference between the amount they are getting
paid, and the amount the arbiter deals they should be paid in fair market
value, becomes a cap penalty. The retired player would therefore appear on
the cap, even if they are working with the team as a community ambassador
or something. In the event that the team cannot add this extra penalty to
their team salary picture - for example, if the aprons are in the way - the
deal is instead voided. Successfully challenged deals can be renegotiated,
but only with the NBA's express oversight. ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 5 (Transactions with Retired Players):
(b) (ii) If the NBA prevails in its challenge under this Section 5, the difference
between (A) the compensation or consideration received by the retired player,
or the value of the investment or business opportunity received by the retired
player (net of any contribution by the retired player), and (B) a reasonable
estimate of the fair market value of the services or other consideration provided
by the retired player, or a reasonable estimate of the fair market value of
the investment or business opportunity, in each case as determined by the
business valuation expert or the System Arbitrator, as the case may be, shall
be included in the Team’s Team Salary, subject to the Team’s Room and other
Salary Cap rules, and further subject to any allocation over time that the
business valuation expert or System Arbitrator determines is appropriate.
In the event that any amount required to be included in the Team’s Team Salary
pursuant to this subsection exceeds the Team’s Room, the challenged transaction
or arrangement shall be rescinded and of no further force and effect.
(iii) If the NBA prevails in its challenge under this Section 5, and the retired
player and the Team and/or Team Affiliate renegotiate or terminate the transaction,
any revised terms of the transaction shall be promptly disclosed to the NBA
and the Players Association, and may, at the request of the NBA, be re-subjected
to the procedures of this Section 5(b).
For all the details of the above, it should hereby be noted that I do not know of a single instance in which it has happened. If ever it did, it will have been decades ago.
Charitable contributions
The CBA is careful to prevent teams and players from using charities as indirect payment channels.
Teams can donate to or in respect
of players, but limits apply. There is a maximum of $20,000 per year per player,
up to a maximum of $75,000 total per year across all the team's players. A
donation "in respect of a player" can be to the player’s foundation, a charity
the player is linked to, a charity chosen because of the player, or a donation
made “for the player’s benefit or reputation”. ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 6 (Charitable Contributions):
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision in this Article XIII, a Team is permitted
to make charitable contributions in respect of players on the Team so long
as the combined value of all donations by a Team in respect of any one player
on the Team does not exceed $20,000 per Salary Cap Year, and the combined
value of all donations in respect of all players on the Team does not exceed
$75,000 per Salary Cap Year. For purposes of this Section 6, a donation in
respect of a player means a donation to a bona fide charity that qualifies
as a tax exempt organization under the Internal Revenue Code and is either
(i) a player’s own charitable foundation or another charity with which the
player is affiliated, or (ii) a charity to which a Team makes a donation on
behalf of, or at the request of, a player or for the purpose of demonstrating
support for a player.
Players also have limits, going
the other way. They can give a maximum of $20,000 per year per team-related
charity, whereby "team-related charity" means the team foundation,
charities tied to the team or its affiliates, charities supported at the team’s
request or to support the team. This exists so that players also cannot “give
back” large charity payments to team-linked causes, so as to prevent circumvention
through image-based compensation loops. ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 6 (Charitable Contributions):
(b) The combined value of all charitable donations by a player to any Team-related
charity may not exceed $20,000 per Salary Cap Year. For purposes of this Section
6, a “Team-related charity” means a bona fide charity that qualifies as a
tax exempt organization under the Internal Revenue Code and is either (i)
the charitable foundation of the player’s Team or other charity with which
the Team or a Team Affiliate is affiliated, or (ii) a charity to which a player
makes a donation on behalf of, or at the request of, his Team or a Team Affiliate
or for the purpose of demonstrating support for the Team or Team Affiliate.
Penalties
If cap circumvention is found, by inference or express conduct, the question then becomes - what powers do the NBA have to penalize those involved? And the short answer is - quite a lot. The NBA Commissioner has a menu of punishments: big fines, draft pick loss, contract cancellation, suspensions, and bans on future deals.
Section 3 of Article XIII lays out the authorized punishments. For those found in violation of Section 1, the aforementioned General Prohibitions, the punishments can be as follows:
● For a first offense
- a fine of up to $4.5 million* ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 3 (Penalties):
(a) Upon a finding of a violation of Section 1 above by the System Arbitrator,
but only following the conclusion of any appeal to the Appeals Panel, the
Commissioner shall be authorized to:
(i) impose a fine of up to $4,500,000 (fifty percent (50%) of which shall
be payable to the NBA, and fifty percent (50%) of which shall be payable to
the NBPA-Selected Charitable Organization (as defined in Article VI, Section
6(a))) on any Team found to have committed such violation for the first time;
[...]
● For a second offense
- a fine of up to $5.5 million* ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 3 (Penalties):
(a) Upon a finding of a violation of Section 1 above by the System Arbitrator,
but only following the conclusion of any appeal to the Appeals Panel, the
Commissioner shall be authorized to:
[...] (ii) impose a fine of up to $5,500,000 (fifty percent (50%) of which
shall be payable to the NBA, and fifty percent (50%) of which shall be payable
to the NBPA-Selected Charitable Organization) on any Team found to have committed
such violation for at least the second time [...]
● The forfeiture
of a first-round pick [note the use of the singular] ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 3 (Penalties):
(a) Upon a finding of a violation of Section 1 above by the System Arbitrator,
but only following the conclusion of any appeal to the Appeals Panel, the
Commissioner shall be authorized to:
[...] (iii) direct the forfeiture of one First Round Draft Pick; [...]
● The voiding of
the relevant player contract ⓘArticle XIII
(Circumvention) Section 3 (Penalties):
(a) Upon a finding of a violation of Section 1 above by the System Arbitrator,
but only following the conclusion of any appeal to the Appeals Panel, the
Commissioner shall be authorized to:
[...] (iv) void any Player Contract, or any Renegotiation, Extension, or amendment
of a Player Contract, between any player and any Team when both the player
(or any person or entity acting with authority on behalf of such player) and
the Team (or Team Affiliate) are found to have committed such violation [...]
● The voiding of
any other pertinent agreement relating to the conduct ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 3 (Penalties):
(a) Upon a finding of a violation of Section 1 above by the System Arbitrator,
but only following the conclusion of any appeal to the Appeals Panel, the
Commissioner shall be authorized to:
[...] (v) void any other transaction or agreement found to have violated Section
1 above.
For those found in violation of Section 2, the No Unauthorized Agreements section, the punishments can increase to the following:
● A fine of up to
$7.5 million* ⓘArticle XIII (Circumvention)
Section 3 (Penalties):
(b) Upon a finding of a violation of Section 2 above by the System Arbitrator,
but only following the conclusion of any appeal to the Appeals Panel, the
Commissioner shall be authorized to:
(i) impose a fine of up to $7,500,000 on any Team found to have committed
such violation (fifty percent (50%) of which shall be payable to the NBA,
and fifty percent (50%) of which shall be payable to the NBPA-Selected Charitable
Organization) [...]
● The forfeiture
of draft picks [note the absence of the singular - and
also the absence of the words first-round] ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 3 (Penalties):
(b) Upon a finding of a violation of Section 2 above by the System Arbitrator,
but only following the conclusion of any appeal to the Appeals Panel, the
Commissioner shall be authorized to:
[...] (ii) direct the forfeiture of draft picks [...]
● The potential voiding
of the relevant player contract ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 3 (Penalties):
(b) Upon a finding of a violation of Section 2 above by the System Arbitrator,
but only following the conclusion of any appeal to the Appeals Panel, the
Commissioner shall be authorized to:
[...] (iii) when both the player (or any person or entity acting with authority
on behalf of such player) and the Team (or Team Affiliate) are found to have
committed such violation, (A) void any Player Contract, or any Renegotiation,
Extension, or amendment of a Player Contract, between such player and such
Team, (B) impose a fine of up to $350,000, on any player (fifty percent (50%)
of which shall be payable to the NBA, and fifty percent (50%) of which shall
be payable to the NBPA-Selected Charitable Organization), and/or (C) prohibit
any future Player Contract, or any Renegotiation, Extension, or amendment
of a Player Contract, between such player and such Team [...]
● A fine for the
player of up to $350,000* ⓘArticle XIII (Circumvention)
Section 3 (Penalties):
(b) Upon a finding of a violation of Section 2 above by the System Arbitrator,
but only following the conclusion of any appeal to the Appeals Panel, the
Commissioner shall be authorized to:
[...] (iii) when both the player (or any person or entity acting with authority
on behalf of such player) and the Team (or Team Affiliate) are found to have
committed such violation, (A) void any Player Contract, or any Renegotiation,
Extension, or amendment of a Player Contract, between such player and such
Team, (B) impose a fine of up to $350,000, on any player (fifty percent (50%)
of which shall be payable to the NBA, and fifty percent (50%) of which shall
be payable to the NBPA-Selected Charitable Organization), and/or (C) prohibit
any future Player Contract, or any Renegotiation, Extension, or amendment
of a Player Contract, between such player and such Team [...]
● The prohibition
of any new or future contract between player and team ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 3 (Penalties):
(b) Upon a finding of a violation of Section 2 above by the System Arbitrator,
but only following the conclusion of any appeal to the Appeals Panel, the
Commissioner shall be authorized to:
[...] (iii) when both the player (or any person or entity acting with authority
on behalf of such player) and the Team (or Team Affiliate) are found to have
committed such violation, (A) void any Player Contract, or any Renegotiation,
Extension, or amendment of a Player Contract, between such player and such
Team, (B) impose a fine of up to $350,000, on any player (fifty percent (50%)
of which shall be payable to the NBA, and fifty percent (50%) of which shall
be payable to the NBPA-Selected Charitable Organization), and/or (C) prohibit
any future Player Contract, or any Renegotiation, Extension, or amendment
of a Player Contract, between such player and such Team [...]
● The suspension
for up to one year of any team personnel found to have engaged in the circumvention
ⓘArticle XIII (Circumvention) Section 3 (Penalties):
(b) Upon a finding of a violation of Section 2 above by the System Arbitrator,
but only following the conclusion of any appeal to the Appeals Panel, the
Commissioner shall be authorized to:
[...] (iv) suspend for up to one (1) year any Team personnel found to have
willfully engaged in such violation [...]
● Unless the player
is able to prove to the arbitrator that they were unaware of the cap circumvention,
the league can direct them to disgorge whatever benefits they
received from the third-party agreement (i.e. be forced to give up the benefits
and/or money received by the cap circumvention). ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 3 (Penalties):
(b) Upon a finding of a violation of Section 2 above by the System Arbitrator,
but only following the conclusion of any appeal to the Appeals Panel, the
Commissioner shall be authorized to:
[...] (v) void any transaction or agreement found to have violated Section
2 above and direct the disgorgement by the player of anything of value received
in connection with such transaction or agreement (except Compensation received
for services already performed pursuant to a Player Contract), unless the
player establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he was unaware
of the violation.
● If any agents were
involved, and the arbiter decides they committed a violation, the NBPA must
accept that finding as final and discipline the agent with at least a one-year
suspension of their certification ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 3 (Penalties):
(c) In any proceeding before the System Arbitrator in which it is alleged
that a player agent or other person or entity acting with authority on behalf
of a player has violated Section 2 above, the System Arbitrator shall make
a specific determination with respect to such allegation. If the System Arbitrator
finds such violation and such finding, if appealed, is affirmed by the Appeals
Panel, the System Arbitrator shall refer such finding to the Players Association,
which shall accept as binding and conclusive the finding(s) of the System
Arbitrator (or, in the case of an appeal, the Appeals Panel) that a violation
of Section 2(a) or 2(b) has occurred and shall consider such finding(s) as
establishing a violation of the Players Association’s regulations applicable
to such person or entity. The Players Association represents that it will
impose such discipline as is appropriate under the circumstances on the person
or entity found to have violated Section 2 above, and that it will promptly
notify the NBA of the discipline imposed; provided, however, that in no event
shall the penalty imposed upon a player agent found to have violated Section
2 above be less than a one-year suspension of that player agent’s certification
by the Players Association.
● The commissioner
also reserves the right to levy an additional fine of up to $1 million on
any team personnel found to have committed the Section 2 violation. Distinct
from the above, this $1 million fine can be imposed unilaterally, i.e. without
requiring findings of liability by an arbiter. ⓘArticle
XIII (Circumvention) Section 3 (Penalties):
(d) In addition to the authority conferred on the Commissioner pursuant to
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) above, the Commissioner shall be authorized to impose
a fine of up to $1,000,000 on any Team or Team personnel found by the Commissioner
to have violated Section 2 above. Any fine imposed pursuant to this Section
3(d) shall not require as a predicate any finding of, or proceeding before,
the System Arbitrator. In the event the Commissioner imposes such a fine,
the Players Association has the right to de novo review of the Commissioner’s
finding that a Section 2 violation occurred under the System Arbitration provisions
of Article XXXII. With respect to any fine imposed under this Section 3(d),
fifty percent (50%) shall be payable to the NBA and fifty percent (50%) shall
be payable to the NBPA-Selected Charitable Organization (as defined in Article
VI, Section 6(a)).
(* the proceeds of all fines are split evenly between the NBA and a charity fund chosen by the Player's Association)
It is not necessarily the case that all those punishments will be imposed. Rather, those are the options and the upper limits, to be utilised at the discretion of the NBA.
If there is an investigation into
possible rule-breaking (be it Sections 1 or 2, or both), the arbitrator can
require teams, players and affiliates to have over tax returns and financial
details, albeit with irrelevant details redacted and confidentiality assured.
ⓘArticle XIII (Circumvention) Section 4 (Production
of Tax Materials):
In any proceeding to enforce Section 1 or 2 above, the System Arbitrator shall
have the authority, upon good cause shown, to direct any Team, Team Affiliate,
or player to produce any tax returns or other relevant tax materials disclosing
income figures for the player (non-income figures may be redacted), or disclosing
expense figures by the Team or Team Affiliate (non-expense figures may be
redacted), which materials shall not be released to the general public or
the media and shall be treated as strictly confidential by all parties.
Teams can be found in violation of both Sections 1 and 2, therefore receiving punishments for both - for example, if a team knowingly underpays a player in a contract (a Section 1 violation, as it is conduct designed to circumvent the salary cap), and also secretly promises him an off-book endorsement deal with a sponsor (a Section 2 violation involving an unauthorized agreement). Alternatively, they can be found in violation of Section 1 only, in the event that their conduct violates both the broad spirit rule (Section 1) but not the specific side deal rule (Section 2).
The extent of the above penalties would be harder to fathom, perhaps, had it not already happened once before.
In the offseason between 1998 and 1999 - which, due to the lockout, was actually January 1999 - Joe Smith left the Philadelphia 76ers to sign with the Minnesota Timberwolves for the value of their Mid-Level exception (which at the time was $1.75 million). Smith and the Wolves made an under-the-table agreement that he would play under three consecutive one-year contracts at below market value, thus building up to full Bird rights (which take three seasons to fully accrue), whereafter the Timberwolves would use those Bird rights to sign Smith to a far larger contract beginning with the 2001-02 season.
Smith would re-sign with the Timberwolves in the summer of 1999 to a one year, $2.1 million contract, and would also re-sign in the summer of 2000 to a one year, $2.3 million contract, Unfortunately, right before the start of the 2000-01 season - which would have been Smiths third with the team - a written agreement to that effect was discovered. Smith and the Timberwolves had not just conspired to circumvent the salary cap, and knowingly underpaid Smith at a time when they could not afford it on the mutual agreement that they would knowingly overpay him later when they could - they had expressly written down that they were going to do it. (Refer back to Section 2(a)(i) above.)
This was the first instance in which the NBA had hard evidence in the form of a signed agreement, and then-commissioner David Stern utilized his powers of punishment in a big way. He fined the Timberwolves the then-maximum of $3.5 million, took away their next five first-round draft picks (two were later returned when the Wolves were deemed to have suffered enough), voided Smiths then-current contract, and forced Wolves owner Glen Taylor and general manager Kevin McHale to take leaves of absence. Smiths Bird right status was also revoked, and he would go on to sign with the Detroit Pistons instead.
To date, this is the only such piece of precedent in NBA history. It is a well-documented one, and it has operated as the deterrent that Stern was hoping it would be. Any team therefore found to be engaging in circumvention behavior cannot therefore in good faith claim to have been unaware of the powers of punishment that the league has at its disposal, and their precedent for using it.
The Kawhi Leonard thing
You will probably have heard about the investigation into whether the Los Angeles Clippers engaged in salary cap circumvention when
End-of-season certification
Whenever a player signs a contract,
extension, renegotiation or amendment - everything except a 10-day contract,
basically - the team official, the player, and the player’s agent must each
swear under penalty of perjury that everything the player is receiving from
the team or its affiliates is fully contained in the written contract. They
must also swear that there are no hidden agreements of any kind outside the
contract, including any promises about future contracts or extensions, any
extra compensation or benefits not written into the deal, or any investment
opportunities or business arrangements offered as an inducement to sign. The
idea is to eliminate any side deals or informal understandings that could
undermine salary cap rules or free agency rules. ⓘArticle
XV (Certifications) Section 1 (Contract Certification):
(a) Every Player Contract (other than a 10-Day Contract), or any
Renegotiation, Extension, or other amendment of a Player Contract, entered
into during the term of this Agreement shall be accompanied by a
certification, sworn to separately by (i) the person who executed the Player
Contract on behalf of the Team, (ii) the player, and (iii) any player agent who
negotiated the Contract on behalf of the player, under penalties of perjury,
that the Player Contract, Renegotiation, Extension, or other amendment sets
forth all components of a player’s Compensation from the Team or any
Team Affiliate, and that there are no agreements or transactions of any kind
(whether disclosed or undisclosed to the NBA), express or implied, oral or
written, or promises, undertakings, representations, commitments,
inducements, assurances of intent, or understandings of any kind (whether
disclosed or undisclosed to the NBA):
(i) concerning any future Renegotiation, Extension, or other
amendment of an existing Player Contract, or entry into a
new Player Contract; or
(ii) except as permitted by this Agreement or contained in such
Uniform Player Contract, involving compensation or
consideration of any kind or anything else of value to be
paid, furnished, or made available by, to, or for the benefit
of the player, or any person or entity controlled by, related
to, or acting with authority on behalf of the player; or
(iii) except as permitted by this Agreement, involving an
investment or business opportunity to be furnished or made
available by, to, or for the benefit of the player, or any person
or entity controlled by, related to, or acting with authority on
behalf of the player.
The same type of sworn certification
is required in certain trades involving players who are in the final year
of their contracts. Before the players contract is assigned (traded)
to another team, the player, the agent and the receiving team must certify
that there are no undisclosed agreements with the new team or its affiliates
concerning future contracts, extensions, renegotiations, compensation or any
other benefits or opportunities. This is meant to prevent teams from making
informal promises during trades that are not reflected in the official contract.
If the player later signs a new contract or extension within two years of
the trade, another certification must be filed confirming that no such hidden
agreements existed at the time of the original trade, and this follow-up certification
must be submitted within sixty days of the new agreement being executed. If
any of the required parties refuses or fails to provide a certification, the
NBA is given discretion to approve or reject the trade entirely. (In addition,
if the refusal comes from an agent, the players union is required to
take disciplinary action against that agent.) ⓘArticle
XV (Certifications) Section 2 (End of Season Certification):
(b) Prior to the assignment of any Player Contract of a player who is in
the last Salary Cap Year of the Contract (or the last Salary Cap Year before
the player or the Team has the right to terminate the Contract), the player,
the player’s agent, and the Team to which such Contract is to be assigned
shall each submit to the NBA a certification, sworn to under penalties of
perjury, that other than the Player Contract that has been assigned, or as
permitted by this Agreement, there are no agreements or transactions of any
kind (whether disclosed or undisclosed to the NBA), express or implied, oral
or written, or promises, undertakings, representations, commitments,
inducements, assurances of intent, or understandings of any kind (whether
disclosed or undisclosed to the NBA), between the player (or the player’s
agent or any person or entity controlled by or related to the player) and the
Team to which the Player Contract is to be assigned or a Team Affiliate of
the Team to which the Player Contract is to be assigned concerning (i) any
future Renegotiation, Extension, or other amendment of the Player
Contract that has been assigned, (ii) any future Player Contract, or (iii) an
investment or business opportunity or compensation or consideration of
any kind or anything else of value to be paid, furnished, or made available
by, to, or for the benefit of the player or any person or entity controlled by,
related to, or acting with authority on behalf of the player.
(c) If a player, within two (2) years after the assignment of such player’s
Player Contract, enters into a new Player Contract, or any Renegotiation,
Extension, or other amendment of the Player Contract that had been
assigned, the Team, the player, and the player’s agent shall each submit to
the NBA a certification, sworn to under penalties of perjury, that, at the time
of the assignment, other than the Player Contract that has been assigned, or
as permitted by this Agreement, there were no agreements or transactions
of any kind (whether disclosed or undisclosed to the NBA), express or
implied, oral or written, or promises, undertakings, representations,
commitments, inducements, assurances of intent, or understandings of any
kind (whether disclosed or undisclosed to the NBA), between the player (or
the player’s agent or any person or entity controlled by or related to the
player) and the Team to which the Player Contract has been assigned or a
Team Affiliate of the Team to which the Player Contract has been assigned
concerning (i) any future Renegotiation, Extension, or other amendment of
the Player Contract that has been assigned, (ii) any future Player Contract,
or (iii) an investment or business opportunity or compensation or
consideration of any kind or anything else of value to be paid, furnished, or
made available by, to, or for the benefit of the player or any person or entity
controlled by, related to, or acting with authority on behalf of the player.
Such certification shall be submitted to the NBA no later than sixty (60) days
following the execution of such new Player Contract, or any Renegotiation,
Extension, or other amendment of the Player Contract.
(d) If an agent, player, or Team fails or refuses to provide a certification
called for under this Article XV, the NBA shall have the option, in its sole
discretion, to approve or disapprove the transaction in question. In the case
of a failure or refusal by an agent, and whether the transaction in question is
approved or disapproved, the Players Association shall take appropriate
disciplinary action against the agent.
At the end of every season, the
governor and the lead basketball executive of every NBA team must certify
that, to the best of their knowledge, that they did not violate anti-tampering
rules, they did not violate prohibited negotiation rules, and they did not
receive league communications showing their team negotiated with free agents
illegally.The NBA then sends these certifications to the NBPA. If somebody
lies on one of these certifications, the NBA or a team can pursue a perjury
complaint. ⓘArticle XV (Certifications)
Section 2 (End of Season Certification):
(a) At the conclusion of each NBA Season, a Governor (or Alternate Governor)
and the executive primarily responsible for basketball operations on behalf
of the Team shall each submit to the NBA a certification, sworn to under penalties
of perjury, that the Team has not, to the extent of their knowledge after
reasonable inquiry, (i) violated the terms of Article XIV, Section 1, (ii)
violated the terms of Article XIII, Section 2, nor (iii) received from the
NBA League Office any communication disclosing that an NBA Team has negotiated
with any Free Agent prior to the execution of a Player Contract with that
player. Upon receipt of each such certification, the NBA shall forward a copy
of the certification to the Players Association.
(b) A violation of this Section 2 may be deemed evidence of a violation of
Article XIV, Section 1 or Article XIII, Section 2.
Article XV (Certifications) Section 3 (False Certification):
Any criminal complaint of perjury filed by the NBA or any Team based upon
a certification required pursuant to Section 1 above shall be against the
player, the player’s agent, and the Team official making such certification.
MAIN TAKEAWAYS:
- Teams cannot make side deals to avoid the salary cap, rookie scale, free agency rules, etc.
- Teams cannot disguise basketball pay as a business partnership (like a sponsor overpaying a player for an endorsement when really it is just hidden salary).
- Teams cannot give financial inducements to players who are not under contract, unless the CBA specifically allows it.
- If they do, the punishments can be severe.