Qualifying Offers = Lies

If your team didn't agree to an extension with its starlet young player this past offseason - such as is the case with the Atlanta duo of Josh Childress and Josh Smith, the Chicago duo of Luol Deng and Ben Gordon, amongst others - then you've probably experienced a modicum of conversation as to whether that player will take the one year qualifying offer this offseason rather than the security of a long term deal, leaving the distinct possibility that your team will lose a key player and important asset, for jack shit in return. Talk of this possiblity happening is particularly widespread in the case of Gordon, who hasn't done much to deny it.

Let me half-arsedly set your mind at rest - it's really not that likely.

Or rather, it should be really unlikely. It might happen, but history suggests that it shouldn't. This is a list of all the rookie scale players to have accepted the fifth year qualifying offer in recent times, accompanied by a headshot for no reason other than cosmetics.



Melvin Ely

Season before free agency: 9.8 points, 4.9 rebounds, 51% shooting
Season spent on Qualifying Offer: 3.0 points, 1.8 rebounds, 36% shooting
Season after that: 3.9 points, 2.8 rebounds, 47% shooting


Melvin Ely is crap. He has had one year of non-crapness in 7 attempts. That one season was, conveniently, the final one of his rookie contract. Never justifying his draft position, this one year gave Ely the chance to make a bit of money, especially given that this was probably his only other chance at a multi-year contract. (Ely was 28 at the time, after joining the league at age 24. No one seems to remember this.) Ely took Charlotte's one year QO of $3,308,615 (which may or may not have been the only contract that they offered) in preference to taking Phoenix's multi year offer, or one from the Warriors.

Ely then played like his usual wank, and is now on a minimum salary contract with the Hornets.





Vladimir Radmanovic

Season before free agency: 11.8 points, 4.6 rebounds, 41% shooting
Season spent on Qualifying Offer: 9.8 points, 4.6 rebounds, 41% shooting
Season after that: 6.6 points, 3.3 rebounds, 42% shooting


Seattle dodged one hell of a bullet here, when Radmanovic turned down their exceedingly generous offer of a 6 year, $42 million. Why he did this, I don't know. Maybe he thought he was worth more. Or maybe he just hated Seattle. Either way, Seattle reacted, dealing him to the L.A. Clippers for Chris Wilcox, a far better player whom they managed to re-sign for half of what Radmanovic turned down.

Radmanovic did manage to somehow coerce a full MLE contract from the L.A. Lakers, a contract which totalled 5 years and $30.427 million. But, when combined with his qualifying offer of roughly $3.1 millionish, Radmanovic managed to lose almost $10 million on the deal, as well as save Rick Sund from himself.





Mickael Pietrus

Season before free agency: 11.1 points, 4.5 rebounds, 49% shooting
Season spent on Qualifying Offer: 7.1 points, 3.7 rebounds, 44% shooting
Season after that: N/A


Pietrus has always been a very flawed player, but with the onset of the new Warriors system under Don Nelson, many of these were able to be reasonably well covered up. In the fourth season of his rookie deal, Pietrus turned in comfortably the best season of his four year career, and was courted heavily by Miami. His agent claims to have had four teams offer their full MLE to Pietrus, which makes it odd that he didn't take any of them.

In the end, Pietrus was stuck with the one year, $3,470,771 qualifying offer from Golden State. From there, the inevitable has happened - he has regressed. His stats are backwards, his weaknesses are no better than they were, and his team just missed the playoffs. Suddenly, Pietrus's package seems less attractive. (Giggidy.)





Stromile Swift

Season before free agency: 9.4 points, 4.9 rebounds, 47% shooting, 1.5 blocks
Season spent on Qualifying Offer: 10.1 points, 4.6 rebounds, 45% shooting, 1.5 blocks
Season after that: 8.9 points, 4.4 rebounds, 49% shooting, 0.8 blocks


Two key things to remember with Stromile's choice to sign the QO:

1) It was for $6.2 million, more than he would have gotten on the open market for the first season of any contract.
2) Memphis made it clear that they would match anything, and wouldn't entertain many sign and trade offers.
3) He really, really didn't want to be there.

(That's three things, but you get the idea.)

Financially, Stromile either breaks about even by turning down the QO and signing a four year MLE deal (which was the deal he signed with Houston after the QO year expired), or he's maybe even slightly ahead on the deal. Unlike most players, his play didn't decline under the QO, and while his numbers have suffered slightly in the last three years, his play remains pretty good.

He did not get his wish for getting out of Memphis, though, as he was traded back there after only one season in Houston. Tough break.






Aaaaaand........that's everyone this decade. I would go back further and include players such as Michael Olowokandi (a pretty resounding example of why not to turn down extensions), but it becomes too difficult to find the right numbers, so I won't. Those 4 are the only rookie scale players to have taken the qualifying offer since the year 2000.

They're 1-4, with only Swift making the right move. (This is unless Pietrus is ridiculously, insanely fortunate.)



First off, it's pretty obvious that 4 people in 4 drafts is not a huge amount of people to accept the qualifying offer. That goes without saying, given that 124 people were drafted in the first round of those 4 drafts. But I said it anyway.

Secondly, note that the one to have made a decent decision to take the qualifying offer was a second overall pick, which had a huge impact on the size of the offer in question. For reference's sake, here is a list of all the qualifying offers for those fourth year rookie scale players from the 2004 draft who did not get extensions:


Emeka Okafor: $7,082,635
Ben Gordon: $6,404,749
Shaun Livingston: $5,809,705
Josh Childress: $4,844,355
Luol Deng: $4,452,574
Andre Iguodala: $3,800,625
Andres Biedrins: $3,609,636
Robert Swift: $3,579,131
Sebastian Telfair: $3,543,834
Kirk Snyder: $3,313,598
Josh Smith: $3,167,882
J.R. Smith: $3,028,241
Dorell Wright: $2,910,104
Delonte West: $2,762,828
Tony Allen: $2,744,299
Sasha Vujacic: $2,605,559
David Harrison: $2,601,474

(Everyone else either got an extension, or have already been waived.)


Not all of these players will get a qualifying offer, because the team does not want them for that price, or indeed any price. In two cases (Swift and Livingston), the qualifying offer might actually be an advisable route, given the serious injuries from which both are struggling to recover. But only in a few cases is the qualifying offer of a significant threat to be a viable option: Emeka Okafor (who turned down a 5 year, $60 million eztension), Ben Gordon (who turned down a 5 year, $50 million extension), and maybe some of the lower players (Allen, Telfair).

Bizarrely, Okafor and Gordon have both had worse years since turning those extensions, which could mean anything. It could make them more likely to take the security while they can still get it, or it could make them more liable to have a third attempt at a successful contract year push.

The other factor here is the deep free agent class, that affects everybody in this list. Pessimists theorise that this may mean more players take the one year QO and make themselves available for the 2009 free agent market instead. Optimists might say that instead, because of the lack of money out there, those offers from their current teams suddenly look alot more lucrative and sensible. You can probably guess which of those two schools of thought I subscribe to.

Either way, it's extremely difficult to imagine those two (plus others, such as Deng and Iguodala) turning down $50+ million, twice. Especially since they haven't done anything to justify turning it down once.




HALF BAKED CONCLUSION FROM HALF-ARSED ANALYSIS:

There is not a lot of recent history on which to deduce whether taking the qualifying offer is a wise/probable decision or not. This, in itself, is indicative of the fact that it's a highly unlikely scenario. And when what little precedent there is shows the move to be a generally unwise one, that only reaffirms the idea that the likelhood of a player choosing to accept the qualifying really is nothing to fear.

Well, except for the two UConn boys.

30 teams in 36 or so days: Golden State

Golden State

Players acquired via free agency or trade:

Austin Croshere (one year minimum)
Troy Hudson (one year minimum)
Kosta Perovic (previous draft pick, 3 years, $5.832 million)




Players acquired via draft:

First round: Brandon Wright (8th overall), Marco Belinelli (18th overall)
Second round: Stephane Lasme (46th overall)



Players retained:

Matt Barnes (re-signed, 1 year, $3 million), Kelenna Azubuike (re-signed, 2 year minimum)




Players departed:

Sarunas Jasikevicius (bought out, to sign in Europe), Adonal Foyle (bought out, signed with Orlando), Mickael Pietrus (unsigned, restricted, will probably re-sign but I didn't know which category to put it in), Zarko Cabarkapa (left unrestricted, unsigned), Josh Powell (left unrestricted, signed with Clippers), Jason Richardson (traded to Charlotte)





Bobbins:

I would like to extend a hearty apology to Golden State Warriors Vice President of Basketball Operations, Chris Mullin. In the early part of his time as GM (I'm not typing "Vice President of Basketball Operations" every time, "GM" will do), I ragged on the bastard somewhat mercilessly for his personel moves. And it seemed justified. Inheriting a pretty poor team. Mullin did not do much to improve that, but did spend over a quarter of a billion dollars on re-signing his core players. In an 18 month period from his hiring in April 2004 to October 2005, Mullin gave out enormous contracts to Mike Dunleavy Jr, Jason Richardson, Troy Murphy, Adonal Foyle and Derek Fisher, contracts which totalled a mindboggling $261 million for only 5 players (two of whom came off the bench). The only surprise was that he didn't give a similarly insane contract to Erick Dampier, a free agent who did get an oversized contract, but with Dallas.

Mullin's excessive spending forced him to then cut some salary, making moves such as having to deal a first round pick along with Eduardo Najera to Denver for next to nothing, just to be able to avoid the tax threshold. He pigeon-holed himself into a corner, having to sacrifice assets to keep within budget, all for a late lottery team. Things were looking bleak, and some people questioned (rather harshly) whether Chris had gotten back on the drink. Those people will go to hell, partly for their poor ethics, but also for just not being funny.

But Chris Mullin and the Golden State Warriors will not go to hell. Somehow - and this surprises no one more than it does me - Mullin has turned the situation around. The contracts of all of the above players have been gotten rid of (while Foyle is still being paid for three more years, his buyout leaves the Warriors paying a not-too-excessive amount to him, and the 30%-ish savings make the buyout an entirely worthwhile venture), and the only questionable contracts remaining are those of Stephen Jackson, Al Harrington and Baron Davis. And in even, in all three instances there, a case could be made that each player is receiving market value, or only a small amount above it.

The Warriors now have the league's 29th highest payroll (not counting Pietrus), which, when phrased more sensibly, means that they have the second lowest payroll around. Players such as Andris Biedrins and Monta Ellis still have big pay days yet to come, but Golden State is now in a position where they can pay the players that deserve big pay days, because they have freed themselves of the players that didn't.

Not just shedding payroll, Mullin has continued to bring in quality players, making very good draft selections such as Biedrins and Ellis to go along with minimum salary finds such as Matt Barnes and Big Lenny Sambuca. He has cleaned out the crap that previously permeated his roster, and continued to pack it with prospects.

And it all began with the can't-miss Baron Davis deal, in which Mullin traded Speedy Claxton and Dale Davis's expiring contract to New Orleans for Davis, who has since had a rebirth of sorts under new Warriors head coach Don Nelson. Despite the occasional slip-up (drafting Patrick O'Bryant and the Mike Montgomery era to name but two), it's been relatively all gravy since then, and the Warriors boast a young and

So well played, Mr Mullin sir. You join an elite group of GM's who can undo previous mistakes without making future ones, and therefore now have distinct seperation between yourself and the McHale/Thomas's of this world. Congratulations.


Now that all that bumlicking is out of the way, let's use less general terms and stick to this past offseason. A relatively tame one given the venom with which it began, Mullin added to his young talent on draft night by obtaining Brandan Wright, Marco Belinelli and Stephane Lasme, all of whom have joined the Warriors straight away. The big savings opened up by moving the salary of Jason Richardson - who was becoming largely expendable away - allow the Warriors more of the previously mentioned financial flexibility that they now enjoy. And as a result, the Warriors can boast a young core that rivals or surpasses that of most other teams in the NBA. They have at least one young talent at every position - often two - with a team crafted to be playoff calbire now, yet even better in the future.

Most importantly, they retained Don Nelson. A frowned-upon signing at the time, Nelson gave the young Warriors team something that they never had before - an identity. They quickly became a fast paced team with a flowing offensive system, not entirely unlike the system previously employed by Nelson during his time at Dallas. This team became one of the better stories in the NBA last year, and scored an upset for ages when they beat Dallas in round one, becoming the first #8 seed to beat a #1 seed in a seven-game series. Which was fun. Where I live, we have an expression for that: "f'in creamed the bastards".

It came apart in the second round, but it still marked a successful season for the franchise, the first for a hell of a long time.

This offseason was of building upon that, to decent effect. The Kevin Garnett whispers came to nothing, but then, that was somewhat expected. You could say that it's something of a disappointment as a fan to hear that Kevin Garnett might be coming to town, yet you wind up with Austin Croshere instead. It's a fair point. But the Warriors have not disappointed in any way, improving their roster slightly and upgrading for the future, while keeping the coach that made last season one to remember.

And what's more, they signed Troy Hudson. I mean, WOW!

(OK, so now I'm taking the piss. But the rest stands.)



Next season:

There is no real reason to suggest that the strategy that got the Warriors to the playoffs last season would not be successful once again. And with only one significant change in the rotation taking place, the Warriors have good continuity going into next season, not least from the return of Nelson. The loss of Jason Richardson should be reasonably offset by the continued improvement of Monta Ellis, the addition of Marco Belinelli (and no I'm not making the obvious surname comparison between him and Don Nelson), and the re-positioning of Stephen Jackson.

Whether the Warriors have the multi-dimensionalness to beat most teams in the playoffs is another question. The addition of Brandan Wright should help their rebounding problem (the Warriors sported the worst rebounding deficiency in the NBA last season, at -5.0), but they remain a poor rebounding and defensive team, once again relying too much upon Andris Biedrins's foul situation to win games. And as any old fart will tell you, these things count double in the playoffs.

Still, win lose or draw, the Warriors and Nellieball will be as entertaining as ever. They won't replicate the storybook nature of last season, but they figure to have a similar level of success, Still outgunned and outsized in the stronger West, the Warriors aren't a home court advantage team, but they're in a better situation for the future than most of their peers.

And it's mainly down to Chris Mullin. Jesus. That's something I'd never thought I would say.