Frank Kaminsky

Frank Kaminsky
PF/C - 7’0, 242lbs - 25 years old - 3 years of experience

On the plus side, this was the year that Kaminsky, a supposed stretch big from day one, finally learned to stretch the floor. After not cracking 34% from three-point range during his first two seasons, Kaminsky got that up to 38.0% this season, and is a high scorer per minute. He hunts his shot, handles well for his size, drives the paint, and played well after the All-Star break, which bodes well for the future.

On the downside is pretty much everything else. A non-factor defensively who defends neither the four spot (where he mostly plays) or the five spot (where he is just attacked all night) well, Kaminsky also rebounds very poorly for a seven footer. He does not want the interior grind, the contact, the physicality, and he has not the foot speed to rebound much out of his area or defend the perimeter. Any rebounds are incidental rather than purposeful.

The last few bits there will always be true. He’s not going to get longer. He’s not going to get much stronger. He’s not going to become a shot blocker. He’s not going to become a rebounder. He’s not going to get quicker, and he is very unlikely to suddenly start wanting contact. He is going to have to make it as a scorer. And so he is going to need to continue to improve his skill level. That means more consistent outside jumpers, considerably better mid-range shooting (he should not plan to take many but he needs to at least hit them), learn to finish better with contact, uses fewer ball fakes (they really don’t seem to help much) and making any non-point blank shot in the paint, and be able to create more with the handle that right now looks OK but does not get him hugely far.

And more than anything, he needs to get much, much more consistent.

Player Plan: One year of rookie scale salary remaining. Extension eligible but there seems to be no reason to go that route. Kaminsky is an asset to the team, warts and all, but it is hard to imagine life as a starter anywhere. Act accordingly.

Frank Kaminsky
PF/C, 7’0, 242lbs, 24 years old, 2 years of experience

Had a couple of good stretches during the season, yet this season will go down in the record books as a sub-40% shooting season. Nevertheless, given that he will never be a rebounder or defender at this level with his lack of explosion, slow foot speed, short arms and lack of toughness, the shots are going to still need to go up. Walker is a pick-and-pop player, and Kaminsky should be one down the road, but the consistent range is still yet to develop (and perhaps will do with a healthy shoulder). As he plays more and more at the power forward spot, the question of whether he has the foot speed to keep up with the pace half of the pace-and-space league becomes increasingly legitimate.

Player Plan: Two years of rookie scale remaining. Needs further development. Does not appear to carry much trade value until then. With Howard in toe, he’s going to need to play power forward going forward. He largely already did, but not very well.

At the 2016 NBA Draft, a few trades occurred, and some others were agreed upon that for salary cap purposes only were fully finalised two weeks later. This is all normal.

Quite a few of these trades involved draft picks, picks for both that year and the future, and quite a few of those draft picks were first rounders. This is also normal.

The perceived value of them, however, was abnormally inconsistent.

#12 pick Taurean Prince was traded by the Utah Jazz in a three team deal that netted them George Hill straight up.

#13 pick Georgios Papagiannis was combined by the Phoenix Suns with #28 pick Skal Labissiere and 2014 #27 pick Bogdan Bogdanovic, then shipped to the Sacramento Kings for #8 pick Marquese Chriss.

#20 pick Caris LeVert was traded by the Indiana Pacers, along with a future second round pick (protected 45th through 60th from 2017 to 2022 and only thereafter unprotected, thereby almost certainly ensuring the pick will be a high second rounder), to the Brooklyn Nets in exchange for Thaddeus Young.

#21 pick Malachi Richardson was traded by the Charlotte Hornets to the Sacramento Kings in exchange for Marco Belinelli.

And finally, #31 pick Devonta Davis and #38 Rade Zagorac pick were combined by the Boston Celtics and sent to the Memphis Grizzlies in exchange for a 2019 first round pick, protected through the first eight picks.

In summation, the #12 pick had seemingly enough value to obtain a very high quality starting point guard in the prime of his career, while the pick immediately after it had to be packaged with two other first rounders just to move up five spots in a weak draft. Similarly, while admittedly packaged with a likely decent second rounder, the #20 pick was deemed sufficiently good to get Young, a valuable and versatile contributor in the prime of his career with at least two years to run on his contract, whereas the pick below it yielded only Belinelli, a journeyman backup shooting guard on an expiring contract who, while fine, is demonstrably less effective than Young as an NBA player, and who was coming off of the worst season he has had since his rookie campaign.

Notwithstanding the oddness of some of those trades – we see above the unlikely situation whereby Sacramento made off with tremendous value, while Memphis clearly wanted the immediacy of Davis’s few minutes to forego the fact that 2019 is the year their Grit and Grind core will have pretty much run its course, and that is the best year for them to have picks in – the inconsistency of their yields despite being traded at the same time speaks to a wobbling value of first round picks in the NBA, one that is increasingly difficult to determine.

Come draft time, however, a first rounder has leverage. Or at least, it seems that it can do on that pick’s date of reckoning, the draft night on which it goes from asset to player rights.

The trade of Chriss speaks to one thing that seems to crop up every year. If a team really, really wants a player, and is not convinced that that player will fall to their own draft selection (whether that fear be justified or not), any team picking a few spots before them can agree to pick that player - or take a calculated gamble and pick that player in the hopes that a future trade will be forthcoming – and then dangle them.

In wanting to trade up, Phoenix had little to no leverage; in knowing they wanted that, Sacramento could be quite demanding, and seemingly were. This practice is fairly common, or at least not that uncommon. The Boston Celtics once allegedly offered six picks to the Hornets for the 2015 #9 pick that eventually became Frank Kaminsky. But Charlotte resisted that package and kept the pick (which Boston supposedly would have used on Justise Winslow instead) in favour of taking Kaminsky for themselves. Boston’s love for one player was somehow worth six picks, yet Charlotte’s love for one player was somehow worth even more than that. Seemingly, on draft night itself, and when specific players are on deck, immediate first round draft picks are ridiculously precious.